

Evaluating Hybrid Electric Turboprop Development with Novel Metrics: Failure Impact and Uncertainty Impact

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This paper introduces two new metrics, Failure Impact (FI) and Uncertainty Impact (UI), to address the limitations of traditional evaluation methods like Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Integration Readiness Level (IRL) in the development of hybrid-electric turboprop aircraft. These metrics, scored on a 1-9 scale, quantify the severity of component failures and the impact of uncertainties. The study applies these metrics to a 50-passenger hybrid-electric turboprop, focusing on four critical components: battery, motor, inverter, and thermal management system (TMS).

Using a Multi-Attribute Decision-Making (MADM) framework, the paper evaluates these components under four strategic scenarios: Balanced, Safety-First, Maturity-Focused, and Uncertainty-Reduction. The results from various MADM methods, including MAUT, AHP, BWM, and TOPSIS, consistently identify the battery as the highest priority for testing and resource allocation due to its high FI and UI scores. The TMS consistently ranks as the second priority. The rankings of the motor and inverter vary depending on the strategic focus, particularly under the Uncertainty-Reduction scenario. A non-compensatory method, ELECTRE III, provided a contrasting ranking by placing the battery last due to its extreme risk scores triggering vetoes. The study concludes that the Best-Worst Method (BWM) is particularly well-suited for aerospace applications due to its simplicity and consistency.

I. Introduction

THE aviation industry faces mounting pressure to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, driving innovation in sustainable propulsion systems [1]. Hybrid electric turboprops, designed for 30–100 passengers, offer a promising solution for regional flights (250-500 km), combining electric motors with conventional engines to reduce fuel consumption while maintaining reliability [2, 3]. However, developing these systems introduces significant challenges: immature technologies, complex integration, and stringent safety and certification requirements [4]. Established metrics like Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Integration Readiness Level (IRL) assess technological and integration maturity but fail to capture the severity of component failures or uncertainties in performance and scalability [5, 6].

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30 This paper proposes two novel metrics - Failure Impact (FI) and Uncertainty Impact (UI) - scored on a 1-9 scale, to
31 quantify failure consequences and development uncertainties for critical components. We then apply these metrics to a
32 hybrid-electric turboprop aircraft use case. However, these metrics offer a versatile framework for decision-makers across
33 industries, such as electric vehicles and renewable energy, enabling risk-informed design and certification. By evaluating
34 components through four decision-making scenarios (Balanced, Safety-First, Maturity-Focused, Uncertainty-Reduction),
35 this study demonstrates FI and UI's utility in prioritizing research, ensuring safety, and advancing sustainable aviation
36 systems.

37 **II. Background and Motivation**

38 Hybrid electric turboprops are gaining traction as a practical step toward sustainable regional aviation, leveraging
39 electric propulsion for efficiency and turboprops for redundancy [7]. However, components like batteries, electric motors,
40 inverters, and thermal management systems introduce unique risks and uncertainties. For instance, battery failures pose
41 safety hazards (e.g., thermal runaway), while the unproven scalability of thermal systems limits certification confidence
42 [4, 8]. Existing metrics fall short in addressing these challenges. TRL and IRL, defined by NASA and Sauser et al.,
43 assess maturity but overlook failure severity and uncertainty [5, 6]. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Failure
44 Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) focus on failure likelihood or operational risks, not component-specific impact or
45 development uncertainties [9]. Uncertainty quantification in environmental models addresses output variability, not
46 technology development [10]. This gap necessitates new metrics. Beyond aviation, FI and UI can guide decision-makers
47 in fields like electric vehicles (e.g., assessing battery fire risks) or renewable energy (e.g., evaluating solar panel
48 scalability). By applying FI and UI to a hybrid turboprop, this paper provides a framework to prioritize safety-critical
49 components, reduce uncertainties, and inform certification, offering a systems-level approach for sustainable technology
50 development.

51 **III. Methodology**

52 This study introduces two novel metrics, Failure Impact (FI) and Uncertainty Impact (UI), to evaluate critical
53 components for any complex project, alongside Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Integration Readiness Level
54 (IRL). Scored on a 1-9 scale, FI quantifies the severity of component failures on safety, mission success, and system
55 redundancy, while UI measures the impact of component uncertainties on system-level outcomes. Unlike TRL and IRL,
56 which assess maturity [5, 6], or probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) and failure mode analyses (FMEA), which focus
57 on likelihood [9], FI and UI address consequence severity and uncertainty impact, critical for aviation certification, and
58 cross-industry applications. This section defines FI and UI, explains their calculation, and outlines their application to a
59 50-passenger hybrid turboprop use case, evaluated through four decision-making scenarios.

60 **A. Failure Impact (FI)**

61 FI measures the severity of a component’s failure on safety, mission success, and system redundancy, scored from 1
62 (negligible) to 9 (catastrophic), calculated as:

$$FI = (0.5 \times \text{Safety}) + (0.3 \times \text{Mission Impact}) + (0.2 \times \text{Redundancy Impact}) \quad (1)$$

63 Weights reflect aviation priorities: safety (0.5) is paramount due to zero-tolerance for catastrophic failures, [4, 9];
64 mission impact (0.3) addresses operational reliability; and redundancy impact (0.2) accounts for built-in backups
65 for redundancies (e.g., turboprop mitigating electric failures). Aviation safety analyses consistently highlight the
66 disproportionate consequences of safety-related failures [9], justifying the 0.5 weight for a factor that can lead to
67 catastrophic outcomes like thermal runaway. Mission impact (0.3) and redundancy impact (0.2) account for operational
68 reliability and the effectiveness of built-in backups, which are significant but secondary to catastrophic safety events[8].
69 Alternative weighting schemes, such as equal weights, were considered, but they did not align with aviation’s safety-first
70 ethos. The formula normalizes the final score to a 1–9 via rounding, ensuring compatibility with the TRL scale [5].
71 By integrating failure severity with maturity, FI provides a holistic risk assessment that enables decision-makers to
72 prioritize mitigation efforts as technologies progress. Sub-variables are scored using literature review, industry reports,
73 or expert input, with definitions in Table 1.

74 **B. Uncertainty Impact (UI)**

75 UI quantifies a component’s uncertainty contribution to system-level outcomes, scored from 1 (negligible) to 9
76 (dominant). Unlike traditional uncertainty quantification, which often focuses on environmental variability [11], UI
77 targets the impact of component-level uncertainty, a critical factor for certifying emerging technologies. UI is derived
78 from the total-order Sobol indices through sensitivity analysis [12]. These indices measure the fraction of variance in
79 system outcomes attributable to each component’s input uncertainty, including all interaction effects. This approach
80 offers a systems-level perspective on risk that is distinct from maturity-focused metrics like TRL [5] or probability-based
81 methods like PRA [9].

82 The process involves four steps: (1) modeling system outcomes, (2) defining uncertainty distributions for component
83 inputs, (3) computing total-order Sobol indices via Monte Carlo simulations, and (4) mapping the resulting indices to a
84 1-9 scale. The thresholds for this mapping are justified by sensitivity analysis literature [13–15], which suggests that total
85 Sobol index greater than 0.3 indicates a dominant uncertainty contributor, while an index below 0.15 reflects minimal
86 impact. These thresholds were calibrated to meet aviation’s need for precise uncertainty quantification, ensuring UI
87 prioritizes components with the greatest system-level risk.

88 The 1–9 UI scale is defined in Table 2.

Table 1 Definition of FI Sub-Variables (1–9 Scale)

Score	Safety	Mission Impact	Redundancy Impact
1	No safety impact	No mission impact	Redundancy fully mitigates failure impact
2	Negligible safety impact (minor discomfort)	Negligible mission impact (<5% performance degradation)	Redundancy mostly mitigates failure impact (negligible residual impact)
3	Minor safety impact (slight injury)	Minor mission impact (5-10% degradation)	Redundancy partially mitigates failure impact (minor residual impact)
4	Moderate safety impact (injury requiring medical attention)	Moderate mission impact (10-20% degradation)	Redundancy moderately mitigates failure impact (moderate residual impact)
5	Significant safety impact (serious injury)	Significant mission impact (20-50% degradation)	Redundancy slightly mitigates failure impact (significant residual impact)
6	Major safety impact (severe injury)	Major mission impact (>50% degradation)	Redundancy minimally mitigates failure impact (major residual impact)
7	Severe safety impact (life-threatening injury)	Severe mission impact (mission compromised)	Redundancy barely mitigates failure impact (severe residual impact)
8	Critical safety impact (multiple life-threatening injuries)	Critical mission impact (mission failure with partial objectives met)	Redundancy does not mitigate failure impact (critical impact)
9	Catastrophic safety impact (fatalities)	Catastrophic mission impact (total mission failure)	No redundancy, failure impact is unmitigated (catastrophic/single point failure)

Table 2 Definition of UI Levels (1–9 Scale) Based on Sobol Indices (S_{Ti})

