Overview

This paper proposes a symmetric cipher, which I name Bähêm, with the following properties:

**Practical:** Requires pre-sharing only a 128-bits key.

**Provably secure:** No cryptanalysis can degrade its security below $\min[H(m), H(k)]$ bits of entropy, even under Grover’s algorithm [1] or even if it turned out that $P = NP$.

**Simple:** Encryption, and decryption alike, is performed in a single round comprised of two additions and one bitwise exclusive-or operation (XOR). A session key is generated once with a single addition. Should computers cease to exist, encryption and decryption can be performed by hand with a pen, a paper and some fair coins, with relative ease.

**Fast:** Runs fast on common hardware. Its early single-threaded implementation achieved similar run-time speeds to OpenSSL’s ChaCha20 [2]. Faster speed is easily doable with parallelism and better true random number generator (TRNG) optimisations.

This comes at a usually-negligible cost of having an approximately $2m$-bit ciphertext output for a $m$-bit cleartext input; since space is usually not a bottleneck for most applications.

Bähêm is the only symmetric cipher to-date that is practical and provably secure. Other ciphers are only one of them, but not both. For example, the one-time pad (OTP) is provably secure but usually impractical, as it requires pre-sharing a key that is as large as the message to encrypt. On the other hand, state of art ciphers, such as ChaCha20 or AES [3], are practical but not provably secure.

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1 Author’s e-mail address: {last name}@pm.me. Public key: EF91FF90DF73A9D76E4841C76D5CB15E7E909C309B307B ED15BF4E1183B6B9903FA784147E87F166F93B002803B99 C0C72C479C253E5DFA5D6BDF320DC0EDBDA.

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Declarations

All data used in this study is included in this paper. The latest version of this paper can be found here, and the latest version of the implementation can be found here.

Notation

H(x): Shannon’s entropy of random variable x.

x + y mod 2128: Unsigned 128-bit addition.

random(128): 128 bits generated by a TRNG.

k: 128-bit pre-shared secret key. Must seem random and uniformly distributed with large enough H(k). Ideally, k = random(128).

m: A cleartext message of |m| many bits.

⌈|m|/128⌉: Number of 128-bit blocks in cleartext m.

mb: The bth 128-bit block from m. In other words: m0∥m1∥...∥mb∥...∥m⌈|m|/128⌉ = m.

s = random(128): Session key.

pb = random(128): Pad key of the bth block.

ŝ, p̂b, ˆmb: Encrypted s, pb and mb, respectively.

Contents

1 Introduction

State of art symmetric ciphers, such as ChaCha20 or AES, are attractive for their practicality (requiring only a small, say, a 256-bit key to pre-share). Their security is probable, but not provable, which is supported by the failure of the many attempts to break them so far.

However, it remains unknown whether they are actually secure. It is even unknown if it is possible for a function in their class to exist, since it remains unknown whether P ≠ NP. This uncertainty about their security is quite risky, as encrypted sensitive data is often exposed over public networks. Should such ciphers be discovered to be broken, the previously encrypted data are effectively exposed. In other words, such ciphers offer the following trade-off:

Trade-off 1 (State of art). Enjoy pre-sharing in advance only a small key |k| = 256, and |ˆm| = |m|. In return give up provable security.

On the other hand, Shannon’s OTP is more than just provably secure, as it satisfies the higher criteria of having perfect secrecy; that is, no cryptanalysis can degrade its security below H(m) many bits.

However, the OTP is usually impractical as it requires the communicating parties to exchange keys that are as large as the size of the messages that they will be exchanging in the future. This often implies the necessity to exchange many gigabytes, or terabytes, of true random bits in advance of the communication, which is too difficult to satisfy with most application scenarios. In other words, OTP offers the following trade-off:

Trade-off 2 (OTP). Enjoy H(m)-bit provable security, and |ˆm| = |m|. In return pre-share in advance a random pad that is as large as the size of the sum of all messages that you will be exchanging in the future. For example, it could be that |k| > 8 × 1012 (terabytes).

Due to OTP’s impractically, most applications choose to rather adopt the practically secure (but not provably) ciphers like ChaCha20 or AES, in order to avoid the unscalable constraint of having to exchange large random bits in advance of their communication.

