

# A Novel Framework for Detecting Disaster-Induced Power Outages Globally via Satellite Observations

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## ABSTRACT

Power systems are vital to our society, yet they remain vulnerable to widespread damage from natural disasters, often resulting in large-scale outages. Satellite-captured nighttime lights offer a global-scale opportunity to map daily electricity use and detect power loss. Prior research has primarily relied on aggregating nightlight data over several days during disasters to compare with recorded power outages. However, the interpretation of daily, short-term nightlight variations to determine outages remains limited, hindering efforts to use this global dataset for timely outage mapping. Leveraging unique outage data, this study introduces a novel interpretation of nightlight intensity loss from buildings during outages to propose a two-stage framework that uses nightlight to predict power outages. First, a classification model is used to identify regions where the fraction of customers experiencing outages exceeds 0.05, thereby mitigating noise and cloud interference that could hinder the identification of extreme outages. Second, a regression model is used to predict outage fractions for high-outage cases to map out actual events utilizing our developed interpretation of nightlight loss. We train and validate our model using historical blackouts during

25 Hurricanes Irma (2017), Michael (2018), Ida (2021), and Ian (2022), each of which affected over a  
26 million customers. We show the model’s generalizability using out-of-sample data from Hurricane  
27 Fiona (2022) in Puerto Rico. We also demonstrate the transferability of the framework to other  
28 disasters by tracking outages after earthquakes in Turkey (February 2023) and Myanmar (March  
29 2025). The framework utilizes open-source, hazard-independent inputs to predict power outages  
30 worldwide, caused by various disasters, including earthquakes or ongoing conflicts, and even in  
31 regions without automated outage reporting.

## 32 INTRODUCTION

33 Power infrastructure forms the backbone of our society, and disruptions to electrical networks  
34 can deprive populations of critical services, such as healthcare, finance, and transportation. The US  
35 economy suffers annual losses of more than 100 billion dollars due to power outages (LaCommare  
36 and Eto 2004). These outages might be triggered by unintentional physical damage from natural  
37 disasters like Hurricane Ian (2022), which left 2.6 million customers without power (Florida Public  
38 Service Commission 2022). Alternatively, outages could occur due to intentional cyberattacks that  
39 target grid communication and control technologies (Avraam et al. 2023).

40 Power outage mapping is a valuable tool for utilities and emergency planners, allowing rapid  
41 response and efficient recovery of disrupted electrical networks. It can supplement manual outage  
42 reporting, especially in areas with communication breakdowns during disasters (Jim Giuliano  
43 2020). Timely knowledge of outages enhances situational awareness, allowing utilities to assess  
44 the scale of disruption and respond proactively with targeted repairs to restore the power (Campbell  
45 2012). Furthermore, identifying affected regions could enable the targeted delivery of emergency  
46 aid, such as medical supplies and food.

47 Beyond the immediate responses, mapping historical outages and their subsequent recoveries  
48 can reveal existing structural vulnerabilities in the grid, supporting long-term planning for grid  
49 resilience. Large structural systems such as buildings and bridges could be surveyed after months  
50 to observe structural performance during disasters (Sonmez et al. 2025; Ceferino et al. 2024) as  
51 recovery for such structures takes a longer time, up to years (Koliou et al. 2020). This extended

52 time period allows researchers to extensively study damages and develop fragility-based damage  
53 functions that link infrastructure performance to hazard intensity for future events.

54 In contrast, power infrastructure needs to be restored much earlier as it supports other critical  
55 infrastructure such as transportation, financial institutions, and healthcare (Gim and Miller 2022).  
56 Thus, we need tools and methods to document outages promptly to understand the coupled inter-  
57 action between power infrastructure and natural hazards, thereby improving their understanding  
58 of grid vulnerability across different components of power systems (Arora and Ceferino 2023a).  
59 Moreover, integrating historical outages with probabilistic hazard analysis can identify regions  
60 most vulnerable to power outages during future natural disasters (Alemazkoor et al. 2020). These  
61 insights can inform policy and investments in mitigation interventions, such as grid hardening,  
62 targeting the regions with the greatest need. Finally, damage functions that relate power outages  
63 and hazard intensity would allow for an initial estimate of outages similar to building damage  
64 estimates available immediately after earthquakes (Wald et al. 2010).

65 Understanding the effects of natural disasters on electrical systems requires detailed records of  
66 power outages. In many regions, there is a lack of automatic metering infrastructure to report and  
67 document outages. Moreover, automatic reporting could be hindered during large-scale disasters  
68 due to damage to infrastructure (PowerOutage 2022). In addition, most utilities do not allow public  
69 access for power system and outage reports due to security concerns, as it exposes the vulnerabilities  
70 of the grid (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2017; U.S. Department  
71 of Energy 2022).

72 Satellite observations offer a globally scalable approach for mapping power outages and in-  
73 frastructure vulnerabilities, especially in data-scarce or inaccessible regions (Román et al. 2019;  
74 Mitsova et al. 2024). Nighttime light imagery has been used to understand power loss during  
75 hurricanes (Montoya-Rincon et al. 2022), but its application to map actual outages remains limited.  
76 Most existing studies focus on long-duration disasters, aggregating nightlight imagery over several  
77 days (Azad and Ghandehari 2021; Mitsova et al. 2024), which limits their ability to capture the dy-  
78 namics of short-term outages. Furthermore, prior studies have primarily quantified the percentage

79 change in nightlight intensity rather than quantifying outages. In (Cole et al. 2017), the authors  
80 used nightlight data to estimate outages based on the number of failed isolating devices, which  
81 required detailed information on power system components. Their analysis was limited to cross-  
82 validation for outages during Superstorm Sandy (2012) in Connecticut and Western Massachusetts.  
83 In contrast, our model is designed to be generalizable with power system independent variables  
84 across different geographies and events, making it globally scalable. The percent drop in nightlight  
85 intensity does not directly reflect actual outages due to inherent limitations, such as nightlights do  
86 not approach zero even for complete blackout, and uncertainties in nightlight retrievals due to cloud  
87 cover and various illuminating sources such as traffic lights (Román et al. 2019).


88 Machine learning and deep learning methods, including neural networks, have demonstrated  
89 significant potential for predicting disaster-induced power outages (Arora and Ceferino 2023b;  
90 Guikema et al. 2010; Wanik et al. 2017; Shashaani et al. 2018). In (Lebakula et al. 2024),  
91 authors leveraged nightlight imagery to also estimate the county-level population in the US using  
92 deep learning techniques. These advances highlight the potential of machine learning techniques to  
93 predict power outages using satellite-derived nighttime data. However, there is a need to understand  
94 the relationship between nightlights and power outages to model the power outages more accurately.