Score	Uncertainty Impact Description
1	Negligible impact ($S_{Ti} < 0.05$): Component uncertainty has minimal effect on outcomes (e.g., motor efficiency on range)
2	Very low impact ($0.05 \leq S_{Ti} < 0.10$): Slight contribution to outcome variance
3	Low impact ($0.10 \leq S_{Ti} < 0.15$): Minor influence, manageable uncertainty (e.g., inverter on efficiency)
4	Low-moderate impact ($0.15 \leq S_{Ti} < 0.20$): Noticeable but not critical contribution
5	Moderate impact ($0.20 \leq S_{Ti} < 0.25$): Significant uncertainty requiring attention
6	Moderate-high impact ($0.25 \leq S_{Ti} < 0.30$): Notable influence on system outcomes (e.g., thermal system on safety)
7	High impact ($0.30 \leq S_{Ti} < 0.35$): Substantial uncertainty affecting performance
8	Very high impact ($0.35 \leq S_{Ti} < 0.40$): Major contributor to system uncertainty
9	Dominant impact ($S_{Ti} \geq 0.40$): Critical uncertainty driving outcome variability (e.g., battery on range)

89 C. Application Use-Case

90 The application use-case evaluates the proposed Failure Impact (FI) and Uncertainty Impact (UI) metrics within a
91 broader decision-making framework designed to help decision-makers allocate resources in the development of a 50 pax
92 hybrid electric turboprop aircraft. The use-case prioritizes testing and development of critical components—battery,

93 electric motor, inverter, and thermal management system (TMS). Hybrid-electric turboprops couple these components
 94 to a conventional gas-turbine core. Because resources often preclude simultaneous testing of all four subsystems to
 95 flight-test maturity, the resource allocation problem can be framed as a multi-attribute decision-making (MADM)
 96 problem whose alternatives are the four components and whose attributes capture the four dominant risk dimensions
 97 identified. The question to answer here becomes: "Which component should receive the next tranche of resources, given
 98 multiple risk dimensions that matter to regulators, engineers, and program managers?" The attributes are summarized in
 99 the table 3.

Attribute	Description	Desired Direction
Failure Impact (FI)	Severity of the consequences if the component were to fail during operation	Higher → Higher Priority
Uncertainty Impact (UI)	Severity of potential consequences arising from uncertainties associated with the component's performance	Higher → Higher Priority
Technology Readiness Level (TRL)	Maturity level of the component technology	Lower → Higher Priority
Integration Readiness Level (IRL)	Readiness of the component for integration with other elements of the subsystem	Lower → Higher Priority

Table 3 Attributes identified for the MADM problem

100 Table 4 compiles FI, UI, TRL, and IRL scores for the components from the most recent literature review.

101 The battery subsystem received an FI of 9 (on the 1–9 impact scale), reflecting its potential for catastrophic failure.
 102 This is derived from the Equation 1 wherein the scores for safety, mission impact, and redundancy impact were all 9 for
 103 the battery. An internal cell fault or thermal runaway can lead to fire or explosion, jeopardizing the entire aircraft. If
 104 battery fails, then that is considered to be total mission failure, and there is no redundancy as this is a single-point failure.
 105 FAA tests have shown that an overheating lithium-ion battery can trigger a chain reaction in which adjacent cells ignite
 106 in succession. Such propagation is extremely difficult to extinguish in flight [16, 17]. This highest failure impact rating
 107 is warranted given historical incidents (e.g. cargo and 787 battery fires [18]) and the need for rigorous containment to
 108 prevent a single-cell failure from escalating into a loss-of-aircraft event. The battery's UI was also rated high due to
 109 significant uncertainty in its novel aviation application. Despite extensive ground testing, there remain unknowns in how
 110 a high-energy-density battery will behave across all flight conditions (vibration, altitude, thermal cycling) [19]. The
 111 X-57 program evidenced this uncertainty: an early battery pack test in 2016 resulted in an unexpected thermal runaway,
 112 prompting a complete module redesign for safety [20]. Such lessons learned underline the unpredictability and risk
 113 margins associated with advanced batteries, justifying a high uncertainty impact score. In terms of maturity, the battery
 114 technology itself is fairly mature as lithium-ion systems have been proven in aerospace use (NASA classifies battery tech
 115 at roughly TRL 9 for space applications) [21]. However, the TRL assigned was 4 to reflect the state of the integrated
 116 aircraft battery pack, as well as the high specific energy required to fulfill future flights. No crewed electric aircraft has

117 flown with a battery of this scale; X-57’s development had to advance the battery (of a lower specific energy) from a lab
 118 prototype to a flight-ready subsystem (achieving on the order of TRL 5–6) through iterative testing [20]. By the time of
 119 this study, the battery pack had demonstrated full functionality and safety in a relevant ground test environment, but not
 120 yet in an actual flight. The advancements in specific energy also remain uncertain. The battery’s IRL was judged to be 4
 121 as well, acknowledging the integration challenges remaining. Safely installing a large Li-ion pack into an airframe
 122 requires managing thermal loads, electrical integration, and containment for fault conditions. The extensive redesign
 123 and validation of X-57’s battery modules, which included propagation tests to ensure a single-cell failure could be
 124 isolated [20], illustrate that significant integration effort was needed before the battery could be deemed flightworthy.

Component	FI	UI	TRL	IRL	Principal Evidence
Battery	9	9	4	4	FAA SAFO 10017 & TC-13-53 thermal-runaway fire data[16, 17]; NASA Small Spacecraft Tech SOA 2024 lists MW-class packs at TRL 4 [22]
Electric Motor	8	1	6	6	NEAT 350 kW motor HIL ground test met TRL 6/IRL 6 criteria [23, 24]
Power Converter/Inverter	7	3	8	8	X-57 Maxwell traction-power system flight-qualified (Mod II), achieving TRL 8 & IRL 8 [25]
Thermal Management System (TMS)	8	1	5	4	Clean-Aviation TheMa4HERA aims at TRL 5 by 2025; project notes cascading safety effects of TMS failure [26]

Table 4 Components with their assigned attribute values and sources

125 For the electric motor, the safety score is 8 as it is critical, but not always fatal. The mission impact is 8 as there is
 126 a scope for partial recovery even though a motor failure in flight would result in immediate loss of thrust. Similarly,
 127 the redundancy impact is 8, as there is some redundancy, but it is still a major issue. From these scores, the FI was
 128 calculated from the Equation 1 to be 8, slightly lower than the battery but still very high. In a twin-motor configuration,
 129 losing one unit can critically impair climb performance and controllability, so each motor is treated as a flight-critical
 130 component. The FI rating reflects this safety impact, albeit recognizing that a motor failure alone is somewhat less dire
 131 than a battery fire. The UI for the motors was assessed at 1, because electric motors themselves are a well-understood
 132 technology with extensive ground heritage (brushless AC motors have decades of development [27]). We assign the
 133 motors a TRL of 6 on the NASA scale. Electric propulsion motors had been demonstrated in relevant environments
 134 through dynamometer tests and were nearly flight-ready by the end of X-57’s Mod II development. The X-57 team
 135 initially sought to use off-the-shelf motors with high TRL to reduce risk [28], and the cruise motors ultimately underwent
 136 extensive qualification testing (spin tests, vibration, thermal) to ensure they met aircraft requirements. By 2023, the X-57
 137 motors had run at full power in ground trials, which corresponds to a prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment
 138 (TRL 6). Full flight demonstration (TRL 7+) had not yet occurred, keeping the rating at the system/subsystem prototype

139 level. The IRL for the motor was rated similarly at 6. This accounts for the effort needed to integrate the motors with
140 propellers, mountings, power electronics, and the airframe. The motor and inverter had to function as a tightly coupled
141 unit, and issues like torque oscillations or electrical harmonics needed to be tuned out during system integration testing
142 [29]. X-57's reports indicate that even with high-TRL components, significant challenges arose in integrating lower-TRL
143 hardware into the aircraft [28], underscoring that integration maturity lagged behind component maturity. Successful
144 dynamometer tests of the complete motor–inverter assembly and its control software [29] demonstrated progress in
145 integration; furthermore, dedicated efforts were made to address control stability in the system [30]. These achievements
146 justify an IRL in the mid-range (the motors were proven in a combined hardware-in-loop environment). Still, until the
147 motors operate reliably as part of the full aircraft in flight, their integration readiness cannot be considered to be fully
148 mature.