Bähem offers a unique trade-off in order to save provable security, while maintaining practicality for most applications. Specifically:

Trade-off 3 (Bähem). Enjoy pre-sharing in advance only a 128-bit key, and a min[H(m), H(k)]-bit provable security. In return |ˆm| ≈ 2|m|.
Trade-off 3 is quite interesting as it does not require excessive planning in advance (as in the OTP case) with a compromise that is only a polynomial increase in space, which is highly tolerable in most real world scenarios, or even unnoticeable.

Common applications, such as instant messaging, emails, monetary transactions, password databases, etc, often exchange small enough data that effectively make the use of Bähem unnoticeable from an end user perspective.

The tests in section 4 show that the run-time difference between Alyal’s Bähem and OpenSSL’s ChaCha20 implementations are extremely similar when encrypting and decrypting a 500 megabytes file, supporting that Bähem’s space overhead is negligible in practice.

2 Proposed Algorithm: Bähem

Algorithms 1 and 2 show Bähem’s encryption and decryption by which the process is repeated over every 128-bit blocks of \(m\): \(m_0, m_1, \ldots, m_{\lfloor|m|\rfloor}\).

The reason for choosing a 128-bit block is only for its implementation simplicity with common hardware. An \(|m|\)-bit block could be more suitable for the pen and paper method.

Communicating peers do not have to exchange a new session key \(s\) with every message that they send. It suffices them to exchange it only with their first message, and then re-use it indefinitely.

Algorithms 1 and 2 are as follows.

**Algorithm 1: Bähem Encryption**

```
input : k, m_0, m_1, \ldots
output: \(\hat{s}, (\hat{p}_0, \hat{m}_0), (\hat{p}_1, \hat{m}_1), \ldots\)
```

\[
s \leftarrow \text{random}(128)
\]

\[
\hat{s} \leftarrow s \mod 2^{128}
\]

\[
\text{for } b \in (0, 1, \ldots, \lfloor |m| \rfloor - 1) \text{ do}
\]

\[
p_b \leftarrow \text{random}(128)
\]

\[
\hat{p}_b \leftarrow p_b \mod 2^{128}
\]

\[
\hat{m}_b \leftarrow m_b \oplus (p_b + s \mod 2^{128})
\]

**Algorithm 2: Bähem Decryption**

```
input : k, \(\hat{s}, (\hat{p}_0, \hat{m}_0), (\hat{p}_1, \hat{m}_1), \ldots\)
output: m_0, m_1, \ldots
```

\[
s \leftarrow \hat{s} - k \mod 2^{128}
\]

\[
\text{for } b \in (0, 1, \ldots, \lfloor |m| \rfloor - 1) \text{ do}
\]

\[
p_b \leftarrow \hat{p}_b - k \mod 2^{128}
\]

\[
m_b \leftarrow \hat{m}_b \oplus (p_b + s \mod 2^{128})
\]

3 Security Analysis

The Bähem encryption is a variation of Shannon’s OTP, the XOR cryptosystem:

\[
\hat{m}_b \leftarrow m_b \oplus (p_b + s \mod 2^{128})
\]

It trivially follows from Shannon’s perfect secrecy proof of the OTP [4] that Bähem is secure if its encryption pad maintains its security.

To simplify the analysis, suppose that the size of a block in Bähem is 3 bits only, and that the cleartext block \(m_b\) is known to the adversary, which implies that the adversary can trivially know that:

\[
p_b + s \mod 2^3 = \hat{m}_b \oplus m_b
\]

in addition to adversary’s knowledge of the public variables \(s\) and \(\hat{p}_b\). More specifically, suppose that the adversary found that:

\[
0 = \hat{s} = s + k \mod 2^3
\]

\[
3 = \hat{p}_b = p_b + k \mod 2^3
\]

\[
5 = \hat{m}_b \oplus m_b = p_b + s \mod 2^3
\]

Then, the question is: will this information reduce the space from which the key \(k\) is chosen from? In other words, what are the possible values of \(k\) that can lead to the outputs 0, 3 and 5 above? Table 1 visualises this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(x)</th>
<th>(y)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Exhaustive unsigned 3-bit addition. For a given output \(x + y \mod 2^3\), there are \(2^3\) many possible input values of \((x, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}\) that map to \(x + y \mod 2^3\).