95 This paper first explores the relationship between attenuation of nightlights and power outages.  
96 Additionally, other factors, such as moon conditions, could also affect the detection of power  
97 outages. Thus, we include nightlight attenuation and additional parameters that can be related to  
98 power outages to develop a machine learning model for documenting power outages using satellite-  
99 based nightlights. To our knowledge, this is the first study to develop a physics-based interpretation  
100 of nightlight intensity loss with power outages and incorporate it into machine learning models to  
101 estimate the fraction of customers without power at the county level.

102 To develop model for percent customer outage using nightlights, we obtained county-level  
103 power outage data from (Brelsford et al. 2024) for major historical hurricane events, including  
104 Irma (2017) for Florida, Michael (2018) for Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia, Ida (2021) in  
105 Louisiana, and Ian (2022) in Florida to train and validate our model. We tested the generalization

106 of the model on out-of-sample outage observations from Puerto Rico following Hurricane Fiona  
107 (2022). We also present the results on documenting power outages caused by earthquakes in Turkey  
108 in February 2023 and Myanmar in March 2025. Finally, we present an example of developing an  
109 outage damage function by correlating satellite-derived outages with hazard intensity measures for  
110 Myanmar.

## 111 NIGHTTIME LIGHTS



**Fig. 1.** Comparison of nightlight imagery before (left: October 6, 2018) and after (right: October 12, 2018) Hurricane Michael’s landfall in Florida. A significant drop in nightlights is visible across the most affected counties (outlined in the figure), highlighting the widespread power outages caused by the storm.

112 The Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (SNPP) is a sun-synchronous satellite equipped  
113 with the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite, which includes a day/night band sensor that can  
114 capture nightlight imagery daily at a 500 m resolution (Román et al. 2018). For this study, we used  
115 the updated nightlight product-VNP46A2, corrected for the Bidirectional Reflectance Distribution  
116 Function, to account for varying illuminating conditions caused by moonlight and atmospheric  
117 conditions.

118 Previous research has demonstrated a correlation between post-disaster reductions in nightlight  
119 intensity and observed power outages at regional scales (Mitsova et al. 2024; Azad and Ghandehari  
120 2021). For example, Figure 1 illustrates a significant drop in nightlight intensities across Florida’s  
121 most affected counties following Hurricane Michael (2018), with reported outages approaching


122 90%. However, the observed decrease in nightlight intensity often does not exhibit a direct  
123 proportional relationship with the actual fraction of customers without electricity. For instance, due  
124 to the inherent properties of the sensor, nightlight data has a minimum detectable intensity threshold  
125 for valid measurements. This threshold prevents percent nightlight reductions from approaching  
126 zero, even for complete (100%) outages. Additionally, clouds obstruct satellite coverage, resulting  
127 in varying spatial coverage of building footprints and nightlight distributions. Thus, the direct  
128 percent difference between pre- and post-disaster nightlights might not accurately represent outage  
129 severity. This highlights the need for an interpretation of the relationship between nightlight  
130 intensity decay and outages.

131 Since SNNP sensors can introduce noise in nightlight observations, we aggregated intensity  
132 at the county level by summing across all pixels with the presence of at least one building. We  
133 utilize the Microsoft open building footprints within US (Microsoft 2018) and OpenStreetMap  
134 footprints from Humanitarian Data Exchange (Humanitarian Data Exchange 2014) for regions  
135 outside US. This minimizes noise and excludes lights from non-relevant sources, such as traffic  
136 lights. Additionally, some daily nightlight pixels within a county could be corrupted due to the  
137 presence of clouds or poor nightlight retrieval. We use the cloud flag and mandatory quality flag  
138 in VNP46A2 nightlight product to remove such affected pixels.

139 Previous studies have found a strong correlation between the varying urban land cover and  
140 total nightlight intensity (Cheon and Kim 2020). We explored the relationship between total daily  
141 nightlight intensity and building footprint in a county obtained from Microsoft building footprints  
142 (Microsoft 2018). Consistent with previous studies, we observe a linear relationship between the  
143 total building footprint and the aggregated nightlight intensity at the county level (Cheon and Kim  
144 2020; Román et al. 2018). Figure 2 shows this trend for Bay County, Florida, where daily building  
145 footprints coverage correlates strongly in a linear trend with total nightlight intensity, except during  
146 the power outages caused by Hurricane Michael between 12 and 17 October 2018.

147 To account for varying satellite coverage, we define a normalized intensity metric ( $I$ ) as the ratio  
148 of total nightlight intensity to total building footprint captured on a given day across a county (see

149 Methods). This normalized intensity metric is used to account for variability in building footprint  
150 coverage resulting from changing visibility conditions.




**Fig. 2.** Linear relationship between total nightlight intensity and building footprints in Bay County, Florida, from May 1 to October 31, 2018.

## 151 PHYSICS BASED FORMULATION FOR NIGHTLIGHTS

152 Previous research has modeled nightlight reductions from foliage cover using parametric forms  
153 analogous to Beer's Law, where observed intensity decreases exponentially with vegetation density  
154 (Román et al. 2018). We adopt a similar approach in which the ratio of post- to pre-disaster nightlight  
155 intensity at the county level decreases exponentially with the fraction of customers experiencing  
156 power outages (see Methods).

157 By analogy with light attenuation, we treat outage-affected areas as a medium that reduces the  
158 luminous sources. While outages are discrete events (e.g., individual buildings losing electricity)  
159 rather than a continuous medium, their aggregate effect on observed luminosity resembles atten-  
160 uation. This analogy enables a tractable relationship between outage fraction ( $f_o$ ) and nightlight  
161 reduction, which we model as a linear function in logarithmic space, i.e.,  $\log(I/\bar{I})$ , where  $\bar{I}$  is the

162 average normalized intensity across the 30 most recent cloud-free pre-disaster days. This physics-  
163 based analogous interpretation enables modeling a non-linear relation between nightlight loss and  
164 the extent of power outages.




**Fig. 3.** Pre- and post-Hurricane Michael nightlight intensity distribution in Bay County and Jefferson County in Florida.

165 To observe and detect outages through nightlights, we must look for significant deviations in the  
166 nightlights during disasters. However, low-lit areas, such as sparsely populated rural counties with  
167 fewer buildings, capture nightlight intensity mostly close to the VIIRS sensor's threshold. Thus,  
168 such regions exhibit variations in nightlights across days due to noise from clouds and varying  
169 moonlight conditions, and significant deviations in nightlights after disasters are not observed.  
170 Figure 3 shows the distribution of nightlights in Bay County with a higher population density of  
171 124 persons per square mile and Franklin County with a lower population density of 9 persons per  
172 square mile. In Figure 3, we observe significant deviations in nightlights across urban Bay County  
173 in pre- and post-Hurricane Michael (2018) satellite imagery, but deviations are insignificant in rural  
174 Franklin County. Hence, we focus on power outage detection in brighter regions with a population  
175 density of at least 25 persons per square mile.