149 For the inverter, safety is scored at 7, recognizing that high-voltage inverter faults can cause localized heating, arc
150 faults, or ejection of material, posing physical risk to nearby systems. However, these events are less likely to escalate
151 into full-system failures if containment measures are in place. Mission impact is also rated at 7 as a failed inverter will
152 disable the associated motor, resulting in a major loss of thrust and likely mission compromise. Redundancy impact is
153 rated 7, as inverter failure in a distributed electric propulsion setup may be partially mitigated by other functioning
154 inverters or propulsion nodes, but system-level consequences remain significant. Applying the weights to the Equation 1,
155 produces a final score of 7, indicating a high but somewhat bounded level of failure severity. An inverter failure would
156 automatically render the corresponding motor inoperable. Moreover, failure modes of high-power inverters can be
157 hazardous in their own right; for example, a shorted semiconductor device can cause a direct fault on the high-voltage
158 DC bus. Testing on X-57 showed that MOSFET (Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor) failures in the
159 inverter could short circuit the DC bus, rapidly heat, and explode/eject material, if not properly contained [31]. Such an
160 event could damage surrounding systems or even ignite the battery. The UI for the inverter was evaluated to be 3 in line
161 with the definition given in Table 2. The inverter is assigned a TRL of 8. This acknowledges that the technology had
162 progressed beyond lab breadboards and was demonstrated in a relevant environment (the X-57 cruise motor controllers
163 had passed ground qualification tests by 2023). They achieved key performance goals such as 98% efficiency at full
164 power, enabling purely air-cooled operation [32], and survived rigorous thermal/vibration trials. Finally, the inverter's
165 IRL was also given to be 8. By the end of ground testing, the inverters had been successfully integrated with the
166 motors and batteries on the X-57 test article, including operation of the complete electric propulsion system. Achieving
167 this required overcoming integration hurdles such as ensuring electromagnetic compatibility and coordinating control
168 algorithms with the rest of the aircraft's systems [30]. The inverter was demonstrably working as part of the integrated
169 ground-test system, warranting a high IRL.

170 The Thermal Management System (TMS) was derived to have an FI of 8. It earns a safety score of 8, since
171 inadequate thermal control can lead to overheating in batteries, inverters, or motors, any of which may then fail in a

172 dangerous mode. While the TMS itself might not be explosive or flammable, its failure can indirectly cause catastrophic
173 outcomes by disabling critical subsystems. The mission impact is rated at 7, as a degraded or failed TMS can lead
174 to derating of power systems, overheating shutdowns, or emergency procedures, effectively compromising the flight.
175 Redundancy impact is scored at 7, reflecting that while some passive thermal buffering or airflow can provide limited
176 backup, the TMS typically operates as a single integrated loop with little modular redundancy. Using the Equation 1,
177 $FI = 0.5 \times 8 + 0.3 \times 7 + 0.2 \times 7 = 7.5$, which rounds to 8, the TMS is identified as a component with significant failure
178 consequences, especially through its cascading effects on other systems. While a thermal system failure might not be as
179 immediately dramatic as, say, a battery fire, it has broad and potentially dire implications. Inadequate cooling will lead
180 to overheating of the battery, inverters, and motors; over time, this can trigger performance degradation or cascading
181 failures (for instance, overheated cells can go into thermal runaway, or electronics can fail and short). Thus, the TMS
182 plays a direct role in preventing other high-impact failures. X-57 documentation notes that the inverter enclosure
183 and design had to account for worst-case MOSFET failures and ensure the TMS could “reject the required heat” to
184 prevent catastrophic outcomes [31]. A loss of cooling capacity, especially in an electric aircraft where heat loads are
185 high, could precipitate exactly the kind of battery thermal event we seek to avoid. Therefore, the TMS is regarded
186 as a critical safeguard and earns a high FI score. As with the others, the UI was evaluated in line with the definition
187 given in Table 2. The TMS’s technological maturity was assessed to be the lowest among the four components, at
188 TRL 5. The fundamentals of thermal management (heat exchangers, cooling loops, etc.) is known, but the specific
189 implementation for a high-power-density electric aircraft is only at a breadboard or prototype level. In X-57’s case, the
190 chosen approach relied heavily on the propulsion components’ high efficiency (minimizing waste heat) and forced-air
191 cooling for electronics [32]. This approach was validated in ground tests to the extent possible, with chamber tests
192 showing the controllers stayed within limits with airflow cooling, characteristic of TRL 5 (component/system validation
193 in relevant environment). Yet, because the TMS had not been proven in an actual flight scenario (with real aerodynamic
194 and environmental conditions), it was not credited with a higher TRL. Lastly, the TMS’s IRL was rated at 4, reflecting
195 that significant integration work was still needed to fully harmonize the thermal subsystem with the aircraft. The TMS
196 must interface with every other power component (battery modules, inverters, motors) and the airframe (e.g., coolant
197 ducts or heat sinks placed in the structure). Ensuring that all parts of the system stay within allowable temperatures
198 during joint operation is a complex integration task. NASA engineers noted that bringing all of Maxwell’s systems
199 together and making them work in concert was one of the biggest challenges of the project, and thermal management
200 is a big part of the challenge [32]. By the end of the development, the TMS had been partially integrated (cooling
201 provisions were built into the X-57’s design and tested on the ground), but a fully integrated demonstration under flight
202 conditions had not yet occurred, justifying the IRL 4 assigned. It was proven that the TMS could function in the ground
203 test environment, but its readiness to perform in an operational flight context remains to be conclusively demonstrated.
204 The subsequent text in this subsection goes into the methodology of single-attribute and multi-attribute decision-

205 making. However, before that, it is important to note that to preserve a consistent higher-score = higher-priority
206 convention, the two maturity attributes are first transformed. While attributes such as Failure Impact (FI) and Uncertainty
207 Impact (UI) inherently adhere to this directional principle (where a larger score signifies a more critical concern)
208 Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Integration Readiness Level (IRL) operate on an inverse scale, where higher
209 scores denoting greater maturity and thus less immediate concern. To reconcile this, these maturity metrics are inverted:

$$210 \quad \overline{\text{TRL}} = 9 - \text{TRL}, \quad \overline{\text{IRL}} = 9 - \text{IRL},$$

211 so that larger values represent larger maturity gaps.

212 *1. Single-attribute Decision Making*

213 Before advocating for any integrated prioritisation scheme, the study first establishes a single-attribute baseline:
214 each component is ranked four separate times, once by Failure-Impact (FI), once by Uncertainty-Impact (UI), once by
215 Technology-Readiness-Level (TRL), and once by Integration-Readiness-Level (IRL). This baseline lets readers see how
216 much the preferred test list can swing when decision-makers focus on only one risk dimension at a time. In later sections,
217 performance gains from multi-attribute methods will be expressed as improvements relative to this one-dimensional
218 benchmark.

219 For each attribute, a self-contained ranked list was generated by ordering the four components strictly according to
220 that single metric. Components are then ranked in descending order of:

- 221 • FI (highest failure impact first)
- 222 • UI (highest uncertainty impact first)
- 223 • $\overline{\text{TRL}}$ (least mature component first)
- 224 • $\overline{\text{IRL}}$ (least likely to integrate component first)

225 Ties, although unlikely with a 1–9 scale, are resolved conservatively by awarding the same rank to both components
226 and leaving subsequent ranks blank. These four deterministic league tables constitute the single-attribute baseline
227 against which multi-attribute rankings will be compared in the next section.

228 *2. Multi-Attribute Decision-Making Framework*

229 Real-world programs often need to balance multiple objectives at the same time. Therefore, a multi-attribute
230 decision making framework is tested in order to enable decision making for resource allocation towards technology
231 maturation in the context of a 50 pax hybrid electric turboprop aircraft. Doing so:

- 232 1) combines the four risk attributes into a single priority score for each component
- 233 2) allows stakeholders to express different strategic emphases through weight vectors
- 234 3) is transparent, reproducible, and statistically auditable

235 To prevent any single attribute from dominating the analysis due to its numerical range, min-max scaling was applied

Scenario	Weight ($w_{UI}, w_{TRL}, w_{IRL}, w_{FI}$)	Recipe	Usage
Balanced	(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)		Early road-mapping phases when there's an equal desire to understand all potential risks and opportunities without prejudging future challenges
Safety-First	(0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.70)		Critical stages like certification audits or public-safety reviews: emphasis on FI ensures that components with even a remote possibility of catastrophic failure are prioritized for rigorous testing
Maturity-Focused	(0.10, 0.40, 0.40, 0.10)		Periods leading up to a significant milestone, this approach pushes immature or poorly integrated components to the forefront of the test queue to mitigate schedule risks
Uncertainty-Reduction	(0.70, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10)		Reduce errors and improve predictive accuracy before committing to physical building or costly fabrication

Table 5 Table showing the four scenarios for decision making to be tested in MADM, along with some suggested use cases for each

236 to normalize each attribute column to a standardized [0,1] range. This robust transformation ensures that the "worst"
 237 score in any column becomes 1 (highest urgency) and the "best" score becomes 0 (lowest urgency), preserving rank
 238 order while giving decision-makers an unbiased picture of where each component stands.

239 Real-world programs must balance multiple objectives, and priorities can shift. Therefore, it was decided to define
 240 four distinct, easily interpretable scenarios, each represented by a unique weight vector that reflects a different strategic
 241 emphasis. Table 5 summarizes these scenarios, their attribute weights, and their intended use cases. This approach
 242 allows us to see how component rankings change when strategic priorities shift from a balanced view to one focused on
 243 safety, maturity, or uncertainty reduction.

244 To ensure our results are not an artifact of a single optimization routine, five conceptually distinct MADM algorithms
 245 were applied to each of the four weighting scenarios. This comprehensive approach provides a reliable and thoroughly
 246 validated set of recommendations. A summary of each algorithm is found in the Table 6. The detailed mathematical
 247 procedure for each of these five methods is provided in Appendix A.