As shown in table 1, the total number of horizontal, or vertical, intersections that simultaneously cross all of the outputs 0, 3 and 5, remain \(2^3\). Meaning, the total number of values of \(k\) that could lead to the outputs remains \(2^3\).

This 3-bit example can be trivially extended by induction to show that the same conclusions hold even
with a 128-bit unsigned addition and any other output numbers than 0, 3 and 5.

Therefore, we can conclude that adversary’s knowledge of the public variables \( \hat{s}, \hat{p}_b, \hat{m}_b \) and the cleartext \( m_b \), which leads to deducing \( p_b + s \mod 2^{128} \), cannot not reduce the space from which \( k, s \) and \( p_b \) are sampled.

If \( k, s \) and \( p_b \) are generated by a TRNG, then any of the \( 2^{128} \) many possibilities are equally likely to correspond to the actual values of \( k, s \) and \( p_b \). In other words:

\[
H(k, s, p_b | \hat{s}, \hat{p}_b, \hat{m}_b, m_b) = 128
\]

However, since \( k \) could be derived from a password, such that it looks random, but with an entropy \( H(k) \leq 128 \), and since finding any of the numbers \( k, s \) and \( p_b \) deterministically leads to finding the others, therefore it follows that:

\[
H(k, s, p_b | \hat{s}, \hat{p}_b, \hat{m}_b, m_b) = H(k)
\]

The numbers \( s \) and \( p_b \) are generated by a TRNG by definition, therefore the weakest element in the chain can only be \( k \).

Since the public variables \( \hat{s}, \hat{p}_b \) and \( \hat{m}_b \), and the cleartext \( m_b \) are exhaustively all of the outputs of \( \text{Bähêm} \) that can be accessible to an adversary, and since they can not reduce \( \text{Bähêm}'s \) private variables’ space below \( H(k) \), therefore no cryptanalysis can reduce their entropy below \( H(k) \).

**Lemma 1** (Secure private values).

\[
H(k, s, p_b | \hat{s}, \hat{p}_b, \hat{m}_b, m_b) = H(k)
\]

It is trivially implied from lemma 1 that, since the private values \( s \) and \( p_b \) maintain an entropy of \( H(k) \), so does their 128-bit summation \( s + p_b \mod 2^{128} \), which is \( \text{Bähêm}'s \) XOR encryption pad. Therefore, \( \text{Bähêm}'s \) encryption pad has to be secure as well.

**Lemma 2** (Secure encryption pad).

\[
H(s + p_b \mod 2^{128} | \hat{s}, \hat{p}_b, \hat{m}_b) = \min[H(m_b), H(k)]
\]

Since \( \text{Bähêm} \) is an XOR cryptosystem, and since its encryption pad is \( H(k) \)-bits secure (lemma 2), therefore it necessarily follows by Shannon’s perfect secrecy [4] that \( \text{Bähêm}'s \) encryption is either \( H(k) \)-bits secure, or \( H(m_b) \)-bits secure, whichever is smaller.

**Theorem 1** (Secure encryption).

\[
H(m_b | \hat{s}, \hat{p}_b, \hat{m}_b) = \min[H(m_b), H(k)]
\]

4  **Benchmark**

This is a benchmark that was performed on a computer with a 3.4GHz Intel Core i5-3570K CPU, 32GB RAM, 7200 RPM hard disks, Linux 5.17.4-gentoo x86-64, OpenSSL 1.1.1n and Alyal v3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OpenSSL</th>
<th>Alyal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ChaCha20</td>
<td>/dev/random file.rand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500MB Encrypt</td>
<td>0.90 secs</td>
<td>2.58 secs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500MB Decrypt</td>
<td>1.06 secs</td>
<td>2.60 secs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.04 secs</td>
<td>2.58 secs</td>
<td>1.35 secs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Wall-clock run-time comparison between OpenSSL’s ChaCha20, and Alyal’s Bähêm implementation with two sources as the TRNG: /dev/random and file.rand; the latter is simply /dev/random that was prepared in advance.

