

1 **PRIORITIZING URBAN AREAS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF**
2 **HYPER-LOCAL FLOOD SENSORS USING STAKEHOLDER**
3 **ELICITATION AND RISK ANALYSIS**

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9 **ABSTRACT**

10 New urban monitoring networks with low-cost sensors can measure hyper-local floods in real-
11 time in hundreds of locations. These novel networks promise enhanced flood risk management,
12 especially within cities where floods can be extremely local. However, current sensor deployment
13 strategies rely on limited metrics (e.g., proximity to densely populated areas) and do not adequately
14 account for the various potential monitoring uses and stakeholders (e.g., emergency responders,
15 critical infrastructure managers, and researchers). Thus, cities have no methodological framework
16 to compare the holistic benefits of deploying new hyper-local sensors in different areas. To address
17 this gap, we develop a framework to prioritize urban areas for sensor deployment based on potential
18 uses for enhanced flood risk management and the exposure of infrastructure and community to high
19 flood hazards at micro-urban scales. This framework includes (1) obtaining stakeholder feedback
20 on the potential uses of sensors and relevant metrics for decision-making on their deployment,
21 (2) quantifying these metrics with publicly available data to integrate them with flood hazard
22 information through probabilistic risk analysis, and (3) combining the metrics to identify areas to
23 be prioritized for sensor deployment. We tested the framework with a case study in New York City,

24 a densely populated urban area with highly heterogeneous communities and infrastructure exposed
25 to high flood hazards. Through elicitation with 45 local stakeholders, we identified 32 potential
26 uses and 58 metrics to prioritize areas for sensor deployment covering flood risk management,
27 the welfare of residents, and the protection of critical infrastructure (e.g., transportation, drainage,
28 and energy). Overall, the proposed framework and case study offer new insights into how modern
29 monitoring networks can help to enhance flood disaster risk management in cities.

30 INTRODUCTION

31 Rapid urbanization and the changing climate have exacerbated flooding for many cities (Dav-
32 enport et al. 2021). For example, in 2021 alone, New York City experienced two unprecedented
33 flooding events that paralyzed the city, inundating numerous subway stations and killing 13 people
34 (Plumer 2021; Newman 2021): on September 1st, Hurricane Ida delivered 3.15 inches of rain
35 within an hour, surpassing the prior record of 1.94 inches set by Tropical Storm Henri only ten days
36 before.

37 Flood monitoring is crucial for flood risk mapping, flood model validation, and flood damage
38 assessment activities in cities (School 2018; Sarchani et al. 2020; Chen et al. 2021). Traditional
39 approaches for recording flood hazards include stream gauges and field inspections for watermarks
40 (Sarchani et al. 2020). However, these methods lack the scalability and accuracy to monitor urban
41 floods effectively. For example, stream gauges are designed for use along river lines rather than
42 inland areas within cities (Krabbenhoft et al. 2022). Watermarks indicate maximum flood depths
43 and can sometimes be taken within cities, but the locations where such (often inaccurate) marks
44 are preserved are extremely limited (Gardner et al. 2023).

45 Modern techniques for flood monitoring can significantly improve the coverage of urban flood
46 measurements. For instance, remote sensing networks, which use satellite sensors, can provide
47 measurements for entire cities with a resolution of less than 10 meters (Chawla et al. 2020). Due
48 to their large coverage, these networks have been successfully used for monitoring hydrologic
49 parameters in coastal cities and evaluating the impact of urbanization on flood risk (Bhatt and
50 Srinivasa Rao 2018; Munawar et al. 2022). However, the high spatial resolution of these networks

51 is offset by a relatively low temporal resolution of approximately one day in the best cases (Chawla
52 et al. 2020), which precludes them from capturing severe, short-duration floods that often occur
53 in cities (Alipour et al. 2020). In addition, the accuracy of remote sensing in dense cities can
54 be affected by buildings that obstruct satellite measurements of the ground (Mason et al. 2012;
55 Giustarini et al. 2013).

56 An emerging flood monitoring technique offers opportunities to address the shortcomings of
57 remote sensing in cities. These networks consist of multiple low-cost sensors installed throughout
58 city streets and sidewalks to measure floods in real-time at large urban scales (Figure 1). Examples of
59 such “urban flood monitoring networks” include FloodNet in New York City (NYC) and StormSense
60 in Hampton Roads, Virginia (Loftis et al. 2018; Silverman et al. 2022; Mydlarz et al. 2024).
61 FloodNet presently operates ~ 85 sensors in NYC; this number will reach 500 by 2027 as part of a
62 \$7.2 million project funded by the city to increase climate resilience (Waraich 2023). These sensors
63 measure water depth with ± 5 mm precision at one-minute intervals. During Hurricanes Henri and
64 Ida in 2021, the sensors recorded remarkably rapid changes in water depths of almost three feet in
65 less than an hour; see Figure 1 (FloodNet 2024). However, urban flood monitoring networks are
66 limited in spatial coverage compared to remote sensing, as floods are only measured at locations
67 where sensors are deployed. Thus, they require cities to develop a strategy for deploying (a limited
68 set of) sensors that maximize network effectiveness in flood risk management.

69 Methods to evaluate sensor placement for collecting data on natural hazards have either focused
70 on a single criterion such as hazard intensity (Krause et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2012; Du et al.
71 2014; Chang et al. 2019; Yu et al. 2022) or adopted multiple metrics that capture a broader
72 representation of risk, like proximity to critical infrastructure and social vulnerability (Sun et al.
73 2018; Sun et al. 2019; Tien et al. 2023). These methods have two main limitations: (1) they fail to
74 account for multiple potential users and uses of a monitoring network (e.g., government agencies
75 for monitoring critical infrastructure, researchers for improving knowledge of hyper-local hazards,
76 the general public for receiving real-time hazard alerts, etc.); and (2) their analysis is not explicitly
77 informed by formal risk quantification, which requires combining spatial information on hazard




Fig. 1. A depiction of a typical FloodNet sensor (left) alongside sample data (right) demonstrating typical sensor performance during a flooding event. The lead author took the sensor picture from NYC streets. The picture does not imply that NYC officers or the FloodNet project endorse this study’s results.

78 with metrics related to exposure and vulnerability.

79 We propose a framework for decision-making on low-cost sensor deployment in urban flood
80 monitoring networks that addresses these two gaps. First, our framework identifies potential
81 stakeholders of the monitoring network, to determine a comprehensive list of its various uses and
82 establish a corresponding set of suitable metrics for evaluating potential sensor locations. Second,
83 the framework integrates these metrics with flood hazard information in a probabilistic risk analysis
84 to determine the likelihood and severity of flood impacts (e.g., expected annual number of flooded
85 hospitals) across different urban areas. The result is a novel risk-informed, stakeholder-oriented
86 spatial mapping of areas that should be prioritized for sensor deployment.