248 Employing this suite of algorithms yields twenty priority lists (five methods \times four weighting scenarios).

249 IV. Results

250 The results are presented in five subsections. The first subsection establishes a single-attribute baseline—the four
 251 "league tables" obtained when each risk metric is considered in isolation. The subsequent subsections build on this
 252 baseline by applying the compensatory (MAUT, AHP, BWM, TOPSIS) and non-compensatory (ELECTRE III) methods
 253 described earlier. Unless stated otherwise, all rankings are derived from the attribute scores in Table 4 after direction
 254 harmonization and min-max scaling.

Algorithm Name	Core Principle & Calculation	Key Characteristics & Justification	Reference
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) (Additive Form)	Each component's aggregate utility U_i is calculated as a weighted sum of its normalized attribute scores: $U_i = \sum_j w_j v_{ij}$.	This approach is fully compensatory, meaning a low score in one attribute can be offset by high scores in others. Its mathematical transparency makes the decision logic easily traceable.	Keeney & Raiffa (1976) [33]
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)	Stakeholder preferences are systematically elicited through a consistency-checked pairwise comparison matrix. The principal eigenvector of this matrix yields the attribute weights, which are then used in a weighted-sum scoring model to rank alternatives.	AHP provides a structured framework for incorporating subjective judgments, ensuring internal consistency in preference elicitation.	Saaty (1980) [34]
Best-Worst Method (BWM)	Decision-makers identify the single most-important and least-important attributes. A linear programming model then derives attribute weights by minimizing the maximum relative deviations, thereby reducing the cognitive burden on decision-makers while maintaining high consistency.	BWM offers a streamlined approach to weight elicitation compared to AHP, requiring fewer comparisons and often leading to more consistent results.	Rezaei (2015) [35]
Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS)	Components are geometrically positioned in a multi-dimensional normalized attribute space. Priority is assigned based on the Euclidean distance from an "ideal point" (representing the best possible score on every attribute) and an "anti-ideal point" (representing the worst score on every attribute).	TOPSIS identifies solutions that are simultaneously close to the ideal and far from the anti-ideal solution, offering a comprehensive relative ranking.	Hwang & Yoon (1981) [36]
ELECTRE III	An outranking procedure establishes pairwise dominance relations between components using pre-defined indifference, preference, and veto thresholds. A subsequent "descending distillation" process then produces a complete ranking.	This method can effectively penalize a single unacceptable score, even if other attributes are favorable. ELECTRE III is particularly useful when dealing with uncertainty and imprecision in preferences, allowing for non-compensatory criteria where a poor performance on one attribute can disqualify an alternative.	Roy (1991) [37]

Table 6 Comparison of Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Algorithms

255 **A. Single Attribute Decision Making**

256 Table 7 presents the single-attribute rankings for the four components based on FI, UI, \overline{TRL} , and \overline{IRL} , establishing
 257 the baseline for multi-attribute analysis. These rankings are obtained when only one risk dimension is considered at a
 258 time as the decision rule.

- 259 • **Failure Impact (FI)** – Test the component whose failure would be most catastrophic.
- 260 • **Uncertainty Impact (UI)** – Test the component whose parameter uncertainty drives the largest share of output
 261 variance.
- 262 • **Technology Maturity Gap** ($\overline{TRL} \equiv 9 - TRL$) – Test the least-mature technology first.
- 263 • **Integration Maturity Gap** ($\overline{IRL} \equiv 9 - IRL$) – Test the component least ready for integration.

264 Ranks are assigned in descending order of each metric; ties receive the same ordinal number, and the following rank
 265 is skipped.

Rank	FI	UI	\overline{TRL}	\overline{IRL}
1	Battery	Battery	Battery	Battery, TMS
2	Electric Motor, TMS	Inverter	TMS	–
3	–	Electric Motor, TMS	Electric Motor	Electric Motor
4	Inverter	–	Inverter	Inverter

Table 7 Single-Attribute Rankings for Hybrid Electric Turboprop Components. Components are ranked in descending order based on Failure Impact (FI), Uncertainty Impact (UI), and transformed Technology Readiness Level ($\overline{TRL} = 9 - TRL$) and Integration Readiness Level ($\overline{IRL} = 9 - IRL$). Ties are assigned the same rank, with subsequent ranks skipped.

266 The battery subsystem tops every column, confirming that it is simultaneously the most hazardous (FI 9), the most
 267 uncertain (UI 9), and the least mature when maturity is expressed as a residual gap. The Thermal-Management System
 268 (TMS) ties for first place under the integration-gap metric but drops to second under FI and \overline{TRL} and disappears from
 269 the podium under UI, foreshadowing its weight-dependent behaviour in multi-attribute analyses. The electric motor
 270 appears ahead of the inverter when failure consequences dominate, but the inverter overtakes when uncertainty alone is
 271 judged, suggesting that the inverter’s risk profile is knowledge-driven rather than consequence-driven. Because each
 272 one-dimensional ranking emphasizes a different component for testing priority, stakeholders cannot rely on any single
 273 metric without risking blind spots, which serves as the motivation for the multi-attribute methods, whose results are
 274 presented next.

275 **B. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)**

276 MAUT aggregates the four risk attributes—*Failure Impact* (FI), *Uncertainty Impact* (UI), and the two inverted
 277 maturity gaps \overline{TRL} and \overline{IRL} —into a single utility score*.

*Each attribute vector was first direction-harmonised and min–max normalised III.C.2

278 Table 8 presents the component rankings derived from the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) algorithm across
 279 the four decision-making scenarios, based on normalized attribute scores and scenario-specific weights.

Scenario	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4
Balanced	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter
Safety-First	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter
Maturity-Focused	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter
Uncertainty-Reduction	Battery	TMS	Inverter	Electric Motor

Table 8 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) Rankings for Hybrid Electric Turboprop Components. Components are ranked based on utility scores calculated as weighted sums of normalized attribute scores (FI, UI, \overline{TRL} , \overline{IRL}) across four decision-making scenarios.

280 In all four scenarios, the battery subsystem retains first place, underscoring its simultaneous exposure to catastrophic
 281 failure, high epistemic uncertainty, and low maturity gaps. Even when Uncertainty Impact receives a 0.70 weight, the
 282 battery’s already extreme FI score keeps it atop the utility list. The TMS claims second position in every scenario,
 283 reflecting a broad middle-ground risk profile: it is less catastrophic than the battery, but more uncertain than the motor
 284 or inverter, and its integration gap ties it with the battery under the \overline{IRL} metric. This robustness signals that funding
 285 TMS tests pays dividends across a wide range of management priorities. The ordering of the two electric-power-train
 286 components (Motor vs. Inverter) flips only under the *Uncertainty-Reduction* scenario. There, the inverter’s relatively
 287 larger UI contribution outweighs its higher maturity, nudging it above the motor in overall utility. In the other three
 288 scenarios, the motor’s higher Failure Impact is decisive.

289 Although ranks provide an intuitive hierarchy, the raw MAUT scores reveal that the utility gap between Rank 1 and
 290 Rank 2 is roughly twice the gap between Rank 2 and Rank 3. Hence, the decision to test the battery first is comparatively
 291 “hard,” whereas the choice between motor and TMS is “soft”. These findings will be compared against the other MADM
 292 methods - the judgement-centric AHP and BWM, the geometry-based TOPSIS, and outranking-based ELECTRE III.

293 C. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)

294 AHP converts scenario-specific pairwise comparisons into weight vectors and utilities via the eigenvector procedure.
 295 The resulting rankings are summarized in Table 9, accompanied by the internal *Consistency Ratio* (CR) for each scenario.

296 †

297 Three of the four scenarios reproduce the MAUT order exactly. Divergence appears only in Uncertainty-Reduction,
 298 where AHP places the electric motor above the inverter. Although the Uncertainty-Reduction matrix exceeds Saaty’s
 299 0.10 guideline (0.195), sensitivity tests show the battery remains first by a large margin even if the most extreme 7:1
 300 judgements are relaxed to 5:1. The principal effect of the inconsistency is the motor–inverter swap at the tail of the

†Balanced, Safety-First, and Maturity-Focused matrices were perfectly consistent (CR = 0) because their pairwise judgements formed exact multiplicative chains. The Uncertainty-Reduction matrix shows CR = 0.195 owing to the strong 7:1 intensities assigned to UI; it was decided to retain this moderate inconsistency and document it rather than dilute the stated emphasis on uncertainty.

Scenario	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4	CR
Balanced	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter	0.000
Safety-First	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter	0.000
Maturity-Focused	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter	0.000
Uncertainty-Reduction	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter	0.195

Table 9 AHP rankings and consistency ratios.

301 ranking, compared to the MAUT rankings.

302 The next subsection applies the Best–Worst Method (BWM) to the same data set, providing a still leaner elicitation
303 variant and an independent weight-generation check.