Table 2 shows that, while the early Bähêm prototype, Alyal, has a faster decryption run-time than OpenSSL’s ChaCha20, it has a slower encryption run-time. However:

1. The differences in run-time are insignificant for most applications, which proves Bähêm’s practical utility in the real world.

2. Bähêm’s provable security should arguably justify waiting the extra seconds, or fractions of seconds in case the TRNG is prepared in advance, for the 500MB data, specially that many user applications involve encrypting much smaller data sizes with unnoticeable time difference.

3. Preparing the random bits in advance significantly reduces the encryption time as shown with the file.rand case in table 2, and can be optimised further should it be prepared in memory.

4. Alyal is currently single-threaded despite Bähêm’s capacity for high parallelism as all blocks are independent. This gives room for future versions to be significantly faster.

5  **Conclusions**

This paper described Bähêm; a provably-secure, yet practical, symmetric cipher. Bähêm’s variation of Shannon’s OTP, where the one-time pad is securely derived from a 128-bit pre-shared key, in a way to
solve OTP’s key impracticality of requiring a pre-shared key that is as large as the sum of all message to encrypt in the future. The trade-off of Bähêm is practically quite negligible as confirmed by benchmarks presented in this paper, which is that the ciphertext is approximately twice as large as the cleartext.

References


A Implementation Examples

A.1 C Functions

Listings 1 and 2 show example C functions for encrypting and decrypting session keys.

Listings 3 and 4 show the same but for encrypting and decrypting cleartext and ciphertext blocks, respectively.

In these examples, all encryptions and decryptions happen in-place whenever possible, so the caller does not have to allocate separate memory for the output. The only exception is listing 1, where the unencrypted session key is required to encrypt the subsequent cleartext blocks. Also, since 128-bit wide CPU instructions are not common, the examples operate in 64-bit basis, each time with a different 64-bit part of the pre-shared and session keys.

Listing 1: Session key encryption function example.

```c
void baheem_session_enc(
    uint64_t *k, /* pre-shared key */
    uint64_t *s, /* session key */
    uint64_t *s_enc /* encrypted s */
) {
    s_enc[0] = s[0] + k[0];
    s_enc[1] = s[1] + k[1];
}
```

Listing 2: Session key decryption function example.

```c
void baheem_session_dec(
    uint64_t *k, /* pre-shared key */
    uint64_t *s /* session key */
) {
    s[0] -= k[0];
    s[1] -= k[1];
}
```

Listing 3: Block encryption function example.

```c
void baheem_block_enc(
    uint64_t *k, /* pre-shared key */
    uint64_t *s, /* session key */
    uint64_t *p, /* pad keys */
    uint64_t *m, /* message */
    size_t len /* length of m and p */
) {
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2) {
        m[i] ^= p[i] + s[0];
        m[i+1] ^= p[i+1] + s[1];
        p[i] += k[0];
        p[i+1] += k[1];
    }
}
```
Listing 4: Block decryption function example.

```c
void baheem_block_dec(
    uint64_t *k, /* pre-shared key */
    uint64_t *s, /* session key */
    uint64_t *p, /* pad keys */
    uint64_t *m, /* message */
    size_t len /* length of m and p */
) {
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2) {
        p[i] -= k[0];
        p[i+1] -= k[1];
        m[i] ^= p[i] + s[0];
        m[i+1] ^= p[i+1] + s[1];
    }
}
```

A.2 A File Encryption Tool: Alyal

Alyal is an single-threaded implementation to demonstrate Bähém’s practical utility with real-world scenarios. Internally, Alyal uses the functions in listings 1 to 4.

A.2.1 Installation

```bash
git clone https://codeberg.org/rajululkahf/alyal
cd alyal
make
make test
```

A.2.2 Usage

```bash
alyal (enc|dec) IN OUT [TRNG]
alyal help
```

To encrypt a cleartext file a and save it as file b:

```bash
alyal enc a b
```

To decrypt the latter back to its cleartext form and save it as file c:

```bash
alyal dec b c
```