176 High cloud cover can reduce satellite visibility and introduce uncertainties in nightlight values,  
177 potentially leading to underestimation or overestimation of power outages. To mitigate this, we  
178 include only those days when satellite observations cover at least one-third of the building footprint

179 and the land area in a county. For a robust baseline intensity estimation, we exclude days where  $I$   
 180 deviates by more than one standard deviation from  $\bar{I}$ . We further remove noisy observations where  
 181  $\log(I/\bar{I}) > 0.5$ , and where  $\log(I/\bar{I}) > 0$  for fraction outages more than 0.2, as we expect negative  
 182  $\log(I/\bar{I})$  during power outages. After filtering, 2.2% outage data points were excluded, leaving  
 183 2,700 data points for training and validation. The 2,700 data points included 229 unique county-  
 184 hurricane combinations, which we split into an 70:30 ratio, resulting in 1,936 training and 764  
 185 validation data points. We observe a strong Spearman correlation coefficient  $|\rho|$  of 0.65 between  
 186  $\log(I/\bar{I})$  and the actual outage fraction, which highlights its utility as a strong predictive feature  
 187 (Figure 4). To test the strong correlation between  $\log(I/\bar{I})$  and  $f_O$ , we also examined alternative  
 188 representations of nightlight decay, such as  $I/\bar{I}$  and  $\sqrt{I/\bar{I}}$ , which showed correlation coefficients  
 189 15% and 8% lower, respectively, than that of  $\log(I/\bar{I})$  with fractional outages.



**Fig. 4.** Correlation between fraction of customers without power and  $\log(I/\bar{I})$ , showing Spearman's  $|\rho| = 0.65$ .


190 From Figure 3, urban areas exhibit significant deviations in nightlight distribution during  
 191 outages, whereas rural regions show minimal deviations. This difference is likely due to the large  
 192 energy consumption in urban areas, which drops significantly after a disaster. Thus, we include

193 a county’s mean pre-disaster nightlight ( $L_M$ ) as an explanatory variable to account for varying  
 194 nightlight distribution across counties. This can help distinguish counties with low baseline  
 195 nightlight and minimal observed post-disaster deviation, which may still experience significant  
 196 outages.

197 We also included the proportion of the buildings’ footprints covered by the satellite ( $f_p$ ) within  
 198 the pixels as input to the outage model. Regions with larger building coverage exhibit higher  
 199 nightlight reductions during large outages, whereas areas with lower coverage may show lower  
 200 or noisy deviations. Hence, including  $f_p$  captures the variations in nightlight intensities due  
 201 to heterogeneity in structural densities. Additionally, building density ( $\rho_b$ ) could indicate the  
 202 distribution of vulnerable power systems (distribution lines and poles) in urban and rural areas  
 203 (Arora and Ceferino 2023b). Significant differences could exist in the propagation and recovery of  
 204 outages in gridded urban and radial rural grids. We also include  $\rho_b$  as input to the outage model to  
 205 capture variations in grid topology.

206 Moonlight can affect the intensity of the nightlight captured by SNPP sensors. As reported by  
 207 (Román et al. 2018), the intensity of nightlight varies with the illumination fraction of the moon.  
 208 Thus, we also included the Moon fraction ( $M$ ) as one of the inputs to correct the moonlight effects.

209 **POWER OUTAGE MODELING FRAMEWORK**



**Fig. 5.** Power outage modeling pipeline from acquiring nightlight imagery to predicting the fraction of customers without power.

210 We perform outage detection in two steps to address noise and data imbalance. Noise in  
 211 nightlight intensity retrieval can introduce significant variability in intensity drop, especially when  
 212 there are close to no outages. Furthermore, the data set is unbalanced, only  $\sim 18.3\%$  of the data

213 points have outages greater than 0.05. This imbalance could result in regression models overfitting  
214 to lower power outages. Since emergency responders and policymakers prioritize high-outage  
215 scenarios, it is crucial that the model correctly identifies and predicts high-outage scenarios.

216 To overcome noise and data imbalance, we first develop a classification model to distinguish  
217 between low- and high-outage days. Here, we define low outages as  $f_0 < 0.05$  and high outages as  
218  $f_0 \geq 0.05$ . Second, we develop a regression model to estimate the fraction of customers without  
219 power for days classified as high-outage events. Figure 5 presents the process of predicting outages  
220 using night-light imagery.

221 Previous studies have demonstrated the successful application of machine learning and deep  
222 learning techniques to estimate power outages across various hazards based on the physics-based  
223 intensity, such as winds of natural hazards (Nateghi et al. 2014). Here, we aim to develop a  
224 power outage model that captures the relationship between nightlight attenuation and the fraction  
225 of customer power outages applicable globally to predict outages at regional scales. Developed  
226 countries, such as the US, have outage monitoring systems, *e.g.*, EAGLE-I, to track outages. These  
227 systems are used by local utilities and planners for situational awareness and decision-making,  
228 especially when power systems are overwhelmed during disasters. The records of historical outage  
229 events could also be utilized to understand the impact of natural disasters on power systems, thereby  
230 anticipating and mitigating the consequences of future extreme events. Thus, a globally applicable  
231 power outage model could help local emergency management restore power outages in regions  
232 without outage monitoring, as power is necessary for the operation of emergency systems such as  
233 hospitals. This will also help plan resilient future grids more effectively.

234 To that end, we develop a machine-learning model that links reductions in highlights to power  
235 outages during natural disasters. Artificial neural networks (ANNs) can capture the nonlinear  
236 relationships and interactions among input variables, enabling more accurate modeling of power  
237 outages. We employ ANNs for classification and regression tasks to model the fraction of customers  
238 without power ( $f_0$ ) as a function of the previously described input parameters (Figure 5).

239 However, in our efforts to also develop a simple and globally applicable power outage model,

240 we also present logistic regression to classify low and high outage events, and linear regression to  
241 predict outages for high outage events. We also compare the performance of logistic and linear  
242 regression combination to model outage against the ANNs-based model. Please see Methods for  
243 an explanation of both models.

## 244 **Models Validation**


245 Due to the class imbalance between low and high outage points, the classification model may  
246 overfit, primarily predicting low outages. To mitigate this, we randomly resampled low-outage  
247 cases to match the number of high-outage points, thereby training the classification model.

248 We used the *sklearn* library in Python to train and validate logistic and linear regression  
249 (Pedregosa et al. 2011). We used the Keras library in Python to build and train our Multi-Layer  
250 Perceptron (MLP) ANN models (Martín et al. 2015). We performed cross-validation to select the  
251 best architecture for classification and regression models of ANN with an input layer of a single  
252 hidden layer with five features, a single hidden layer with six neurons, and an output layer with only  
253 one output (see Methods and Supplementary Text S1). We use the Adam optimizer with a learning  
254 rate of  $10^{-4}$  to train our models in mini-batches of 8 samples. We employed early stopping if the  
255 validation loss did not improve for 25 consecutive epochs, where one epoch represents a complete  
256 pass through the training data. We achieved the lowest validation loss for the classification model  
257 after 341 epochs and for the regression model after 1357 epochs.