304 D. Best–Worst Method (BWM)

305 The Best–Worst Method (BWM) uses a leaner judgment process to derive scenario-specific weight vectors, requiring
306 only five pairwise comparisons per scenario. Table 10 presents the weight vectors obtained for each scenario by solving
307 the corresponding linear programs that minimize maximum deviation from the expert-provided “best-to-others” and
308 “others-to-worst” comparisons.

Scenario	w_{FI}	w_{UI}	$w_{\overline{TRL}}$	$w_{\overline{IRL}}$
Balanced	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Safety-First	0.70	0.10	0.10	0.10
Maturity-Focused	0.10	0.10	0.40	0.40
Uncertainty-Reduction	0.10	0.70	0.10	0.10

Table 10 Attribute weights derived from BWM across the four decision-making scenarios. All vectors sum to 1.00.

309 These weight vectors match the MAUT scenario recipes exactly because the pairwise judgments were chosen to
310 reproduce those proportions. All four BWM linear programs returned a minimum deviation value $\xi^* = 0$, yielding a
311 BWM consistency ratio of $CR_{BWM} = 0.000$ in every case.

312 Table 11 shows the component rankings obtained when these weights are applied to the same min-max normalized
313 attribute matrix used for MAUT and AHP.

Scenario	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4
Balanced	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter
Safety-First	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter
Maturity-Focused	Battery	TMS	Electric Motor	Inverter
Uncertainty-Reduction	Battery	TMS	Inverter	Electric Motor

Table 11 Component rankings under the Best–Worst Method (BWM).

314 Because the BWM weights were constructed to match the MAUT scenario recipes, the component rankings reproduce

315 the MAUT results exactly. This validates the judgment inputs and highlights that the MAUT and BWM frameworks are
 316 compatible in both formulation and outcome.

317 The BWM linear model guarantees the lowest possible inconsistency for a given set of best–worst comparisons.
 318 The fact that all four cases achieved $\xi^* = 0$ implies that the original judgements were internally coherent and needed
 319 no reconciliation. BWM’s minimal comparison burden (five values per scenario) and deterministic output make it an
 320 attractive choice when stakeholder time is limited or when rapid iteration is needed to reflect evolving programme
 321 priorities.

322 Next, we examine the results for TOPSIS, which shifts from a weighting logic to a geometric lens—ranking
 323 components based on their Euclidean proximity to the best and worst possible composite attribute vectors.

324 **E. Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS)**

325 TOPSIS evaluates alternatives by measuring their geometric distance to an ideal (worst-case) and anti-ideal
 326 (best-case) composite profile across all attributes. Each component is scored on a 0–1 scale for Failure Impact (FI),
 327 Uncertainty Impact (UI), and the inverted maturity gaps ($\overline{\text{TRL}}$, $\overline{\text{IRL}}$). For each decision scenario, these attributes are
 328 weighted, and the relative closeness of each component to the worst-case risk vector is computed:

$$C_i^* = \frac{S_i^-}{S_i^- + S_i^+}$$

329 where S_i^+ and S_i^- are the Euclidean distances from component i to the ideal and anti-ideal points, respectively. A
 330 higher C_i^* indicates greater urgency for testing.

331 Table 12 shows the resulting rankings.

Scenario	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4
Balanced	Battery	TMS	Motor	Inverter
Safety-First	Battery	TMS	Motor	Inverter
Maturity-Focused	Battery	TMS	Motor	Inverter
Uncertainty-Reduction	Battery	TMS	Inverter	Motor

Table 12 TOPSIS rankings for hybrid-electric turboprop components across four decision scenarios. Rankings are based on relative closeness C_i^* to the ideal composite risk vector.

332 In all four scenarios, the battery receives a perfect closeness score of $C^* = 1.000$, indicating that it lies precisely at
 333 the worst-case corner of the weighted attribute space. This result is geometrically expected because the battery holds the
 334 maximum score on every attribute ($\text{FI} = \text{UI} = \overline{\text{TRL}} = \overline{\text{IRL}} = 1$) before weighting. The Thermal Management System
 335 consistently ranks second, regardless of how weights are distributed. Its moderate-to-high risk profile across all four
 336 attributes ensures it remains closer to the ideal than either the motor or the inverter, but never surpasses the battery.

337 In the uncertainty reduction scenario, UI receives a 0.70 weight, magnifying the penalty for epistemic uncertainty.

338 Although the motor performs better on maturity gaps, its $UI = 0$ allows no contribution to closeness when UI dominates
 339 the composite risk space. In contrast, the inverter, despite being worse on maturity, has a nonzero UI score, bringing it
 340 geometrically closer to the ideal. This reverses the ranking seen in MAUT and AHP, where maturity was more strongly
 341 emphasized. The score gap between TMS and the motor in the Balanced case is roughly $0.540 - 0.396 = 0.144$, indicating
 342 a moderately firm preference. By contrast, the difference between motor and inverter in the Uncertainty-Reduction case
 343 is less than 0.03, underscoring how close those options are under UI-heavy weighting.

344 In summary, the TOPSIS method confirms the dominant role of the battery subsystem while revealing subtle
 345 geometric trade-offs among the remaining components, especially under asymmetric weight distributions.

346 F. Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE III)

347 ELECTRE III offers a fundamentally different approach to ranking: it is a non-compensatory, outranking-based
 348 method that incorporates real-world features such as imprecise preferences and veto thresholds. Rather than aggregating
 349 scores into a single utility value, ELECTRE compares components pairwise to determine whether one outranks another,
 350 based on thresholds of indifference q , preference p , and veto v . In this study, all attributes were assigned thresholds
 351 $q = 0.05$, $p = 0.20$, and $v = 0.40$ to reflect typical test-planning tolerances.

352 For each decision scenario, a credibility matrix was constructed, and each component's total number of strong
 353 outrankings (credibility score > 0.65 with no veto triggered) was tallied. Table 13 shows the resulting rankings based
 354 on descending outrank count.

Scenario	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4
Balanced	Inverter	Motor	TMS	Battery
Safety-First	TMS	Inverter	Motor	Battery
Maturity-Focused	TMS	Inverter	Motor	Battery
Uncertainty-Reduction	Inverter	TMS	Motor	Battery

Table 13 ELECTRE III rankings based on outranking counts. A component ranks higher if it strongly outranks more alternatives (credibility > 0.65) without violating any veto threshold.

355 In all four scenarios, the battery is vetoed by every other component, due to having the maximum possible risk score
 356 on every attribute. Its outranking count is zero across the board, which sharply contrasts with the additive methods (e.g.,
 357 MAUT, BWM, AHP, TOPSIS), where the battery consistently ranks first. The thermal-management system (TMS)
 358 outranks all others in both the Safety-First and Maturity-Focused scenarios, while the inverter does the same for the
 359 other two scenarios.

360 ELECTRE III thus highlights failure modes that other methods overlook and provides an important counterpoint to
 361 additive ranking strategies.

V. Discussions

This study introduced and applied a systematic Multi-Attribute Decision-Making (MADM) approach for prioritizing component testing in the development of a 50-passenger hybrid-electric turboprop aircraft. The results derived from the various MADM methods (MAUT, AHP, BWM, TOPSIS, and ELECTRE III) reveal critical insights regarding the prioritization of components based on different strategic decision-making scenarios: Balanced, Safety-First, Maturity-Focused, and Uncertainty-Reduction.

Across all additive methods (MAUT, AHP, BWM, and TOPSIS), the battery subsystem consistently ranked as the highest priority. This outcome is primarily attributed to the battery's uniquely severe combination of high failure impact (FI = 9), substantial uncertainty impact (UI = 9), and the lowest technology and integration readiness (TRL = 4, IRL = 4). This consistency underscores the significant risk that the battery poses to safety, mission success, and system reliability, necessitating prioritized testing regardless of strategic perspective. This consistency also indicates robustness in the MADM methods applied, particularly in scenarios where component risks span multiple dimensions.

The Thermal Management System (TMS) consistently secured the second rank across most scenarios and methods, highlighting its critical intermediate risk profile characterized by moderate-to-high failure impacts and integration challenges. The robustness of TMS's ranking across varied decision-making frameworks suggests a persistent requirement for testing to mitigate system-level risks, particularly those associated with integration complexities that could cascade into broader system performance and safety issues.

A notable divergence emerged in the ranking of the electric motor and the inverter. In the scenario focusing on uncertainty reduction, the inverter typically outranked the motor due to its relatively higher uncertainty. In contrast, scenarios that prioritize failure impacts and maturity metrics favored the electric motor. This outcome highlights the sensitivity of ranking decisions to attribute weight assignments, emphasizing the need to carefully align decision-making strategies with clearly articulated stakeholder objectives.

The non-compensatory ELECTRE III approach provided a markedly different prioritization pattern, placing the battery at the lowest rank across all scenarios due to its extreme attribute scores triggering veto thresholds. This unique outcome emphasizes the importance of using complementary decision-making methods to uncover critical vulnerabilities that compensatory models may inadvertently obscure.