87 **FRAMEWORK TO PRIORITIZE URBAN AREAS FOR SENSOR DEPLOYMENT**

88 The proposed framework, outlined in Figure 2, comprises three stages. The first stage involves
89 stakeholder elicitation to explore potential uses of the network and identify suitable metrics for
90 evaluating sensor locations in terms of these uses. The second stage involves a flood risk analysis
91 that combines the identified metrics with flood hazard models, enabling sensor deployment locations
92 to be considered in the context of possible flood impacts. Stage three evaluates trade-offs between
93 the metrics to investigate how the sensors can best be deployed to serve their multiple potential




Fig. 2. Overview of the three-stage framework to prioritize flood sensor deployment areas through stakeholder elicitation, risk analysis, and metric combination and tradeoff analysis.

94 uses.

95 **Stage 1: Stakeholder Elicitation**

96 Stakeholder elicitation is an established method to systematically gather inputs and perspectives
 97 from relevant parties affected by a specific issue or project (Reed 2008). This stage of the framework
 98 has three main goals: (1) identify various flood risk management uses for the data generated by
 99 the monitoring network, (2) define a set of corresponding metrics that can be used to evaluate
 100 sensor locations according to these uses, and (3) include specific metrics that focus on particularly
 101 vulnerable communities with lower capacity to cope and recover from flooding disasters, e.g.,
 102 because of lower income (Dow and Cutter 2006; Flanagan et al. 2011). The stakeholder elicitation
 103 stage occurs in three phases:

104 *Stakeholder Identification*

105 We followed the principles of stakeholder analysis to define a two-step process for determining
 106 relevant stakeholders (Gilmour and Beilin 2007; Pouloudi and Whitley 1997). The first step involves
 107 brainstorming a preliminary list of uses to identify an initial set of stakeholders. These stakeholders

108 are then consulted to determine further potential uses and associated stakeholders.

109 We identified four key stakeholder categories from the literature on disaster risk management
110 and hazard monitoring (Mojtahedi and Oo 2017; Rabinovici et al. 2022; Mojtahedi and Oo 2017;
111 Fontainha et al. 2017; Cremen and Galasso 2021; Cremen et al. 2022; Webster et al. 2022):
112 *government agencies, research institutions, the private sector, and resident representatives*. The
113 last category refers to individuals who could speak or act on behalf of their community. While
114 non-exhaustive, these stakeholder categories are key in risk management processes for natural
115 hazards (Scolobig et al. 2014). These categories, which can be further refined into sub-categories
116 or specific entities, can be used to determine the preliminary list of stakeholders.

117 *Elicitation of Uses and Metrics*

118 Next, stakeholder feedback is collected through the following three overarching questions:

- 119 1. “How and when would you use flood sensor data to help you in your duties before, during,
120 or after floods?”
- 121 2. “What metrics could help prioritize the location of flood sensors according to your needs?”
- 122 3. “What social vulnerability metrics and related factors should also be considered when decid-
123 ing on flood sensor placements?”

124 The stakeholder elicitation process must follow established guidelines (Chambers 2002; De-
125 partment for International Development 2002; International Association for Public Participation
126 2004; Reed 2008; Knol et al. 2010; Wates 2014; Hemming et al. 2018; Rabinovici et al. 2022).
127 For example, the workshops should be conducted in person where possible, to promote an effective
128 exchange of ideas and foster discussion among participants (Rabinovici et al. 2022). The number
129 of participants should be limited to 40-50 to allow enough time for everyone to share their views.
130 Participants can further be divided into smaller working groups (e.g., ~ five people (Chambers
131 2002)) to promote richer discussions and interactions (Wates 2014). Workshops must be guided
132 by moderators who clearly explain the workshop’s goals and format and record the outputs of
133 discussions using a visible medium (e.g., a whiteboard).

134 Following [Rabinovici et al. \(2022\)](#), stakeholders should spend 5 to 10 minutes independently
135 formulating their responses to each question, which are then shared with the wider (working) group
136 to develop a set of collective insights. These insights are used to define interim sets of *Use-Case*
137 *Metrics*, (addressing question two) and *Social Vulnerability Metrics* (addressing question three).
138 An example of a Use-Case Metric could be the volume of vehicular traffic on roads and highways,
139 corresponding to the use of sensors in helping a local transportation department monitor traffic
140 during flooding. An example of a Social Vulnerability Metric could be the income to indicate
141 neighborhoods with low resources and likely disproportionately impacted by floods ([Lee et al.](#)
142 [2022](#); [Sanders et al. 2023](#)).

143 The stakeholder analysis literature suggests that convening *resident representatives* and *govern-*
144 *ment agencies* together in a single workshop could lead to more reserved and less open discussions,
145 due to competing expectations and demands ([Gilmour and Beilin 2007](#); [Yu and Leung 2018](#);
146 [Blázquez et al. 2021](#)). For example, *government agencies* might fear upsetting *resident representa-*
147 *tives*, potentially leading to political repercussions. It is therefore recommended that the elicitation
148 workshops are conducted in two rounds: (1) an initial round consisting of one workshop for *resident*
149 *representatives* and another for the remaining stakeholder categories, and (2) a second combined
150 workshop that is used to finalise the set of metrics, reflecting diverse perspectives. In the second
151 combined workshop, stakeholder categories should be equally represented regarding participants
152 to ensure a balanced outcome ([Knol et al. 2010](#)).

153 *Selection of the Final Set of Prioritization Metrics*

154 The interim sets of Use-Case Metrics and Social Vulnerability Metrics are refined by requiring
155 each participant to select the three most important metrics from each set. These choices are
156 indicated on visible media, e.g., using voting dots on a whiteboard. The n metrics chosen the
157 most from each set are used for further analysis. We define the vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ to contain these m
158 metrics. Thus, $m = 2 \cdot n$ for n Use-Case Metrics and n Social Vulnerability Metrics. By selecting
159 a larger m , the sensor location decision-making process accounts for a wider range of network uses
160 and a broader representation of social vulnerability. However, very large m values could cause

161 problems in a subsequent post-processing activity, as explained in a following section. Finally,
162 each stakeholder assigns an importance coefficient (α_j) to each of the m metrics in both sets, in
163 line with their preferences on sensor deployment. The methodology for defining these coefficients
164 is detailed in stage three.