258 We present the confusion matrix for logistic and ANN classification models on the testing data,  
259 which includes 616 points for low-outage events and 148 points for high-outage events, in Figure  
260 6. The large difference in the number of low- and high-power outage data points represents the  
261 overall imbalance in power outage data, which is intuitive, as extreme power outage events are rare.  
262 We also present statistics on the classification models in Table 1. In Table 1, the accuracy means  
263 the ratio of events (either lower outage or high outage) classified correctly to the total events. The  
264 recall represents the ratio of the event classified correctly to the total instances of that event in the  
265 testing data. The precision represents the ratio of correctly classified events to the total number of  
266 cases of that event predicted on the testing data. Please also refer to the Methods section for the

267 confusion matrix and formulas for accuracy, recall, and precision.

268 We used the Keras library in Python to build and train our ANN models (Martín et al. 2015). We  
269 performed cross-validation to select the best architecture for classification and regression models  
270 of ANN with an input layer of a single hidden layer with five features, a single hidden layer with  
271 six neurons, and an output layer with only one output (see Methods and Supplementary Text S1).  
272 We use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of  $10^{-4}$  to train our models in mini-batches of  
273 8 samples. We employed early stopping if the validation loss did not improve for 25 consecutive  
274 epochs, where one epoch represents a complete pass through the training data. We achieved the  
275 lowest validation loss for the classification model after 341 epochs and for the regression model  
276 after 1357 epochs.



**Fig. 6.** Confusion matrix for logistic regression and ANN methods for classification of low and outage events.

277 All statistical performance metrics, including accuracy (75.9% for logistic regression and  
278 83.7% for the artificial neural network), are comparable between the two models. Hence, we  
279 can also deploy logistic regression to capture high-outage events. However, both models exhibit  
280 relatively low precision (43% for logistic and 56% for ANN model) for high-outage predictions.  
281 This is primarily due to the class imbalance in the dataset, where low-outage events significantly  
282 outnumber high-outage events. Consequently, any misclassification of low-outage cases as high-  
283 outage cases disproportionately impacts precision. Given the importance of detecting high-outage  
284 events, we also emphasize recall for high-outages, which reached 71.6% on the validation dataset

285 for the logistic model. Thus, we can correctly identify 71.6% of the cases with high outages.  
 286 Furthermore, the average outage for high-outage points misclassified as low outages is only 0.20  
 287 for logistic regression and 0.19 for the ANN classification model.


288 Additionally, the logistic regression classification model achieved an accuracy of 77.8% in the  
 289 training data compared to 75.9% on the testing data. Similarly, the ANN achieved an accuracy of  
 290 80.5% on the training data compared to 83.7% on the testing data. The close agreement between  
 291 training and validation performance suggests that our model generalizes well and is not overfitting.

292 We used the high-outage points ( $f_o \geq 0.5$ ) in the training data to fit ANN and linear regression  
 293 models. The linear regression model achieved an mean absolute error (MAE) of 0.14 on the training  
 294 and validation datasets. The ANN regression model achieved an MAE of 0.12 on the training and  
 295 0.13 on the testing datasets. The linear regression model also shows comparable performance to  
 296 the ANN regression model. Similar to classification models, linear regression models also do not  
 297 overfit to the training data, as evidenced by comparable MAEs on training and validation datasets.


Model	Accuracy	Precision		Recall	
		Low Outage	High Outage	Low Outage	High Outage
Logistic Regression	75.9%	91.8%	42.7%	76.9%	71.6%
ANN	83.7%	93.7%	55.9%	85.5%	76.3%

**TABLE 1.** Comparison of classification models across performance metrics

298 We present the scatter plot on test data for the combined classification and regression models  
 299 in Figure 7. We report weighted mean absolute errors (WMAE) for both models (see Methods) in  
 300 Figure 7. WMAE is similar to MAE, but assigns greater weight to cases where actual high-outage  
 301 points are misclassified as low-outage points, emphasizing the severity of missing major outages.  
 302 In addition to demonstrating performance comparable to that of ANN models, logistic regression  
 303 for classification and linear regression for predicting outage levels offer the advantage of being  
 304 easily expressed through analytical equations. This enhances their interpretability and facilitates  
 305 broader applicability across different geographic regions by using simplified equations. Here, we  
 306 also present the classification and regression models in Figure 8 with coefficients of trained models,  
 307 which can be used across different regions to predict the fraction of customers without power ( $f_o$ ).



**Fig. 7.** Actual and predicted fraction of outages for the combined classification and regression models.



**Fig. 8.** Coefficients for the trained logistic regression and linear regression models.


308 The coefficients provided in 8 are for scaled features with zero mean and a standard deviation of  
309 one to avoid bias due to different scale of features (see Methods).

310 We find a negative coefficient for the decay parameter  $\log(I/\bar{I})$ , which indicates that outages  
311 increase as the decay parameter decreases. In contrast, a negative coefficient for building density  
312 represents that more populated urban areas with gridded power infrastructure are more robust to  
313 outages, which is consistent with the literature (Mitsova et al. 2018). We use a combination of  
314 logistic and linear regression models, as presented in Figure 8 to show the application of our  
315 developed model to detect power outages across several events.

## 316 DOCUMENT OUTAGES ACROSS EVENTS

### 317 Puerto Rico Outages During Hurricane Fiona (2022)

318 We evaluated our combined classification and regression models using Hurricane Fiona (2022),  
319 which made landfall in Puerto Rico on September 18, 2022. Figure 9a shows the predicted power  
320 outages using nightlight imagery with our developed approach, and Figure 9b presents a snapshot  
321 of the observed power outages reported by (PowerOutage 2022) on 25 September 2022, during the  
322 ongoing recovery of Puerto Rico communities. Note that the snapshot from (PowerOutage 2022)  
323 report discrete outage values (0.1, 0.3, 0.6, 1), whereas our model outputs continuous values from  
324 0 to 1. Our model qualitatively captures the spatial pattern of extreme outages consistent with those  
325 reported by (PowerOutage 2022). In an effort to make a comparison between discrete outage values  
326 from (PowerOutage 2022) and our continuous, we classify the outages into four categories, i.e.,  
327 low, medium, high, and severe. For the discrete case, we assign outages with 0.1 fractional outages  
328 to low, 0.3 to moderate, 0.6 to major, and 1.0 to severe category. For our continuous predictions, we  
329 assigned fractional outages less than 0.1 to low, between 0.1 to 0.3 to moderate, 0.3 to 0.6 to major,  
330 0.6 to 1.0 to severe category. Extended Figure 1 presents the multiclass confusion for outages in  
331 76 municipalities of Puerto Rico, excluding 2 municipalities with observations obscured by cloud  
332 cover. The overall accuracy of multiclass classification of outage levels across Puerto Rico is 62%.  
333 Furthermore, the severe outages had a recall of 86% and 70% of major outages are either classified



**Fig. 9.** **a.** Predicted fraction of customers without power in Puerto Rico on 09/25/2022 following Hurricane Fiona (2022). **b.** Snapshot of observed outages reported by (PowerOutage 2022). **c.** Power outage trajectories after Hurricane Fiona for Eagle-I recorded outages in black, proposed method (combined classification and regression models) in blue, and interpreted fractions of outages as the same as loss in nightlights in red. Initial satellite observations could be hindered by the formation of dense clouds during hurricanes.