Comparing the single-attribute decision-making outcomes with those from the MADM approaches further justifies the use of a multi-attribute framework. Single-attribute decisions showed significant swings in prioritization based on isolated metrics, potentially leading to oversight of critical risks in multidimensional scenarios. MADM approaches, in contrast, provide balanced and nuanced insights that reflect the complexities inherent in the maturation of aerospace technology, where multiple risk factors must simultaneously guide resource allocation.

Considering the comparative effectiveness of the various MADM methods tested, the Best–Worst Method (BWM) emerges as particularly suitable for aerospace application contexts. Its minimal cognitive burden (requiring fewer

395 comparisons), inherent consistency checks, and straightforward interpretation offer substantial advantages in high-stakes,
396 rapidly evolving project environments like hybrid-electric aviation development. Furthermore, BWM’s robustness to
397 varied scenario weightings makes it particularly valuable in adaptive resource allocation contexts.

398 **VI. Conclusion**

399 This study introduced two novel metrics, Failure Impact (FI) and Uncertainty Impact (UI), specifically designed
400 to quantify critical risks and uncertainties inherent in developing hybrid-electric propulsion systems. The practical
401 application of these metrics within a comprehensive Multi-Attribute Decision-Making (MADM) framework demonstrated
402 their utility and effectiveness for prioritizing testing and resource allocation among components such as the battery,
403 Thermal Management System (TMS), electric motor, and power converter.

404 The robust and consistent prioritization of the battery in various MADM methods and strategic scenarios emphasizes
405 the importance of integrating these new metrics into risk assessments to achieve a holistic view of the vulnerabilities
406 of the components. The consistently high ranking of the Thermal Management System further illustrates the need to
407 consider multiple attributes simultaneously, given its significant yet nuanced risk profile.

408 In addition, this study validates the use of MADM methodologies in single-attribute decision-making by revealing
409 significant oversights that can arise when only isolated metrics are considered. Among the MADM methods evaluated,
410 the Best–Worst Method (BWM) emerged as particularly advantageous due to its simplicity, interpretability, consistency,
411 and robustness across varying strategic emphases.

412 Future research should further explore the generalization of the FI and UI metrics across other aerospace and
413 engineering domains, and focus on integrating real-time data analytics into these MADM frameworks. Doing so could
414 lead to adaptive, risk-informed systems capable of dynamically allocating resources in complex and rapidly evolving
415 development environments.

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VII. Appendix: Detailed MADM Methodologies

510

511 **Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)** - Multi-attribute utility theory is used as the baseline compensatory
 512 framework to synthesize four heterogeneous risk attributes, Failure Impact (FI), Uncertainty Impact (UI), Technology
 513 Readiness Level (TRL), and Integration Readiness Level (IRL), into a single numerical priority score for each component.
 514 A compensatory model permits trade-offs among attributes: a component that is highly immature (low TRL) but
 515 presents only moderate failure consequences may still outrank a safer yet very mature component if the decision context
 516 emphasizes technological advancement.

517 The calculations were done for the four scenarios identified in Table 5. Each scenario is encoded in a weight vector
 518 $\mathbf{w}^{(\sigma)}$:

$$\mathbf{w}^{(\sigma)} = \left[w_{\text{FI}}^{(\sigma)}, w_{\text{UI}}^{(\sigma)}, w_{\text{TRL}}^{(\sigma)}, w_{\text{IRL}}^{(\sigma)} \right], \quad \sum_{j=1}^4 w_j^{(\sigma)} = 1, \quad (2)$$

519 where σ indexes the scenario. Using explicit numerical weights rather than implicit preference statements ensures
 520 that subsequent sensitivity analysis can trace ranking changes directly to stakeholder emphasis shifts.

521 For each component i and scenario σ , the scenario-specific utility is computed as

$$U_i^{(\sigma)} = \sum_{j=1}^4 w_j^{(\sigma)} \tilde{v}_{ij}. \quad (3)$$

522 where $0 \leq \tilde{v}_{ij}$ and $0 < w_j^{(\sigma)} \leq 1$, utilities are bounded in $[0,1]$. A component attains the maximal utility of 1 only if
 523 it is simultaneously the most critical on every attribute, given the scenario's priorities.

524 *Ranking:* Components are ordered by descending $U_i^{(\sigma)}$; ties are rare but, if present, indicate that the risk-priority
 525 under that scenario's weighting logic is indistinguishable.

526 *Compensatory behavior:* The linear form means that a shortfall in one attribute can be offset by excellence in
 527 another.

528 *Scenario analysis:* Comparing rankings across σ reveals how priority lists evolve when attention shifts.

529 **Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)** - The Analytic Hierarchy Process offers a second, more judgment-centred route
 530 for transforming the four risk attributes—Failure Impact, Uncertainty Impact, $\overline{\text{TRL}}$, and $\overline{\text{IRL}}$ —into a single priority
 531 score. Whereas MAUT assumes the decision-maker can state attribute weights explicitly, AHP derives those weights
 532 from a small set of intuitive pairwise comparisons, and then checks their internal consistency.

533 1) Pairwise comparison matrix construction - For four criteria, a 4 x 4 reciprocal matrix is created

$$A = [a_{ij}], a_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & i = j, \\ \text{weights from scenarios} & i \neq j, \\ 1/a_{ji} & \text{reciprocal} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

534 Each scenario defined earlier in Table 5 is translated into a coherent pairwise matrix by following the weights
535 assigned to each metric in each scenario.

536 2) Deriving the priority vector - Once A is populated, weights are obtained as the principal-eigenvector of the
537 matrix:

$$\mathbf{Aw} = \lambda_{\max} \mathbf{w}, \sum_{j=1}^4 w_j = 1. \quad (5)$$

538 Essentially, this means that each column is first normalized by its sum, then each row is averaged, and again the
539 resulting vector is renormalized to unit sum.

540 3) Consistency Ratio (CR) - Because pair-wise judgements are seldom perfectly self-consistent, AHP provides
541 an internal logic check called the Consistency Ratio. To calculate the CR, first, the largest eigenvalue of the
542 comparison matrix is computed. If every judgement was logically exact, then this would equal to the matrix
543 order n; any excess indicates contradiction. This excess is converted into the Consistency Index (CI)

$$CI = \frac{\lambda_{\max} - n}{n - 1}. \quad (6)$$

544 Next, the observed CI is compared with Saaty's Random Index (RI) - a benchmark obtained from thousands of
545 random reciprocal matrices of the same size [34]. For a 4 x 4 matrix RI(4) = 0.90. Finally the CR is calculated as

$$CR = \frac{CI}{RI(n)}. \quad (7)$$

546 CR, therefore, represents the percentage of inconsistency relative to what one would expect from an arbitrary set
547 of judgments. A widely used rule of thumb accepts CR < 0.10 as sufficiently coherent. Importantly, a CR > 0.10
548 does not invalidate the weights outright; it merely flags potential contradictions that merit extra attention.

549 **Best-Worst Method (BWM)** - The Best–Worst Method (BWM) provides a third, judgment-based route for eliciting
550 attribute weights. Introduced by Rezaei [35], BWM requires only ((2*n)-3) comparisons for n criteria instead of
551 ((n*(n-1))/2) while still producing a full weight vector. In BWM, the step that converts comparisons to weights guarantees
552 the lowest possible inconsistency given those comparisons; therefore, no post-hoc editing of ratings is needed.

553 1) To implement BWM, first, the best (most important) criterion B and the worst (least important) criterion W are
554 identified. To keep the experimental design coherent with earlier sections, each scenario is aligned with a Best

555 criterion that embodies its strategic emphasis and a Worst criterion that represents the least-emphasized risk
556 dimension. Below, for each of the four scenarios, the best and worst criterion are defined.

557 *Balanced:* B = $\overline{\text{TRL}}$ | W = UI

558 $\overline{\text{TRL}}$ serves as an appropriate Best anchor in Best-Worst Method analysis even when all weights are nominally
559 equal due to its unique combination of universality, calibration ease, and foundational importance. TRL is
560 defined on a well-established nine-level scale that most subject-matter experts can rank with high confidence,
561 and anchoring on a criterion that everyone can score crisply minimizes inconsistency in the BWM optimization
562 step, producing stable solutions even when other criteria are equally weighted. Beyond its scoring reliability,
563 technology maturity functions as a gateway criterion since it represents a prerequisite for translating any
564 prospective benefit, whether reduced uncertainty, low failure impact, or easy integration, into actual practice.
565 Therefore, using TRL as the "most desirable" pole grounds the comparison in a necessary condition for success
566 rather than favoring an outcome that sits further downstream in the development process. This approach also
567 provides significant leverage on schedule and cost considerations, as it formalizes the common trade study
568 instinct of first asking whether technology is ready enough to merit deeper scrutiny, ensuring that immature
569 options receive appropriately lower composite scores once pairwise comparisons propagate through the model.
570 UI serves as the least useful (Worst) anchor in a balanced scenario due to its high epistemic noise and redundancy
571 with other metrics. UI is inherently subjective, as the same datapoint can appear to have either low or high
572 impact depending on the underlying modeling assumptions used in the analysis. If UI were chosen as the best
573 anchor, its noisier pairwise ratios would drive the entire optimization fit and could magnify expert disagreement,
574 which is precisely what researchers want to suppress when every criterion is supposed to matter equally in the
575 decision framework. Additionally, UI exhibits significant redundancy with other metrics commonly used in
576 aerospace test-planning problems, where large portions of UI variance are already reflected indirectly through
577 TRL (since immature technology is usually more uncertain) and Failure Impact (as high-stakes systems often
578 have poorly characterized hazards). By treating UI as the Worst anchor, analysts can keep it in the model to
579 maintain comprehensiveness without allowing it to double-count risks that other criteria already capture, thereby
580 preventing distortion of the overall assessment while preserving the balanced weighting structure intended for
581 the study.