165 **Stage 2: Risk Analysis**

166 This stage combines the metrics output from the previous stage with flood hazard models that
167 account for different flood types and scenarios, using a probabilistic disaster risk analysis approach
168 (Arora and Ceferino 2023b; Arora and Ceferino 2023a; Avraam et al. 2023; Arora and Ceferino
169 2024). The results are spatialized sets of sensor deployment prioritization measurements that
170 account for flood intensity (i.e., risk values). The stage includes four steps:

171 *Definition of Geographic Units*

172 The region of interest \mathcal{A} is subdivided into smaller geographic units $\mathcal{P} = \{A_i \mid i = 1, \dots, t\}$,
173 where t is the number of geographic units that compose the city. $\mathcal{A} = \cup_{i=1}^t A_i$ and $A_i \cap A_j = \emptyset, \forall i \neq j$,
174 i.e., A_i are collectively exhaustive and do not overlap. Each A_i represents one spatial point in the
175 risk analysis process and is therefore associated with unique measurements of sensor deployment
176 prioritization (risk values). The number of sensors deployed in each geographic unit depends on
177 the total number of available sensors N compared to t . If $N < t$, a single sensor could be deployed
178 in each $N A_i$ with the highest priority (measured using the $I(A_i)$ index introduced later). If $N > t$,
179 more sensors could be deployed in higher priority units than those with less importance.

180 The size of A_i is constrained by two factors. The first is the availability and granularity of
181 data for each considered metric. Cities may have key urban information recorded at various scales,
182 ranging from city blocks to larger administrative boundaries (City of New York 2023; City of
183 San Francisco 2023). The second is the level of spatial correlation in flood intensity between
184 flood-prone areas; if this is too high between units, there may be redundant locations where sensors
185 would record the same information. We can decrease redundancies through methods that maximize
186 hazard information as long as sufficient relevant information is available (Krause et al. 2008; Wu
187 et al. 2012; Du et al. 2014; Chang et al. 2019; Yu et al. 2022). Without this information, decisions

188 on the size of A_i in terms of minimizing redundancies can only be judged mainly qualitatively from
 189 available flood data.

190 *Definition of Flood Hazards*

191 The flood hazard data can represent multiple flood types affecting a city, e.g., storm surge,
 192 pluvial, riverine, and tidal flooding. For each considered flood type w , we can have different
 193 spatialized intensity maps (e.g., with flood depths spatial extents) associated with a corresponding
 194 return period $T \in \mathbb{R}^+$, i.e., the average time interval between occurrences of a flood associated
 195 with given intensities or larger. Each intensity map for a specific flood type can constitute a flood
 196 scenario.

197 To represent a flood scenario, we define a function $g(T)$ that maps a return period T to
 198 a flooded geographic area \mathcal{F} . For each flood type w , the function g_w is formally defined as
 199 $g_w : \mathbb{R}^+ \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$, where \mathcal{F} represents the set of all flooded areas composed of polygons enclosing
 200 affected geographical extents. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction between A_i and $g_w(T)$ for $T = T_1$
 201 and $T = T_1 > T_2$ for a generic flood type w . Note that the area covered $g(T)$ is monotonically
 202 increasing, as flood-prone areas identified by \mathcal{F} can only remain constant or expand for growing T .




Fig. 3. Example partition of a city into geographic units, denoted as (A_i) , and illustration of the function $g_w(T)$ that represents the spatial extent of flooding for varying return periods and a generic flood type w .

203 For each geographic unit $A_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and each considered flood type w , we then define a Bernoulli

204 random variable $B_w(A_i)$ representing whether a flood occurs or not any given year for the considered
 205 flood type w . $B_w(A_i)$ can take a value of 1 with probability $p(A_i \cap g_w(T) \neq \emptyset)$, i.e., the probability
 206 that the geographic unit intersects with the flood scenario with return period T , or 0 with probability
 207 $1 - p(A_i \cap g_w(T) \neq \emptyset)$. Under Poisson assumptions,

$$208 \quad p(A_i \cap g_w(T) \neq \emptyset) = 1 - e^{-1/T_w^*(A_i)}, \quad (1)$$

209 where $T_w^*(A_i) = \min\{T \mid A_i \cap g_w(T) \neq \emptyset\}$. In other words, $T_w^*(A_i)$ is the minimum return period
 210 for which A_i experiences flooding for flood type w . $T_w^*(A_i)$ is determined by investigating the set of
 211 flood scenario data of flood type w available for the city of interest; these data are now accessible
 212 for many geographic regions and multiple return periods (Wing et al. 2023).

213 While $T \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is continuous, often flood hazard data may be only available for a few return
 214 periods. In that case, we can still use the same formulation presented in this paper. For example, if
 215 only maps for two return periods are available, like in Figure 3, the function $g_w(T)$ can be defined
 216 as follows:

$$217 \quad g_w(T) = \begin{cases} \emptyset & \text{for } 0 \leq T < T_1, \\ \mathcal{F}(T_1) & \text{for } T_1 \leq T < T_2, \\ \mathcal{F}(T_2) & \text{for } T \geq T_2. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

218 For A_3, A_4 and A_5 , the minimum return period causing flooding is T_1 (i.e., $T_w^*(A_3) = T_w^*(A_4) =$
 219 $T_w^*(A_5) = T_1$). A_6 and A_7 start becoming flooded for T_2 (i.e., $T_w^*(A_6) = T_w^*(A_7) = T_2$). A_1 and A_2
 220 do not experience flooding at T_2 (i.e., $T_w^*(A_1) = T_w^*(A_2) = +\infty$ in the absence of additional flood
 221 scenarios with $T > T_2$).

222 *Characterization of Metrics*

223 Given $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ (output from the stakeholder elicitation stage), we define a corresponding
 224 vector $\mathbf{v}(A_i)$ that represents values of the m metrics for each A_i . Note that $v_j(A_i)$ values for Social
 225 Vulnerability Metrics are scaled by the number of residents living in A_i to also account for exposure.

226 *Quantifying Risk*

227 This step computes an expected annual value $\mathbf{V}(A_i)$ corresponding to $\mathbf{v}(A_i)$. Considering a
228 specific flood type w , the expected annual value $\mathbf{V}_w(A_i)$ is calculated as follows:

$$229 \quad \mathbf{V}_w(A_i) = \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{v}(A_i) \cdot B_w(A_i)] = \mathbf{v}(A_i) \cdot \left(1 - e^{-1/T_w^*(A_i)}\right) \quad (3)$$

230 We consider multiple flood types independent and that damage from multiple floods is cumu-
231 lative. Thus, the expected value of the sum of the effects of each flood type is the sum of the
232 individual expected values:

$$233 \quad \mathbf{V}(A_i) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_w (\mathbf{v}(A_i) \cdot B_w(A_i)) \right] = \mathbf{v}(A_i) \cdot \sum_w \left(1 - e^{-1/T_w^*(A_i)}\right) \quad (4)$$

234 For example, consider a hypothetical metric v_1 (e.g., “Number of residential buildings”).
235 Assume that the geographic unit A_i contains 100 such buildings (i.e., $v_1(A_i) = 100$), and the
236 minimum return periods causing flooding in A_i are $T^* = 100$ years for flood type 1 (e.g., storm
237 surge), and $T^* = 10$ years for flood type 2 (e.g., riverine). The expected annual number of at-risk
238 residential buildings in A_i , $V_1(A_i)$, is then computed as:

$$V_1(A_i) = 100 \cdot \left[\left(1 - e^{-1/100}\right) + \left(1 - e^{-1/10}\right) \right] = 10.5$$

239 **Stage 3: Combination of Metrics and Tradeoffs Between Deployment Areas**

240 Metrics are considered simultaneously by combining them into a unique index $I(A_i)$ that is
241 calculated in two steps. The first involves defining the α_j importance coefficients at the end of the
242 stakeholder elicitation process. These coefficients are then used to scale normalised versions of
243 each metric and the results are linearly combined to produce $I(A_i)$.