334 as major or severe outages. The model shows potential to categorize and identify the most extreme  
 335 outages.

336 Next, we obtained the power outage data for Puerto Rico during the storm from the EAGLE-I

337 dataset. The outages recorded in the EAGLE-I data set were available for seven health divisions  
338 encompassing Puerto Rico after Hurricane Fiona (2022) (Brelsford et al. 2024). These seven  
339 divisions include 78 municipalities (similar to counties) in Puerto Rico. The seven health divisions’  
340 scale and county-level predictions differ, but we still compare the total outages across Puerto Rico  
341 (Figure 9c). Due to the clouds obscuring the nightlights, power outage prediction is unavailable in  
342 all regions. Therefore, we assign these regions the mean fraction of customers without power for the  
343 available areas. We obtained total outages by multiplying the fractional outages in a municipality  
344 by the number of customers. Immediately after Hurricane Fiona (2022), there was no imagery  
345 due to clouds, so the outage peak was detected after a few days using nightlights. Our predicted  
346 recovery closely follows the actual recovery of Puerto Rico. We also present in Figure 9c the  
347 outages correlated as a percent change in mean nightlight across the municipality without any  
348 normalization with building footprint as referred in the literature (Montoya-Rincon et al. 2022).  
349 The peak of detected outages using our model has only 13% error compared to 21.1% error for  
350 outages correlating based on existing approach. Moreover, the existing approach consistently  
351 overestimates outages even during recovery, whereas our proposed method tracks the observed  
352 recovery trajectory more closely. Thus, our developed model can help detect the outages more  
353 accurately using nightlights.


354 The model could still occasionally predict zero outages despite reported outages. Such discrep-  
355 ancies could be addressed through temporal smoothing, *i.e.*, interpolating outage values on days  
356 with zero predictions if outages are predicted for adjacent days.

### 357 **Outages in Turkey after the 2023 Earthquake**

358 On February 6, 2023, Turkey experienced a devastating sequence of earthquakes that severely  
359 disrupted critical infrastructure across a wide region. The initial earthquake, a magnitude 7.8  
360 event, struck at 1:17 UTC approximately 34 kilometers west of Gaziantep. This was followed by a  
361 powerful aftershock of magnitude 7.5 centered in Kahramanmaş Province (Ceferino et al. 2024).  
362 By February 23, 2023, more than 200 aftershocks were recorded in the region (Li et al. 2023). The  
363 districts of Antakya and Defne in Hatay Province, Turkey, especially suffered significant building

364 damage from these powerful earthquakes. Furthermore, on 20 February 2023, a 6.3-magnitude  
 365 earthquake occurred in Hatay. This earthquake jolted southern Turkey, exacerbating the damage  
 366 from the February 6 earthquakes (Sakarya et al. 2024).

367 There were no measures to track the damage to the power infrastructure after these massive  
 368 earthquakes. Li et al. (2023) measured the communication network in the regions around the  
 369 epicenters of above mentioned earthquakes. We utilize our outage models on nightlights to identify  
 370 power outages in Turkey following the earthquakes. We used nightlight imagery to track the outages  
 371 in heavily damaged districts of Antakya and Defne (Figure 10).




**Fig. 10.** Power outages tracked using our model in the districts of Antakya and Defne in Turkey after the February 2023 earthquakes.

372 Both regions exhibit a significant decline in the proportion of consumers with power following  
 373 the earthquakes on February 6. Due to clouds, the first power outage prediction is available in  
 374 Antakya on February 12, 2023, and in Defne on February 10, 2023. The peak fractional outage  
 375 recorded with our model after the February 6 earthquakes is 0.46 in Antakya and 0.45 in Defne.  
 376 Additionally, after the earthquake on 20 February, our nightlight-based model predicts peak fraction  
 377 outage of 0.73 in Antakya and 0.61 in Defne. The Defne district shows quicker response to power  
 378 outages than Antakya, which had suffered more damage. Our model predicts zero outages in Defne

379 on February 15th, which could be a false negative due to nightlight variation caused by clouds. This  
 380 could also be due to recovery efforts, which could introduce extra lighting that could be mistaken  
 381 for lights from buildings. Thus, we apply temporal interpolation to interpolate outages for days  
 382 if the preceding and successive outage predictions were non-zero. On 15 March 2023, reports  
 383 emerged of flash flooding in Turkey, which could have triggered power outages again in Antakya  
 384 and Defne (Project HOPE 2023). Moreover, news reports the concerns about the unstable power  
 385 supply in Antakya even months after the earthquake. Our proposed method can potentially capture  
 386 the possible power outages during the worst-affected days across different hazards and different  
 387 geographical regions.

388 **Outages in Myanmar after the 2023 Earthquake**



**Fig. 11. a.** MMI across Myanmar after the 7.7 magnitude earthquake on March 28, 2025. **b.** Spatial distribution of power outages across Myanmar as derived from satellite-based observations. **c.** Fragility curve showing the relationship between MMI and fraction outages.

389 On March 28, 2025, at approximately 12:50 p.m. local time in Myanmar, an earthquake  
 390 of magnitude 7.7 struck near Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city. The earthquake was  
 391 responsible for more than 3,500 fatalities and more than 5,000 injuries. The regions of Mandalay,  
 392 Nayi Pyi Taw, and Magway suffered significant damage from the earthquake. USGS impact

393 summary of the event reports damage to more than 100,000 homes (U.S. Geological Survey nd).

394 There were reports of widespread outages after the earthquake throughout Myanmar (Shahzada  
395 et al. 2025). Furthermore, power outages began to recover the morning after the earthquake  
396 (POWERCHINA 2025). This provides an opportunity to document outages based on satellite-  
397 based observations. We used satellite imagery to predict outages in Myanmar on March 28,  
398 following an earthquake. In Figure 11, we show the distribution of Modified Mercalli Intensity  
399 (MMI) and predicted power outages after the earthquake. Our model predicted 99% outages in the  
400 Nay Pyi Taw region, 73% in Yangon, 67% in Bago (East), 48% in Mandalay, 36% in Magway,  
401 23% in Kayah, 23% in Shan (South) and 19% in Kayin. These areas were the worst affected by  
402 the earthquake. Our model also predicted 39% outages in the Kachin region, which is not directly  
403 related to the earthquake but could be related to the conflict at the Myanmar Border (Council on  
404 Foreign Relations nd).