582 *Safety-First:* B = FI | W = UI

583 FI is the best criterion is self-evident as it is paramount in safety-critical contexts, as the consequences of failure
584 dominate decision-making.

585 UI is chosen as the worst anchor due to the fundamental distinction between direct and indirect risk mitigation
586 approaches in safety-critical systems. Failure Impact quantifies the consequence side of risk, representing
587 tangible harm that could occur, while uncertainty merely captures lack of knowledge about likelihood or

588 magnitude without addressing the underlying hazards themselves. In a safety-first posture, organizations mitigate
589 consequences up front through proactive measures such as designing out catastrophic failure modes and adding
590 redundancy, rather than spending equivalent resources on refining probability estimates that leave the fundamental
591 risks unchanged. This prioritization becomes even more pronounced under time-critical decision cadences,
592 where safety reviews often function as go/no-go gates operating on compressed schedules. Resolving epistemic
593 uncertainty through additional testing might delay system fielding without proportionally reducing worst-case
594 outcomes, and when deadlines loom, resources naturally flow toward hazard elimination rather than uncertainty
595 characterization. Perhaps most importantly, UI might suffer from inverse leverage in safety-critical focus, where
596 even large reductions in uncertainty rarely change the maximum credible loss for safety-critical hardware, since
597 regulations typically demand planning for worst-case scenarios regardless of their perceived probability. This
598 regulatory reality means that UI is logically the weakest anchor in a safety-first scenario assessment framework.

599 *Maturity-Focused: B = $\overline{\text{TRL}}$ | W = UI*

600 For a maturity-focused scenario, the best anchor candidates were $\overline{\text{TRL}}$ and $\overline{\text{IRL}}$. $\overline{\text{TRL}}$ is explicitly chosen over
601 $\overline{\text{IRL}}$ due to three central reasons that establish TRL's foundational primacy in system development. First, TRL
602 addresses foundational importance by assessing the maturity of the fundamental technology itself, evaluating
603 basic feasibility and demonstration of functional performance, while IRL evaluates how well that technology
604 integrates with the rest of the system, something that is inherently downstream from basic technology maturation.
605 Without sufficient technology maturation as measured by TRL, integration readiness becomes irrelevant or
606 premature, since organizations cannot meaningfully integrate a technology that isn't yet proven or stable at its
607 core functional level. Second, TRL provides leverage, particularly in the stages targeted by maturity-focused
608 scenarios approaching critical milestones such as design reviews or initial flight tests, where the risks are
609 typically tied directly to raw technology immaturity rather than integration challenges. Resolving technology
610 immaturity through TRL advancement usually removes the largest schedule roadblocks and provides more
611 immediate and measurable benefits than addressing integration maturity, since fundamental technology gaps
612 create cascading delays throughout the entire development timeline. Finally, empirical precedent from historical
613 data and real-world experience in aerospace development programs consistently demonstrates that unresolved
614 basic technology issues manifesting as low TRL cause delays more frequently and significantly than integration
615 challenges reflected in low IRL [38–40]. Technology-level issues typically require fundamental rework, prototype
616 re-design, or extensive research that results in substantial delays, while integration challenges, though significant,
617 generally arise only after basic technology hurdles have been overcome, making TRL the naturally preferred
618 priority when aiming to stabilize the critical path and ensure program success.

619 Integration path dependency becomes the dominant factor once a component reaches $\text{TRL} \geq 6$, where remaining
620 program risk shifts overwhelmingly toward interfacing details captured by IRL rather than raw uncertainty

621 about underlying physics or fundamental performance characteristics. At these advanced maturity stages, UI's
 622 marginal information value shrinks relative to IRL's practical importance. Budget trade-offs at late development
 623 stages further reinforce this prioritization, as money spent on additional uncertainty quantification yields
 624 minimal schedule relief compared with investments in integration tooling, harness design, or qualification
 625 testing that directly address the remaining barriers to system readiness. This approach finds strong support
 626 in empirical precedent from historical data gathered from hybrid-electric demonstrators such as NASA's
 627 X-57 and EPS-Alpha programs, which consistently show that once TRL climbs to higher levels, certification
 628 bottlenecks are seldom uncertainty-driven but rather emerge from interface and system-engineering challenges
 629 that require practical integration solutions [41–43]. The worst criterion position for UI, therefore, represents an
 630 evidence-based modeling choice that reflects real-world program dynamics and resource allocation priorities for
 631 a maturity-focused scenario.

632 *Uncertainty-Reduction: B = UI | W = \overline{IRL}*

633 In a scenario dedicated to uncertainty reduction, UI naturally becomes the most critical criterion as addressing
 634 uncertainty explicitly is the fundamental goal.

635 \overline{IRL} is chosen as the worst criterion due to three main reasons. IRL's effect on posterior variance is fundamentally
 636 different from other criteria because integrability problems generally manifest as deterministic re-engineering tasks
 637 once identified, such as designing new brackets or rerouting harnesses, rather than widening epistemic-uncertainty
 638 bounds on system performance to the same extent that fundamental aerodynamic or electrochemical unknowns
 639 create. This distinction means that while integration challenges require engineering effort to resolve, they don't
 640 contribute to the fundamental uncertainty about whether a system will meet its performance specifications.
 641 The decoupling from modeling fidelity further supports IRL's relegation, as the dominant tools for uncertainty
 642 propagation treat integration assumptions as deterministic boundary conditions rather than stochastic variables.
 643 Finally, resource triage considerations in uncertainty-driven campaigns demonstrate that test-design money is
 644 preferentially spent on experiments that collapse probability distributions. Integration experiments typically
 645 occur later in the development timeline, when variance bounds have already been established through more
 646 fundamental testing, making the worst criterion designation for IRL a reflection of this established funding logic
 647 and development sequencing.

Scenario	Best criterion B	Worst criterion W
Balanced	\overline{TRL}	UI
Safety-First	FI	UI
Maturity-Focused	\overline{TRL}	UI
Uncertainty-Reduction	UI	\overline{IRL}

Table 14 Summary of Best and Worst Criterion Selections

Numerical value	Verbal meaning
1	equal importance
3	moderate importance
5	strong importance
7	very strong importance
9	extreme importance

Table 15 Saaty's 1-9 scale mapped to verbal meaning

648 2) Next, two short lists of pairwise ratings on Saaty's 1-9 verbal-numerical scale are expressed. Verbal ratings
649 mapped to Saaty's 1-9 scale are given in the Table 15 below:

650 The two short lists expressed are:

- 651 • Best-to-Others vector $A_{B \rightarrow} = (a_{BFI}, a_{BUI}, a_{\overline{BTRL}}, a_{\overline{BIRL}})$, where a_{Bj} is "how many times more important
652 is B than criterion j?"
- 653 • Others-to-Worst vector $A_{\rightarrow W} = ((a_{FIW}, a_{UIW}, a_{\overline{TRLW}}, a_{\overline{IRLW}})$, where a_{jW} is "how many times more
654 important is criterion j than W?"

655 These two lists contain $((2*n)-3)$ which is 5 for $n = 4$ ratings (the entries 1 for $B \rightarrow B$ and $W \rightarrow W$ are fixed).

656 3) The next step is to derive numerical weights from the provided qualitative judgments. Once we have the two lists,
657 we need a mathematical approach to translate them into a coherent and consistent set of attribute weights. To
658 achieve this, an optimization problem is defined. The objective is straightforward: find attribute weights that
659 closely align with what experts originally opined as per Saaty's scale in the lists. The optimization problem can
660 be defined as:

minimise ξ

$$\text{subject to the constraints: } \left| \frac{w_B}{w_j} - a_{Bj} \right| \leq \xi, \quad \text{and} \quad \left| \frac{w_j}{w_W} - a_{jW} \right| \leq \xi, \quad \text{for each criterion } j. \quad (8)$$

661 Also, the sum of all the weights must equal 1, so as to easily interpret them as percentages

$$w_{FI} + w_{UI} + w_{\overline{TRL}} + w_{\overline{IRL}} = 1, \quad (9)$$

662 And each weight must be non-negative, as no criterion can have negative importance:

$$w_j \geq 0 \text{ for all criteria } j. \quad (10)$$

663 The variable ξ is the maximum absolute deviation between the weight ratios and the expert ratios.

664 4) The optimum ξ obtained from the previous step can be normalized into a Consistency Ratio (CR_{BWM}):

$$CR_{BWM} = \frac{\xi}{\xi_{max}(n)}, \quad (11)$$

665 where $\xi_{max}(n)$ is the largest deviation expected from a randomly generated judgement set of order n. Empirical
666 benchmarks suggest $CR_{BWM} \leq 0.20$ indicates acceptable reliability, a lighter threshold than AHP as BWM
667 already minimizes inconsistency at the optimization stage.