244 *Quantifying the Relative Importance of Different Metrics*

245 The importance coefficients are determined using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)
246 (Saaty 1987). This process is chosen for its ability to systematically decompose complex problems

247 into manageable sub-problems and its consistency-check mechanism that ensures the reliability of
248 decision-maker judgments. Importance coefficients for Use-Case Metrics and Social Vulnerability
249 Metrics are defined separately because each set has different objectives. Use-case metrics center
250 on the practical purposes of sensor data for different stakeholders (e.g., monitoring infrastruc-
251 ture, enhancing flood understanding, whereas Social Vulnerability Metrics focus on vulnerable
252 populations.

253 AHP consists of pairwise comparisons of metric h against k , assigning a score from one to nine
254 to indicate their relative importance. A score of one means both metrics are equally important.
255 A score of two for metric h suggests it is slightly more important than k , while a score of nine
256 indicates a significant importance difference. Scores between these values represent varying levels
257 of relative importance. The AHP scores are assigned to a matrix, where cell h, k indicates the
258 relative importance of metric h compared to k , and cell k, h stores the reciprocal value. According
259 to the established AHP methodology, this matrix's principal eigenvector components provide the
260 α_j importance coefficients assigned to each metric (Saaty 1987). Note that AHP decreases in
261 reliability when the number of considered metrics exceeds approximately 7 to 9 (Saaty 1987),
262 which constrains the value of m .

263 Each participant (stakeholder) performs AHP individually, using printed tables or software.
264 Individual AHP matrices are assessed using the Consistency Ratio (CR), an index that evaluates
265 the coherence of the pairwise comparisons. Only matrices with a CR of less than 0.10 are retained
266 according to the recommendations outlined in (Saaty 1987). α_j for each metric is then quantified
267 as the geometric mean of the corresponding principal eigenvector component associated with each
268 valid matrix.

269 We denote as $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^m$ the vector containing the importance coefficients associated with each
270 metric in $\mathbf{v}(A_i)$. The first n entries of α represent importance coefficients for the Use-Case Metrics,
271 and the remaining n entries denote the importance coefficients for the Social Vulnerability Metrics.

272 *Combining Metrics into a Unique Index*

273 The metrics are first normalized to a comparable scale because they are typically expressed in
274 various units, e.g., annual average daily traffic on roads, and number of subway stations. Normal-
275 ization methods that can be employed include Percentile normalization (transforming metric values
276 to percentiles), Min-max scaling (rescaling data to a 0–1 range), and Standardization (modifying
277 data to achieve a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) (Saisana et al. 2005). We then calculate
278 $V_a(A_i)$ and $V_b(A_i)$ as

$$279 \quad V_a(A_i) = \sum_{j=1}^n \bar{V}_j(A_i) \cdot \alpha_j \quad (5)$$

$$280 \quad V_b(A_i) = \sum_{j=n+1}^m \bar{V}_j(A_i) \cdot \alpha_j \quad (6)$$

282 where a corresponds to the Use-Case Metrics, b corresponds to the Social Vulnerability Metrics
283 and $\bar{V}_j(A_i)$ denotes normalized values. Then:

$$284 \quad I(A_i) = \gamma \cdot V_a + (1 - \gamma) \cdot V_b \quad (7)$$

285 where $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ represents the relative importance of Use-Case Metrics over Social Vulnerability
286 Metrics (such that $\gamma = 0.5$ denotes equal importance). γ could also be determined through
287 stakeholder elicitation.

288 A_i with the highest $I(A_i)$ values should be prioritized in terms of sensor deployment. The
289 precise placement of sensors within each A_i can be based on the individual metrics contributing
290 more to $I(A_i)$, e.g., close to critical infrastructure if this metric contributes substantially. Ideally,
291 high $I(A_i)$ values should be sense-checked against any available ground-truth data (e.g., field
292 survey, satellite imagery) to ensure they adequately reflect actual flood risk conditions.

293 **CASE STUDY IN NEW YORK CITY**

294 We chose NYC as a proof-of-concept case study of the proposed framework for four main
295 reasons. First, NYC provides abundant publicly accessible data for implementing the proposed

296 framework. Second, the city faces significant flood risks due to its densely populated nature,
297 vulnerable infrastructure, and heterogeneous social groups. Third, NYC has several initiatives for
298 reducing flood impacts, including the FloodNet urban flood monitoring network. Our case study
299 focuses on deploying these sensors in the city, but we want to note that the actual sensor deployment
300 strategy of FloodNet differs from what is presented in this paper. Fourth, many authors of this paper
301 are or were based in NYC and could, therefore, leverage local connections to recruit stakeholders
302 for this study.

303 **Stage 1: Stakeholder Elicitation**

304 *Stakeholder Identification and Elicitation Process Set Up*

305 The stakeholder elicitation process consisted of a single workshop involving the following
306 stakeholder categories: *government agencies, research institutions, and the private sector*. We
307 classified government agencies into two primary categories: those engaged in emergency response
308 (e.g., the Fire Department) and those overseeing various public services and infrastructure. In terms
309 of the latter, we distinguished between agencies responsible for infrastructure directly related to flood
310 risk mitigation (e.g., the Department of Environmental Protection) and those managing other types
311 of infrastructure (public services) that could potentially be impacted by natural hazards (e.g., the
312 Departments of Transportation, Parks, Housing, Sanitation, Education). Research institutions were
313 divided into two sub-categories: (1) academic research institutions consisting of universities; and
314 (2) non-academic research institutions that include governmental research institutions specializing
315 in flood studies (e.g., the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), community-based
316 initiatives on flood data collection (e.g., the Community Flood Watch Project ([com 2023](#))), and
317 private entities focused on flood risk assessment and modeling (e.g., the First Street Foundation ([fir](#)
318 [2023](#))). We included private sector stakeholders through catastrophe (re)insurance companies and
319 civil engineering consultancies engaged in flood mitigation.

320 The refined stakeholder classifications were used to recruit stakeholders for the workshop.
321 Potential participants were targeted from the authors' network and were contacted three months
322 before the event. We extended workshop invitations to 74 stakeholders that represented each

TABLE 1. Information on participants involved in the stakeholder elicitation process .