405 Historically, power outages resulting from natural disasters have not been well-documented.  
406 This provides an opportunity to understand the vulnerability of power systems at a global scale.  
407 Furthermore, documenting such outages could be utilized to develop damage functions similar  
408 to fragility curves developed for building damage. This would allow officials and emergency  
409 responders to identify the places in need and arrange for backups until the power is recovered fully.  
410 Here, we utilize our predicted outages (excluding the Kachin region as outages might be due to other  
411 conflicts) in Myanmar to fit a lognormal function to determine the fraction of outages as a function  
412 of MMI, presented in Figure 11c (Zentner et al. 2017) (see Methods). Note that the fragility curve  
413 for outages as a function of MMI is explicitly presented for the Myanmar region using our nightlight-  
414 based outage prediction model, other regions may exhibit different power grid vulnerabilities and  
415 consequently may have different fragility curve. Applying our model to nightlights to document  
416 historical outages during major natural disasters could help link disaster intensity (e.g., MMI for  
417 earthquakes) with outage patterns, allowing rapid assessment and timely deployment of emergency  
418 backups for severely affected regions. Additionally, fragility-based outage estimate in combination  
419 with probabilistic analysis, could identify the most vulnerable regions to future disasters, enabling

420 informed decisions on policies such as grid hardening, prioritization of infrastructure investments,  
421 and target emergency preparedness strategies (Arora and Ceferino 2023a).

## 422 DISCUSSION

423 This study demonstrates the utility of satellite-derived nightlight data for mapping power out-  
424 ages at a global scale. Identifying vulnerabilities in power infrastructure is a critical step toward  
425 enhancing system resilience and informing future grid planning efforts. Furthermore, this frame-  
426 work provides a foundation for rapid post-disaster assessment, particularly in data-scarce regions,  
427 by integrating satellite observations with infrastructure vulnerability analysis.

428 Previous research mostly interpreted outages directly as drop in nightlights (Montoya-Rincon  
429 et al. 2022) or utilized exclusive power system information with nightlights for a particular disasters  
430 to a limited geographic region (Cole et al. 2017), which limited the potential of nightlights to  
431 interpret outages at a global scale. We presented a novel framework with hazard- and power  
432 system- independent variables to estimate power outages using satellite-observed nightlight data.  
433 We modeled the attenuation of nightlight intensity in the logarithmic scale, which showed a good  
434 correlation ( $|\rho| = 0.65$ ) with fraction of customers without power. Additionally, we incorporate  
435 building density as a proxy for the spatial distribution of power systems, enabling a more accurate  
436 estimation of outage impacts.

437 There is inherent noise in satellite observations due to clouds and nightlight retrievals at satellite  
438 sensor, particularly at fractional outage levels close to zero, and only 18.3% of the available data  
439 corresponds to outage fractions greater than 0.05, which limits the sample size for model fitting.  
440 To address the noise and data imbalance challenge, we developed an outage detection model using  
441 nightlights in two stages. First, we developed a classification model to classify low and high outage  
442 events with a boundary at 0.05 fraction of customers without power. Second, we developed a  
443 regression model to predict the fraction of customers without power for high outage events.

444 We developed logistic regression models for outage classification and linear regression models  
445 for predicting the magnitude of outages. Recognizing that artificial neural networks (ANNs) are  
446 capable of capturing complex nonlinear relationships, we also implemented ANN-based classifi-

447 cation and regression models. Our results showed that the combined use of logistic and linear  
448 regression models achieved performance comparable to that of ANN models on the test dataset. In  
449 addition to their comparable performance, these simpler models are easily expressed as mathemat-  
450 ical equations, making them more accessible for global users seeking to apply satellite nightlight  
451 data for outage assessment.

452 We trained our model on major historical hurricanes, and the model performed well on the  
453 out-of-sample case of Hurricane Fiona (2022), demonstrating strong generalization. Our model  
454 showed a peak outage error of 13%, compared to 21.1% when outages were estimated using  
455 percentage changes only in nightlight intensity for Hurricane Fiona (2022). We also presented  
456 the case of Antakya and Defne, the worst-hit districts from the 2023 Turkey earthquakes. Both  
457 districts experienced outages following the initial earthquake on February 6, 2023, with the outages  
458 worsening after a 6.4 magnitude earthquake struck the Hatay region in southern Turkey on February  
459 20, 2023.

460 We further extended our study to predict outages in Myanmar following the March 28, 2025,  
461 earthquake, which revealed a strong correlation with the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) in  
462 Myanmar. Based on this analysis, we developed a lognormal fragility curve that relates the fraction  
463 of customers without power to MMI, supporting efforts toward rapid damage assessment following  
464 disasters. Similar regional fragility functions could be developed for other regions worldwide to  
465 strengthen disaster resilience.

466 Our approach relies on openly available and hazard- and power system-independent inputs,  
467 making it generalizable and adaptable to a wide range of outage scenarios. Although satellite  
468 observations immediately after a natural disaster may be limited by cloud cover, developing and  
469 refining historical damage functions based on hazard intensity can still support rapid assessments  
470 and improve the long-term risk assessment of power outages caused by extreme events. Additionally,  
471 long-term outage mapping can aid in post-disaster damage assessment, inform emergency response  
472 efforts, and provide insights into population displacement in severely affected regions.

## 473 **METHODS**

## 474 **Outage Dataset**

475 We obtained county-level power outage data from Oak Ridge National Laboratory Database  
476 (Brelsford et al. 2024) for major historical hurricane events, including Irma (2017) for Florida,  
477 Michael (2018) for Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia, Ida (2021) in Louisiana, and Ian (2022)  
478 in Florida for training and validating our model. Since nightlight imagery would be able to capture  
479 outages during nighttime, we averaged the reported outages from 9 p.m. to 4 a.m. local time for  
480 training, validation, and testing. Our prediction variable is the fraction of customers without power  
481 ( $f_O$ ) in a given county. The dataset included 229 unique county-hurricane combinations, which  
482 we split into a 70:30 ratio, resulting in 1,936 training and validation and 764 testing data points.  
483 Since there is a limited number of data points for training and validation, we performed 10-fold  
484 cross-validation for hyper-parameter tuning (see Supplementary). Finally, we divided the 1,936  
485 data points into a 90:10 ratio for early stopping of training for ANN to avoid overfitting of the model  
486 to the training data.

## 487 **Normalized Nightlight Intensity**

488 We define a normalized intensity metric as the ratio of total nightlight intensity to total building  
489 footprint captured on a given day across counties. This is formulated as,

$$490 \quad I = \frac{\sum L_i}{\sum A_i}, \quad (1)$$

491 where  $L_i$  is nightlight intensity of the  $i^{th}$  pixel containing at least one building and  $A_i$  is the building  
492 footprint area (in sq. meters) in that pixel. The building footprints are obtained from Microsoft  
493 open building footprints for regions within US (Microsoft 2018) and OpenStreetMap footprints  
494 from Humanitarian Data Exchange (Humanitarian Data Exchange 2014) for regions outside US.