668 5) The final step is utility aggregation once the weight vector $w^{(\sigma)}$ is obtained for scenario σ . The utility model is
669 given by:

$$U_i^{(\sigma)} = \sum_{j=1}^4 w_j^{(\sigma)} \tilde{v}_{ij}. \quad (12)$$

670 **Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS)** - The Technique for Order of
671 Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) is a multi-attribute decision-making approach that ranks alternatives
672 by how closely they resemble an ideal solution, and conversely, how far they lie from a worst-case (anti-ideal) solution.
673 TOPSIS explicitly leverages geometry to evaluate each alternative in a straightforward yet robust way. TOPSIS explicitly
674 evaluates proximity both to the ideal (perfect) alternative and the anti-ideal (worst possible) alternative, making it
675 sensitive to both strengths and weaknesses of each candidate. While still using attribute weights, TOPSIS outcomes are
676 often more stable against small changes in weights, since it evaluates actual distances rather than just weighted averages.

677 The underlying logic of TOPSIS in brief is summarized before moving on to a step-by-step procedure of TOPSIS.
678 Each alternative is described by multiple attributes (FI, UI, \overline{TRL} , \overline{IRL}). An ideal solution is an imaginary alternative
679 defined by selecting the best (highest-priority) possible value of each attribute from among all considered alternatives.
680 An anti-ideal solution is similarly defined, but using the worst (lowest-priority) values. Alternatives closest to the ideal
681 and furthest from the anti-ideal are considered most preferable.

682 The step-by-step procedure of TOPSIS is given below: -

- 683 1) Construct the Decision Matrix: - We start by creating a decision matrix D with each row representing a different
684 alternative (here, the aircraft components: Battery, Motor, Inverter, Thermal Management System), and each
685 column representing an attribute (FI, UI, \overline{TRL} , \overline{IRL}). Each entry d_{ij} is the attribute score of alternative i on
686 criterion j.
- 687 2) Normalize the Decision Matrix: - Since attributes have different measurement units and scales, we first normalise
688 the decision matrix to standardise scales and ensure fair comparisons:

$$r_{ij} = \frac{d_{ij}}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^m (d_{ij})^2}}, \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, m, j = 1, \dots, n \quad (13)$$

689 This formula normalises values such that the squared sum of values in each column equals 1, making attributes

690 dimensionless and comparable.

691 3) Apply Attribute Weights: - Attribute weights are then applied to the normalized matrix. If attribute j has weight
692 w_j , then the weighted normalised value v_{ij} is calculated as:

$$v_{ij} = w_j \cdot r_{ij}, \text{ for all } i, j \quad (14)$$

693 Applying weights reflects the relative importance that decision-makers assign to each attribute.

694 4) Identify the Ideal and Anti-Ideal Solutions: - We now identify the ideal solution (A^+) and the anti-ideal solution
695 (A^-). The ideal solution (A^+) takes the best value of each attribute across all alternatives (highest value for
696 attributes indicating urgency like FI, UI, $\overline{\text{TRL}}$, $\overline{\text{IRL}}$). The anti-ideal solution (A^-) takes the worst value of each
697 attribute.

698 Formally,

$$A^+ = \{v_1^+, v_2^+, \dots, v_n^+\}, \quad v_j^+ = \max_i(v_{ij}) \quad (15)$$

$$A^- = \{v_1^-, v_2^-, \dots, v_n^-\}, \quad v_j^- = \min_i(v_{ij}) \quad (16)$$

699 5) Compute distances from Ideal and Anti-Ideal: - We calculate the Euclidean (geometric) distance of each
700 alternative from the ideal solution (A^+) and the anti-ideal solution (A^-).

701 Distance to the ideal solution:

$$S_i^+ = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^n (v_{ij} - v_j^+)^2}, \quad \text{for alternative } i \quad (17)$$

702 Distance to the anti-ideal solution:

$$S_i^- = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^n (v_{ij} - v_j^-)^2}, \quad \text{for alternative } i \quad (18)$$

703 Each component can be seen as a point in the multidimensional space defined by attributes, and these distances
704 show how close or far each component is from ideal and anti-ideal scenarios.

705 6) Calculate relative closeness to the ideal solution: - Finally, the relative closeness score (C_i^*) of each alternative to
706 the ideal solution is calculated by:

$$C_i^* = \frac{S_i^-}{S_i^+ + S_i^-}, \quad 0 \leq C_i^* \leq 1 \quad (19)$$

707 A high relative closeness (close to 1) indicates the alternative is closer to the ideal and further from the anti-ideal,

708 thus more preferable. A low value (close to 0) means the opposite.

709 The final TOPSIS score (C_i^*) communicates which alternatives offer the best combination of desirable attributes,
 710 balancing both strengths and weaknesses. Alternatives with higher relative closeness to the ideal solution naturally
 711 become higher priority for testing and development resources. Because of the explicit geometric reasoning, stakeholders
 712 can intuitively visualise why one alternative is ranked higher: it's closer to an ideal state and further from a problematic
 713 state in the attribute space.

714 **Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE) III** - ELECTRE III is the final multi-attribute decision-
 715 making method employed in this study. ELECTRE III is different from the rest in that it is non-compensatory: an
 716 extremely poor performance on any one attribute can block, or veto, an alternative, no matter how strong it is elsewhere.
 717 This property can be said to mirror some real-world certification logic, where a single show-stopper can invalidate an
 718 otherwise attractive component.

719 This method has some conceptual building blocks - indifference threshold, preference threshold, and veto threshold.
 720 Indifference threshold is a small difference on attribute j that decision makers agree is negligible. Preference threshold
 721 is a larger gap on attribute j that clearly favors one alternative. Veto threshold is an extreme gap on attribute j that can
 722 single-handedly block an alternative from outranking another. These three thresholds are defined once per attribute.

723 Now we see the step-by-step procedure for this method: -

724 1) Indifference threshold, preference threshold, and veto threshold are assigned to every attribute j.

Threshold	Symbol	Default fraction of column range*
Indifference	q_j	$q_j = 0.05$
Preference	p_j	$p_j = 0.15$
Veto	v_j	$v_j = 0.40$

Table 16 The values for the three thresholds assigned to each attribute

*With all attributes scaled 0-1, these fractions translate directly into absolute numbers (e.g., $q_j = 0.05$ means a difference within ± 0.05 we consider scores indistinguishable).

725 2) For every ordered pair of alternatives (A,B) the following indices are computed.

726 • Concordance on each attribute

$$c_{AB}^{(j)} = \begin{cases} 1, & \tilde{v}_{Aj} \geq \tilde{v}_{Bj} - q_j \\ 0, & \tilde{v}_{Aj} \leq \tilde{v}_{Bj} - p_j \\ \frac{\tilde{v}_{Aj} - \tilde{v}_{Bj} + p_j}{p_j - q_j}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (20)$$

727 This means that attribute j "votes" for component A if A is at least as bad as B within the indifference band;
 728 votes 0 if clearly better by the preference band and interpolates linearly in between.

729

- Global concordance

$$C_{AB} = \sum_{j=1}^n w_j c_{AB}^{(j)} (0 \leq C_{AB} \leq 1). \quad (21)$$

730

Higher C_{AB} means stronger overall evidence that A should be ranked ahead of B.

731

- Discordance (veto) tests for each attribute,

$$d_{AB}^{(j)} = \begin{cases} 0, & \tilde{v}_{Aj} \geq \tilde{v}_{Bj} - p_j \\ 1, & \tilde{v}_{Aj} \leq \tilde{v}_{Bj} - v_j \\ \frac{\tilde{v}_{Bj} - \tilde{v}_{Aj} - p_j}{v_j - p_j}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (22)$$

732

If any $d_{AB}^{(j)} = 1$, attribute j triggers a veto: A cannot outrank B regardless of the concordance tally.

733

- Credibility of outranking

$$\sigma_{AB} = \begin{cases} C_{AB}, & \text{no veto activated,} \\ C_{AB} \times \prod_{d_{AB}^{(j)} < C_{AB}} \left(\frac{1 - d_{AB}^{(j)}}{1 - C_{AB}} \right), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

734

The penalised concordance $\sigma_{AB}(0-1)$ is the final belief that A outranks B.

735

3) Ranking by descending distillation - After all the σ have been computed, an arrow is drawn from A to B if the σ

736

\geq chosen cut-off. Nodes with no incoming arrows at a given cut-off form the first stratum or highest priority.

737

They are removed, and the cut-off is lowered. This is continued until all components are placed into strata.