Category	Number	Subcategory	Number
Government agencies	16 (37%)	Emergency response	25%
		Non-emergency response	75%
Research institutions	23 (50%)	Academic	90%
		Non-academic	10%
Private sector	6 (13%)	Insurance	67%
		Civil Engineering consultants	33%

323 stakeholder category in the following proportions: 43% (research institutions), 41% (government
324 agencies), and 16% (private sector). Given the proof-of-concept nature of the case study, our
325 priority was to maximize stakeholder participation rather than to achieve a balanced representation
326 of stakeholder categories. 45 stakeholders ultimately participated in the workshop; their distribution
327 across stakeholder categories is detailed in Table 1.

328 The workshop was held at the New York University in a conference room with 8-chair tables,
329 whiteboards, and a large screen. Groups, each with six to seven stakeholders randomly mixed
330 together in terms of stakeholder category, were arranged at eight tables. Adhesive voting dots were
331 provided for the voting activity required to select the final prioritization metrics. Paper tables were
332 used to facilitate the pairwise comparisons of the AHP process. Note that stakeholders did not
333 discuss how metrics could be quantified during the workshop (e.g., in terms of absolute numbers or
334 percentages) or consider data availability. These issues were addressed in stage two (risk analysis).

335 *Answers to Question #1: How and when would you use the flood sensor data to help you in your*
336 *duties before, during, or after floods?*

337 Thirty-two potential uses of sensor data were discussed. These uses can be broadly categorized
338 as follows: (1) emergency response and recovery planning; (2) infrastructure and public service
339 management; (3) flood risk awareness; and (4) improving the characterization of flood hazard and
340 risk. (See Supplementary Information for a complete list of the 32 uses, organized by category).
341 For example, regarding the first category, it was identified that sensor data could be used during the
342 emergency phase to direct rescue and relief operations to the most affected areas, ensuring timely

343 and effective aid. Sensor data could also be used in the post-event recovery period as a proxy for
344 assessing damage and informing strategic resource allocation for cleanup, repairs, and community
345 support.

346 For the second category, it was identified that sensor data could be used to evaluate the
347 effectiveness of green infrastructure projects by monitoring the rate at which they absorb or redirect
348 rainfall or assess the performance of stormwater systems by measuring flow and capacity during
349 various weather conditions, for example. The data could also pinpoint flood-prone areas as part
350 of infrastructure planning activities, guiding flood defense investment decisions. Furthermore,
351 sensor data could be useful for managing infrastructure unrelated to flood mitigation. The data
352 could help inform decision-making (e.g., prompt preemptive shutdowns or flood barriers) for
353 essential facilities, such as wastewater and energy infrastructure, public services (e.g., garbage
354 collection, snow-plowing, education), and transportation (e.g., bus services, metro stations) affected
355 by flooding.

356 Concerning the third category, dissemination of sensor data through various channels (e.g.,
357 media, in-person education workshops, reports, etc.) could play an important role in conveying
358 the extent of previous local floods to residents, increasing their awareness of flood risk. Residents
359 could use sensor data as evidence of flooding to support applications for post-storm financial
360 assistance, receive financial aid for building upgrades related to flood-risk mitigation, and advocate
361 for receiving public funding for flood-risk protection and mitigation infrastructure.

362 As for the fourth category, sensor data could be used to empirically refine the parameters
363 of hydrologic and hydraulic models (e.g., the catchment runoff coefficient, soil permeability and
364 infiltration rates, drainage system capacity), and quantify spatial and temporal correlations in
365 flood intensities. Information on past floods could also help property buyers to more rigorously
366 account for flood risk when assessing real estate values (Rajapaksa et al. 2016). Private insurers
367 and government agencies involved in flood risk assessment and insurance provisioning (e.g., the
368 Federal Emergency Management Agency in the US) could use sensor data to identify insurance
369 gaps related to flood protection (e.g., determine neighborhoods with flood exposure but no flood

370 insurance, or where flood risk is underestimated). Sensor data can also be used by insurers as a
371 trigger for parametric insurance policies (Lin and Kwon 2020), which provide payouts based on the
372 occurrence of predefined conditions related to an event, such as the exceedance of a certain flood
373 depth.

374 *Answers to Question #2: ‘What metrics could help prioritize the location of flood sensors according*
375 *to your needs?’*

376 Workshop participants identified 23 Use-Case Metrics in Question 2 (See Supplementary
377 Information for a full list). Some metrics relate to more than one of the use cases determined in
378 response to Question 1. For instance, “Number of basement dwellings” could correspond to the
379 use of sensor data in either helping emergency responders direct rescue operations toward areas
380 with a higher prevalence of such dwellings or raising flood awareness for residents living in these
381 dwellings. Several metrics focus on using sensor data for infrastructure management, e.g., “Number
382 of flood mitigation infrastructure projects” and “Number of critical infrastructure facilities”. Metrics
383 related to raising flood awareness include “Number of buildings without flood insurance”. Metrics
384 associated with enhancing the characterization of flood hazard include “Number of citizen-reported
385 flood incidents” and “Number of applications for post-flood assistance”. These metrics could help
386 identify flood-prone areas in the absence of flood models. They could also be used to benchmark
387 and, therefore, improve the accuracy of flood models, where available (Negri et al. 2023).

388 *Answers to Question #3: ‘What social vulnerability metrics and factors should be considered when*
389 *deciding on flood sensor placements?’*

390 Workshop participants identified 35 Social Vulnerability Metrics in addressing Question 3
391 (see Supplementary Information for a full list of these metrics). Three of the identified metrics
392 are well-established indices. The most well-known one is the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI),
393 which assesses the resilience of communities under external stresses, such as disasters or other
394 emergencies. Several versions of SVI exist in the literature, such as the Centers for Disease
395 Control and Prevention / Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry’s (CDC/ATSDR) SVI
396 (Flanagan et al. 2011), and the SVI developed by (Dow and Cutter 2006). The other two indices

TABLE 2. The eight Use-Case Metrics that received the highest number of votes

METRIC NUMBER	METRIC DESCRIPTION
v_1	Number of critical infrastructure facilities (e.g., energy, communications, wastewater facilities)
v_2	Number of buildings not compliant with updated building code regulations
v_3	Vehicular and foot traffic along (private and public) transportation routes
v_4	Level of uncertainty in flood model predictions (e.g., mismatch between flood reports and modeled flooding)
v_5	Number of bus and subway stations
v_6	Number of flood mitigation infrastructure projects (e.g., green infrastructure)
v_7	Number of polluted sites (e.g., brownfield land)
v_8	Historical number of flood insurance claims

397 identified are the Environmental Protection Agency’s Environmental Justice Index (EJI) ((EPA)
 398 2023) and the NYC Displacement Risk Index (NYCDCP 2023). EJI assesses the environmental
 399 burden and vulnerability of communities, focusing on exposure to pollutants and health risks. The
 400 NYC Displacement Risk Index evaluates the risk of residents being involuntarily displaced due to
 401 rising housing costs, eviction, or redevelopment.