## 495 Nightlights Decay and Fractional Outages

496 Based on previous studies for attenuation of nightlights when passing through vegetation, we  
497 developed an analogous relationship for the decay of nightlights during power outages as,

$$498 \frac{I}{\bar{I}} \propto \exp(-f_O) \quad (2)$$

499 Here,  $f_O$  is the fraction of customers without power,  $I$  is the normalized nightlight intensity  
500 on a given day (Eq. 1),  $\bar{I}$  is the average normalized intensity across the 30 most recent cloud-free  
501 pre-disaster observations. We considered the 30 most recent cloud-free pre-disaster nights to define  
502 the baseline, as nightlight intensity can vary seasonally due to changing environmental conditions.  
503 Based on Eq. 2, we can model  $f_O$  as a linear function of nightlight intensity reduction in log space  
504 *i.e.*,  $\log(I/\bar{I})$ .

## 505 Feature Scaling

506 Machine learning algorithms, especially those that use gradient descent methods to learn  
507 coefficients, are highly sensitive to the scale of different values. Variables with a higher order of  
508 magnitude can dominate the regression and result in unreliable coefficients. Thus, we used the  
509 standard scaler, *i.e.*, converting values to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one based  
510 on the values of the variable present in the training set. For a variable  $v$ , scaling is given as

$$511 v_{\text{scaled}} = \frac{v - \mu_v}{\sigma_v} \quad (3)$$

512 where  $\mu_v$  and  $\sigma_v$  are the mean and standard deviations for the variable. In Table 2, we present  
513 the variables' mean and standard deviation to scale the feature for future predictions.

## 514 Logistic and Linear Regression

515 Logistic regression is one of the most widely used methods for binary classification (Hastie  
516 *et al.* 2009), which defines a boundary between the two binary classes based on the inputs. The  
517 boundary separating two binary classes can be represented as

Feature	$\mu_v$	$\sigma_v$
$\log(I/\bar{I})$	-0.063	0.281
$L_M(nW \cdot cm^{-2} \cdot sr^{-1})$	10.516	10.955
$f_p$	0.029	0.036
$M$	48.364	37.193
$\rho_b$ (building per sq. miles)	132.304	147.325

**TABLE 2.** Mean and Standard Deviation of Input Features

$$z = \left( \sum_{i=1}^n w_j x_{i,j} \right) + b \quad (4)$$

where  $x_{i,j}$  are the inputs,  $w_j$  are the weights,  $b$  is the bias,  $i$  represents one geographic region, such as county and  $j$  represents the input parameters. The sigmoid function is applied to convert  $z$  in Eq. 4 to represent the probability of classes and output ranges from 0 to 1. The sigmoid function is given as:

$$S(z) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z}} \quad (5)$$

If the output is greater than 0.5, it is classified as a high outage event; otherwise, it is classified as a low outage event. The weights and biases for logistic regression are learned through minimizing the cross entropy loss. We apply Ridge Regularization (Hoerl and Kennard 1970) with  $\lambda_c = 1$  to prevent overfitting to the training data which is given as.

$$L_c = \sum_{i=1}^N [y_{c,i} \log(S_c(x_i)) + (1 - y_{c,i}) \log(1 - S_c(x_i))] \quad (6a)$$

$$L_{c,reg} = L_c + \lambda_c ||w_i||^2 \quad (6b)$$

where  $N$  is the number of training samples,  $y_{c,i}$  is one for high outages, otherwise zero,  $S_c(x_i)$  is the probability output for high outages by the classification model, and  $w_i$  are the weights in Eq. 4. Here, we employ logistic regression to classify the day as a low outage ( $f_o \leq 0.05$ ) or a high

533 outage ( $f_O > 0.05$ ) in a county. For high outage events, we use a linear regression model to predict  
 534 the percentage of customers without power.

535 Since the fraction of customers without power should be bounded between zero and one, we  
 536 apply a transformation to our target variable. The transformation should be monotonic-increasing  
 537 for one-to-one mapping and differentiable for smooth optimization to obtain the weights for linear  
 538 regression (Dunn and Smyth 2018). Here, we use the logit transformation, as shown below.

$$539 \quad g(f_O) = \log\left(\frac{f_O}{1 - f_O}\right) \quad (7)$$

540 where  $g(f_O)$  is the logit transformation of the fraction of customers without power. So, the  
 541 linear regression is represented as.

$$542 \quad g(f_O) = \beta_j x_{i,j} + c \quad (8)$$

543 where  $\beta_j$  and  $c$  are the coefficients for  $j^{th}$  input parameter and intercept of linear regression.  
 544 The transformation  $f_O = 1/(1 + e^{-g(f_O)})$  gives the final output as a fraction of customers without  
 545 power. When applying the logit transformation on  $f_O$  in Eq. 7, it should be in the open interval,  
 546 i.e.,  $0 < f_O < 1$ . Without compromising generalizability and ensuring that our input variable in  
 547 Eq. 7 lies in the open interval between zero and one, we introduce a slack variable, as in (Arora  
 548 and Ceferino 2024).

$$549 \quad \tilde{f}_O = \begin{cases} f_O + \epsilon, & \text{if } f_O = 0 \\ f_O, & \text{if } 0 < f_O < 1 \\ f_O - \epsilon, & \text{if } f_O = 1 \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

550 Similarly to (Arora and Ceferino 2024), we chose  $\epsilon = 10^{-8}$ , to ensure no significant impact  
 551 on the precision of the predicted outages. Thus, we use  $\tilde{f}_O$  from Eq. 9 in Eqs. 7 and 8 to obtain  
 552 the fraction of customers without power using linear regression. Like Eq. 10b, we minimize the

553 regularized ridge loss  $\lambda_r = 1$  in linear regression to prevent overfitting, which is given as:

$$554 \quad L_r = \sum_{i=1}^N (g(f_{o,i}) - g(\hat{f}_{o,i}))^2 \quad (10a)$$

$$555 \quad L_{r,reg} = L_r + \lambda_r \|\beta_i\|^2, \quad (10b)$$

556 where  $N$  is the number of data points used to fit the linear regression,  $f_{o,i}$  and  $\hat{f}_{o,i}$  are the actual and  
557 predicted fraction of customers without power,  $g(\cdot)$  is the logit function in Eq. 7, and  $\beta_i$  are the  
558 weights in Eq. 8. We use the training data with values only above 0.05 for  $f_o$  to fit the regression  
559 model.

## 560 **Artificial Neural Network**

561 ANNs consist of multiple computational layers composed of single units, "neurons" that transmit  
562 information and learn non-linear patterns to perform classification and regression tasks (Haykin  
563 1994). Furthermore, they can better model the interaction between the input parameters, such as  
564 the aggregated attenuation in nightlights and pre-disaster median nightlights, to predict outages  
565 with higher accuracy.