402 The complete set of identified Social Vulnerability Metrics was subsequently organised into
 403 four categories: (1) Socio-economic and Demographic factors, (2) Access to Public Services and
 404 Infrastructure, (3) Community Engagement, and (4) Risks from Compounding Hazards., which
 405 align with those identified in previous studies on social vulnerability and natural hazards (Cutter
 406 et al. 2010; Finch et al. 2010; Dow and Cutter 2006; Garbutt et al. 2015; Daniel et al. 2022; Englund
 407 et al. 2023).

408 *Selection of the Final Set of Prioritization Metrics*

409 Workshop participants voted to determine the eight Use-Case Metrics and eight Social Vulner-
 410 ability Metrics to be used for prioritization; see Tables 2 and 3 (i.e., $m = 16$).

TABLE 3. The eight Social Vulnerability Metrics that received the highest number of votes

METRIC NUMBER	METRIC DESCRIPTION
v ₉	Social Vulnerability Index
v ₁₀	Number of essential public services (e.g., schools, markets, evacuation centers) per capita
v ₁₁	Level of compound risk (e.g., from flooding and heat)
v ₁₂	Level of social isolation/civil capacity (e.g., number of senior or community centers per capita)
v ₁₃	EPA Environmental Justice Index
v ₁₄	Usage of the 311 (Wikipedia contributors 2023) reporting system by residents
v ₁₅	Percentage of non-documented households
v ₁₆	Median housing costs relative to median household income

411 **Stage 2: Risk Analysis**

412 *Definition of Geographic Units*

413 We examined the city at the census tract level for three main reasons. First, census tracts are
 414 defined to be relatively uniform with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and
 415 living conditions ([United States Bureau of the Census 1994](#)). Second, relevant data are available at
 416 this level of granularity.

417 *Definition of Flood Hazards*

418 NYC is exposed to three flood types: storm surge, pluvial flooding, and tidal flooding ([Rosen-
 419 zweig et al. 2013](#)). Separate maps are available for each. The storm surge maps considered in
 420 this study are those developed by the New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC), which
 421 combine sea level rise projections with FEMA’s 2013 Preliminary Work Maps for 100-year and
 422 500-year return periods ([Patrick et al. 2019](#)). The pluvial maps considered are the NYC Stormwater
 423 Flood Maps ([NYC Mayor’s Office of Resiliency 2021](#)), which depict rainfall-induced flood extents
 424 under current and future climate conditions for a moderate (10-year return period) and an extreme
 425 (100-year) rain event. The tidal flood maps considered are from NPCC ([Patrick et al. 2019](#)), which
 426 depict current high tide levels. Figure 4 presents two examined flood maps. Tidal flooding is




Fig. 4. Storm surge flood map (left) and pluvial flood map (right) for New York City, both corresponding to a return period of $T = 100$ years. The storm surge map shows areas flooded by sea water intrusion during a storm surge, typically along coastlines and river mouths. The pluvial flood map displays flooding from heavy rainfall accumulating on the land surface, which creates a dispersed pattern across the urban landscape.

427 assigned a probability of 1 for any given year, given the certainty of high tides occurring multiple
 428 times yearly.

429 *Characterization of Metrics*

430 The characterization process required some of the $m = 16$ metrics to be slightly refined or
 431 disregarded based on data availability and potential overlaps. Tables 4 and 5 describe the refined
 432 versions of metrics. The Supplementary Information provides the data sources, types, and the
 433 quantification method associated with characterized metrics.

434 Metrics v_4 and v_{14} required more elaborate refinement given their original broad definitions.
 435 These metrics were quantified based on the number of tax lots, which are individual parcels of land
 436 defined for property tax purposes (a Census tract contains, on average, 350 tax lots), and information
 437 on the number of 311 reports. The 311 reports and the tax lot data were then aggregated at the
 438 census tract level. More specific details on their characterization are provided in the next section.

TABLE 4. Characterized Use-Case Metrics

ORIGINAL MET- RIC	REFINED MET- RIC	EXPLANATION
v_1 – Number of critical infrastructure facilities (e.g., energy, communications, wastewater facilities)	Number of electricity substations	Electricity substations are examined due to their critical role in maintaining essential services and economic stability. Substations are particularly vulnerable to flooding, as observed during past events (New York City Government 2023), leading to widespread power outages affecting safety, health, and business activities. Sensor data can aid in the management of these facilities during emergencies, such as enabling preemptive shutdowns to mitigate damage.
v_2 – Number of buildings not compliant with updated building code regulations	Number of residential units in pre-1961 buildings	The NYC 1961 Zoning Resolution is selected as the building code of interest, due to its regulatory significance (NYP). Sensor data can help identify the buildings most impacted by flooding, facilitating targeted allocation of restoration resources.
v_3 – Vehicular and foot traffic along (private and public) transportation routes	Annual Daily (AADT) of vehicles along roads and highways	AADT is used due to the high volumes of vehicular movement in NYC. Sensor data can aid in managing the road network during flood events, for example, by optimizing rerouting strategies to prevent congestion.
v_4 – Level of uncertainty in flood model predictions	Discrepancy between flood maps and flood reports: Areas where flood reports exceed flood map predictions	Discrepancy between flood maps and reports is used to measure model uncertainty, highlighting areas where model predictions used to produce the flood maps do not match flood occurrences as measured by resident reports. The characterization of this metric is explained separately.
v_5 – Number of bus and subway stations	Annual Average Ridership (AAR) for subway stations	AAR for subway stations is used, given the significant damage experienced in subway stations during past flooding events like hurricanes Sandy and Ida. This metric focuses on stations where service disruptions would impact the largest number of passengers. Sensor data can help manage the subway network during flooding, for example, by facilitating the timely closure of flooded stations and rerouting of passengers.
v_6 – Number of flood mitigation infrastructure projects (e.g., green infrastructure)	Spatial extent of public green infrastructure projects	Green infrastructure projects are a key flood-mitigation initiative in NYC (Catalano de Sousa et al. 2016 ; Culligan 2019 ; Geberemariam 2017). Sensor data can assist in monitoring the effectiveness of green infrastructure projects, enabling performance evaluation for future planning.
v_7 – Number of polluted sites (e.g., brownfield lands)	Number of New York State (NYS) classified environmental remediation sites	NYS classifies all polluted sites in a geo-located database named Environmental Remediation Sites. Flooding can disperse pollutants, and sensor data can trigger targeted remediation efforts.
v_8 – Historical number of flood insurance claims	Proxy not included in the case study because of lack of data	N/A

TABLE 5. Characterized Social Vulnerability Metrics

ORIGINAL MET- RIC	REFINED MET- RIC	MET- RIC	EXPLANATION
v_9 – Social Vulnerability Index	Social Vulnerability Index		No refinements required.
v_{10} – Number of essential public services (e.g., schools, markets, evacuation centers) per capita	Floor area of public schools per capita		Schools were specifically selected for examination, given that they often serve as emergency shelters (Long 2017), implying that areas with ample school space are better prepared for disasters.
v_{11} – Level of compound risk (e.g., from both flooding and heat)	No refined version of the metric is created due to data unavailability		N/A
v_{12} – Level of social isolation/civil capacity (e.g., number of senior or community centers per capita)	Number of human service centers per capita		Human service centers include community centers, employment centers, and senior centers. The presence of such services is deemed a reasonable proxy for civil capacity.
v_{13} – Environmental Justice Index	Environmental Justice Index		No refinements required.
v_{14} – Usage of the 311 reporting system by residents	Discrepancy between flood reports and flood maps: Areas where flood map predictions exceed flood reports		Discrepancy between flood map predictions, and actual flood reports are used to measure the underreporting of flood events, highlighting areas where fewer reports are filed despite high risk predicted by flood maps. The characterisation of this metric is explained separately.
v_{15} – Percentage of non-documented households	No refined metric version is created due to data unavailability.		N/A
v_{16} – Median housing costs relative to median household income	No refined version of the metric is created because it is already highly correlated with v_9 .		N/A

439 *Quantifying Risk*

440 Given that data used for characterizing each metric are available at a finer resolution than the
 441 granularity of the selected A_i (i.e., census tracts), only spatial elements that intersect with inundation
 442 on each flood map were used to quantify $V(A_i)$ (and count towards flood exposure) in this case
 443 study. For instance, take A_i as Census tract #1003300 in Downtown Manhattan. A_i contains two
 444 subway stations referred to as *Station A* and *Station B* (Figure 5). *Station A* and *Station B* record
 445 AAR of 5,415,350 passengers and 1,331,778 passengers, respectively. Both stations intersect with
 446 the 100-year storm surge map (Figures 5a and 5b). *Station A* intersects the 10-year pluvial flood
 447 map (see Figure 5c), whereas *Station B* only intersects the 100-year pluvial flood map (see Figure
 448 5d). In the absence of tidal flooding, this means that $V_5(A_i)$ is computed as

$$449 \begin{aligned} V_5(A_i) = & \text{AAR}(\text{StationA}) \cdot \left(1 - e^{-1/10} + 1 - e^{-1/100}\right) + \\ & + \text{AAR}(\text{StationB}) \cdot \left(2 \times (1 - e^{-1/100})\right) = 595,725 \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

450 v_4 and v_{14} were instead quantified as discrepancies between the expected annual number of tax
 451 lots exposed to flooding (y calculated analogously to equation 8) and the annual average number
 452 of flood-related 311 reports (x calculated using all available data from 2010 to the present) per A_i .
 453 A linear regression was performed for each pair of x and y to compute the slope coefficient m . The
 454 annual *predicted* number of flooded tax lots (\hat{y}) is then given by

$$455 \hat{y} = x \cdot m \quad (9)$$

456 $V_4(A_i)$ is then computed as

$$457 V_4(A_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{\hat{y}-y}{\hat{y}+1}, & \text{if } y \leq \hat{y} \\ 0, & \text{if } y > \hat{y} \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

458 $V_4(A_i)$ can be considered an indicator of flood hazard underestimation. The denominator in
 459 Equation 10 avoids that areas with many tax lots within flood-prone areas dominate the results. The
 460 unit constant in the denominator differentiates between tracts with a positive number of reports but




Fig. 5. Map of the NYC subway stations in Census tract #1003300 intersected with flood maps with different return periods.

461 no tax lots in flood-prone areas. By adding the unit constant, tracts with more reports are assigned
 462 higher V_4 . $V_{14}(A_i)$ was calculated the same way as $V_4(A_i)$ except that x and y were inverted, such
 463 that $\hat{y} - y$ reflects the discrepancy between the number of 311 reports forecasted by the linear
 464 regression model and the actual number of recorded reports. Larger $V_{14}(A_i)$ may signal potential
 465 underutilization of the reporting system within the considered community.

466 Stage 3: Combination of Metrics and Tradeoffs Between Deployment Areas

467 The weights α_j obtained during the AHP process were rescaled to sum to one because of the
 468 dropped metrics. The final values of α_j are provided in the Supplementary Information.

TABLE 6. The three census tracts in each borough with the highest values of $I(A_i)$ and the corresponding metrics that rank within the top quartile.

Borough	Ref. on Figure 6	Overall ranking of I value	Top Quartile Metrics
Manhattan	A	41	v_2, v_6, v_9
	B	6	$v_2, v_3, v_5, v_9, v_{10}$
	C	44	v_3, v_4, v_9
Bronx	D	67	v_2, v_3, v_9
	E	20	v_9, v_{12}
	F	90	v_2, v_{10}, v_{12}
Queens	G	4	$v_2, v_3, v_4, v_{10}, v_{12}$
	H	1	v_2, v_3, v_9, v_{13}
	I	3	$v_1, v_2, v_{12}, v_{13}, v_{14}$
Brooklyn	J	13	v_2, v_3, v_{13}
	K	12	v_2, v_3, v_6, v_{14}
	L	5	v_2, v_7, v_{10}, v_{12}
Staten Island	M	28	$v_2, v_3, v_6, v_{12}, v_{13}, v_{14}$
	N	2	v_2, v_3, v_6, v_{13}
	O	8	v_2, v_3, v_{13}, v_{14}

469 *Combining Metrics into a Unique Index*

470 To compute $V_a(A_i)$ and $V_b(A_i)$ (Equations 5 and 6), each metric was normalized using percentile
471 normalization. $I(A_i)$ was then calculated for $\gamma = 0.50$ (Figure 6). We assigned to γ the value of
472 0.50 because the relative importance of Use-Case Metrics and Social Vulnerability Metrics was
473 not investigated during the stakeholder elicitation process.

474 We analysed individual metrics for the three census tracts in each NYC borough with the highest
475 $I(A_i)$ (denoted using letters A to O in Figure 6), in terms of their quartile values. Table 6 provides
476 the metrics that rank in the top quartile for each A_i .

477 Each metric features in at least one row of Table 6, demonstrating the effectiveness of I in
478 collectively capturing the metrics. Multiple metrics rank in the top quartile for each A_i in Table 6,
479 indicating compounding sources of risk. For example, Washington Heights in northern Manhattan,
480 labeled **B** in Figure 6, which faces relatively frequent inundation from pluvial flooding and storm
481 surge, is an important vehicular transport junction (annual AADT at risk of 3,000 vehicles), a




Fig. 6. Values of the prioritization index I across NYC census tracts A_i , for $\gamma = 0.50$. The three tracts from each borough with the highest $I(A_i)$ values are highlighted and labeled with letters A to O. The overlaid image highlights the Census tract labeled as **A**, which encompasses Riis Houses, a residential complex of 1191 units dating back to 1949, situated within the 100-year storm surge flood plain. This tract, known for its high social vulnerability (91st percentile), also includes the renovated East Side Park, a key green infrastructure project aimed at enhancing flood resiliency.