566 In this study, we employed a feedforward neural network architecture for both classification and  
567 regression tasks. Each layer in an ANN performs linear operations, where every input is connected  
568 to each output through learnable weights. A non-linear activation function is then applied element-  
569 wise to the output, which is essential for capturing the complex non-linear interactions between  
570 input and output variables. The operation performed for each layer of the neural network can be  
571 given as,

$$572 \quad O = G(W \times I + b) \quad (11)$$

573 where  $O$  is the set of output vectors of length  $k_2$ ,  $I$  is the set of input vectors of length  $k_1$ ,  $W$  is the  
574 matrix of weight parameters of size  $k_1 \times k_2$  with each corresponding to connection between one  
575 input and one output,  $b$  is the bias, and  $G$  is an activation function applied element-wise for each  
576 layer.

577 For both the classification and regression models, we used the rectified linear unit (ReLU)  
 578 activation function in the hidden layer and the sigmoid activation function in the output layer. The  
 579 ReLU function is given as.

580 given as

$$581 \quad \text{ReLU}(x) = x, \text{ if } x > 0 \text{ else } 0 \quad (12)$$

582 The sigmoid function maps inputs to a range between 0 and 1 as represented in Eq. 5. Similar  
 583 to logistic regression, the classification ANN model represents the probability of high outages,  
 584 with values above 0.5 indicating a high-outage day. The regression model predicts the fraction of  
 585 customers without power in counties classified as high-outage regions.

586 The weights of neural networks are learned by minimizing a loss function. For classification,  
 587 we used binary cross-entropy loss ( $L_c$ ) in Eq. 6a. For the regression model, we use the Huber loss  
 588 ( $L_h$ ) (Gokcesu and Gokcesu 2021), given as,

$$589 \quad L_h = \frac{1}{N} \sum \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}(y_{r,i} - S_r(x_i))^2, & \text{for } |y_{r,i} - S_r(x_i)| \leq \delta, \\ \delta \cdot (|y_{r,i} - S_r(x_i)| - \frac{1}{2}\delta), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

590 where  $y_{r,i}$  is the true fraction of customers without power, and  $S_r(x_i)$  is the predicted fraction  
 591 of customers without power. The Huber loss function combines mean squared error (MSE) for  
 592 small errors and mean absolute error (MAE) for large errors, making it robust to outliers. We chose  
 593  $\delta = 0.05$  to handle the significant deviations from extreme outages.

594 There are multiple architectures possible for both classification and regression ANNs. We  
 595 performed cross-validation to select the best architecture for our developed classification and  
 596 regression models. Please see the details in the supplementary. The classification and regression  
 597 models we developed include an input layer, one hidden layer with six neurons, and one output  
 598 node, as this architecture resulted in minimum cross-validation error.

599 **Model Performance Metrics**

600 **Confusion Matrix:** A confusion matrix compares the model predictions with the actual ob-  
 601 served values (Table 3). The diagonal elements of the confusion matrix represent correct clas-  
 602 sifications, while the off-diagonal elements represent misclassifications. In this study, we define  
 603 low-outage events as "Negative" and high-outage events as "Positive". Accordingly, "True Positives"  
 604 refer to events that are actually high outages and are correctly classified as high outages. "False  
 605 Positives" refer to events that are actually low outages but are incorrectly classified as high outages.  
 606 Similarly, "True Negatives" and "False Negatives" refer to correct and incorrect classifications of  
 607 low-outage events, respectively.

	<b>Predicted: Low Outage</b>	<b>Predicted: High Outage</b>
<b>Actual: Low Outage</b>	True Negative (TN)	False Positive (FP)
<b>Actual: High Outage</b>	False Negative (FN)	True Positive (TP)

**TABLE 3.** Confusion matrix for binary outage classification

608 **Accuracy:** The ratio of the total number of correct classifications (both positive and negative)  
 609 to the total number of events in the dataset. Accuracy is computed as given below.

$$610 \text{ Accuracy} = \frac{\text{TP} + \text{TN}}{\text{TP} + \text{TN} + \text{FP} + \text{FN}} \tag{14}$$

611 **Recall:** The ratio of correct classifications for a given class to the total number of events in  
 612 that class. Below, we report the recall for positive (high-outage) events. Similarly, recall can be  
 613 calculated for negative (low-outage) events.

$$614 \text{ Recall} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FN}} \tag{15}$$

615 **Precision:** The ratio of correct classifications for a given class to the total number of events  
 616 predicted as belonging to that class. Below, we report the precision for positive (high-outage)  
 617 events; similarly, precision can be calculated for negative (low-outage) events.

618 
$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FP}} \quad (16)$$

619 **Weighted Mean Absolute Error (WMAE):** To evaluate the performance of the complete  
 620 model, which combines classification and regression, we used WMAE to amplify the error for false  
 621 negatives, *i.e.*, cases where high outages are classified as low outages (Shashaani et al. 2018). We  
 622 can represent WMAE as

623 
$$\text{WMAE} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N w \mathbf{1}\{\text{FN}(i)\} |y(x_i) - \hat{y}(x_i)| \quad (17)$$

624 where  $\mathbf{1}\{\text{FN}(i)\}$  is one for false negative case otherwise zero,  $y(x_i)$  are the true fraction of  
 625 outages,  $\hat{y}(x_i)$  are the predicted fraction of outages,  $N$  are the total number of testing data points.,  
 626 and we use  $w = 10$  for our study based on the study from (Shashaani et al. 2018).

627 **Outage Function for Earthquakes**

628 we use our predicted outages in Myanmar to fit a lognormal function to determine the fraction  
 629 of outages as a function of Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI), presented in Figure 11c (Zentner  
 630 et al. 2017) (see Methods), which can be presented as.

631 
$$f_O = \phi \left( \frac{\ln \left( \text{MMI} / \overline{\text{MMI}} \right)}{\beta} \right) \quad (18)$$

632 where  $f_O$  is the fraction of customers without power,  $MMI$  is the observed intensity in a region,  
 633  $\overline{\text{MMI}}$  is the median of fragility curve (*i.e.*,  $f_O(\overline{\text{MMI}}) = 0.5$ ), and  $\beta$  is the dispersion parameter.

634 **CONTRIBUTIONS**

635 P.A., L.C., and G.D. conceptualized the framework for power outage detection using nightlight  
 636 imagery. P.A. curated the outage and satellite data and trained the power outage models with  
 637 suggestions from L.C. and G.D.. P.A. drafted the manuscript with inputs and edits from L.C. and  
 638 G.D.

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## 643 DATA AVAILABILITY

644 Code and Data used to train and validate the models have been deposited to NSF’s DesignSafe  
645 Repository (Arora and Ceferino 2025), available at link <https://doi.org/10.17603/ds2-a8cv-yc65>

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
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## EXTENDED DATA



**Extended Figure 1.** Confusion matrix representing the outage categories across 76 municipalities for predictions on 09/25/2022 after Hurricane Fiona (2022) caused power outages across Puerto Rico.