482 substantial subway hub (annual AAR at risk of 345,000 passengers), and has a high CDC social
 483 vulnerability index (exceeding the 90th percentile). Sensors could be deployed in this census tract
 484 to enable quick decision making on subway closures and the rerouting of vehicular traffic during
 485 flood events. In addition, socially vulnerable residents of this tract could leverage the sensor data
 486 to advocate for enhanced resilience measures by the city.

487 Another example is Springfield Gardens in southeastern Queens, labeled *I* in Figure 6, frequently
488 cited by the media for its susceptibility to flooding (Costella 2010; Bisram 2022). This area hosts
489 the 146th Avenue electricity substation and 191 pre-1961 residential buildings in flood-prone zones.
490 It ranks above the 98th percentile on the Environmental Justice Index for PM 2.5, air toxic cancer
491 risk, and the presence of Underground Storage Tanks. Furthermore, it has only 0.03 human service
492 centers per 1,000 residents – markedly below the city average of 0.18. The disparity between the
493 high number of tax lots in flood-prone areas (191) and the relatively few flood-related 311 reports
494 (29 over 13 years) highlights this community’s possible underuse of the 311 reporting system or that
495 the worst floods are yet to happen. Deploying flood sensors could enhance real-time monitoring
496 at critical infrastructure like the electricity substation and provide accurate flood data for older
497 residential buildings. Using sensor data could also address the high social vulnerability of the
498 community by informing targeted resilience measures.

499 The Use-Case Metric v_7 , representing the number of New York State classified environmental
500 remediation sites, is referenced only once in Table 6. The specific location, designated as *L* in Figure
501 6, is situated in the Williamsburg neighborhood of Brooklyn. This area includes two environmental
502 remediation sites contaminated with substances like toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene, and acetone.
503 These chemicals are typical pollutants that can impact soil and groundwater quality and pose risks
504 to human health and the environment. In the event of flooding, these substances could disperse,
505 highlighting the need for sensor monitoring to aid in planning remediation activities.

506 The same census tract also has a low floor area of public schools per capita (metric v_{10}),
507 approximately 0.75 m² per person, which is below the 20th percentile for the city. Tracts with
508 greater public school space per person are less likely to experience educational disruptions, as
509 larger facilities can better absorb impacts and serve as emergency shelters during natural disasters.
510 Conversely, tracts with lower school space can experience additional social vulnerability.

511 Lastly, we note that two Use-Case Metrics consistently appear across nearly all highlighted
512 Census tracts in Table 6: v_2 (Number of residential units in pre-1961 buildings) and v_3 (Annual
513 Average Daily Vehicular Traffic). This outcome is expected, as buildings and roads are ubiquitous

514 in an urban context.

515 **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

516 This study proposes a framework to guide the deployment of hyper-local, real-time flood sen-
517 sor networks in urban areas, adopting a unique risk-informed, end-user-oriented approach. The
518 framework is composed of three stages. The first stage involves stakeholder elicitation, where
519 various strategically selected stakeholders (e.g., city agencies, researchers, engineering consul-
520 tants, insurers, and residents) provide feedback on how they might use the sensor data and which
521 corresponding metrics should be leveraged to determine where to deploy the sensors. The metrics
522 gathered from stakeholders fall into two categories: Use-Case Metrics and Social Vulnerability
523 Metrics. The former includes metrics directly linked to specific sensor data applications, such
524 as monitoring vehicular traffic to safeguard transportation infrastructure during floods. The latter
525 pertains to attributes that heighten community vulnerability to natural hazards (e.g., income levels).
526 The second stage integrates these metrics in a flood risk quantification process, using probabilistic
527 risk analysis to combine data on each metric with flood hazard information. Stage three involves
528 the Analytical Hierarchical Process to determine stakeholder preferences for the individual metrics,
529 which are used to combine the metrics into a single index that identifies areas to be prioritized in
530 terms of sensor deployment.

531 A case study demonstration of the framework was conducted for New York City (NYC), focusing
532 on a new street-level, real-time flood monitoring network. We engaged with key NYC stakeholders
533 across three main categories: government agencies (including emergency responders and public
534 infrastructure managers), research institutions, and the private sector (engineering consultants and
535 insurers). Stakeholders identified 32 possible uses for flood sensor data that we classified into
536 four main categories: emergency response and recovery planning, infrastructure management, risk
537 awareness increase, and flood hazard characterization. An important insight from this feedback
538 is that real-time sensor data has the potential to inform flood risk management decision-making
539 across multiple timescales; it can be used during the emergency phase (e.g., to send early warnings
540 to residents), in the aftermath of an event (e.g., to direct relief operations to the most affected areas),

541 and in the longer term (e.g., for infrastructure planning activities).

542 The stakeholders then defined 22 Use-Case Metrics, each linked to one or more previously
543 identified uses. Infrastructure management and flood hazard characterization emerged as primary
544 themes among these metrics, reflecting the strong representation of city officials and researchers in
545 our elicitation process. We also observed that the Use-Case Metrics reflected the three core elements
546 of a risk-analysis framework: hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. For instance, the "Historical
547 number of flood-related emergency response incidents" metric pertains to hazard whereas "Number
548 of basement dwellings" primarily corresponds to vulnerability. Other Use-Case Metrics encompass
549 many other risk-analysis elements, e.g., "Historical number of flood insurance claims.". The
550 stakeholders further identified 35 Social Vulnerability Metrics. These metrics predominantly
551 addressed socioeconomic and demographic factors similar (or equivalent) to established indexes
552 such as the Social Vulnerability Index.

553 Our proposed index revealed that areas that could be prioritized for sensor deployment in NYC
554 are located in both inland and coastal regions. Furthermore, metrics that exhibit consistently large
555 values across census tracts with the highest priority include "Number of residential units in pre-
556 1961 buildings" and "Annual Average Daily Traffic for vehicular traffic along roads and highways".
557 This finding is expected, as buildings and roads constitute the majority of the urban environment.

558 Our case study was not designed to provide a definitive list of NYC areas to be prioritized in
559 terms of flood sensor deployment. Instead, it serves two important alternative purposes: first, it
560 provides a practical demonstration of the proposed framework, and second, it identifies an initial set
561 of stakeholders, use cases, and metrics that can improve current flood sensor deployment strategies.
562 Future applications can strengthen our framework's application case study by including resident
563 representatives and more a balanced distribution of participants across other stakeholder categories.
564 Despite this limitation, our case study underlines the potential value that this framework could bring
565 to the increasingly prevalent challenge of flood risk management decision-making.

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