

Smart Drone Warfare: A Study of AI-Powered Loitering Munitions in Russia-Ukraine War

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Abstract

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is widely acknowledged as the world's first large-scale drone-centric war. This case study examines the technological supremacy and battlefield deployment of smart loitering munitions in the Russia-Ukraine war. Emphasizing their role as a revolutionary factor in modern battlefield dynamics, the study evaluates their use of artificial intelligence (AI) in intelligent surveillance, loitering, targeting and precision strikes against traditional armored units, military logistics and installations while considering countermeasures such as electronic warfare, deception and air defense systems. Further, multiple comparison graphs have been presented throughout the paper to visually analyze the superiority of AI-powered loitering munitions. Next, it underscores the limitations, risks, ethical and humanitarian aspects in the light of international laws. Finally, the study concludes with future implications of this decisive and sophisticated technology.

Keywords

loitering munition, kamikaze drone, smart autonomous weapons, Artificial Intelligence (AI), international humanitarian law (IHL), defense technology

1.1 Introduction

A loitering munition, also known as a kamikaze drone, suicide drone or autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is a flying robotic weapon with a warhead that is designed to manoeuvre in the air until a target is designated to detonate or crash into it. Armed with AI, kamikaze drones can identify, lock the targets and crash into crucial targets with minimal human intervention. Due to its astounding impact on the battlefield, it has vital military and strategic importance. Since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in

February 2022, drone technologies have evolved at an unprecedented rate in terms of production, precision, intelligence, deployment and scalability. Debates have sparked on the legality and the ethical use of such intelligent autonomous and semi-autonomous drones. The purpose of this study is to analyze how the application of AI in loitering munitions or kamikaze drones has shaken the Russia-Ukraine battlegrounds while raising unresolved legal and ethical challenges with an insight into future implications. The study has addressed the following questions:

1. How have AI-enabled loitering munitions transformed modern warfare?
2. What are the smart and technical aspects of a loitering munition?
3. How has the use of drones increased efficiency and precision in warfare?
4. What strategic advantages and limitations do smart military drones present compared to conventional systems?
5. What ethical challenges arise from the use of AI-enabled drones in warfare, particularly regarding civilian casualties and accountability?
6. To what extent does the use of smart suicide drones comply with international humanitarian law?
7. How do advancements in autonomous drone technologies shape the future of warfare?
8. What are its future implications?

1.2 Background

Since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Ukraine's domestic drone industry has emerged as an increasingly crucial element in the war to resist and outmaneuver the sheer Russian military strength. Although Russia has been developing drones for years, Ukraine's innovative use of drones, assisted by foreign governments, has allowed the country to counter Russia's far greater resources and strike back at targets everywhere from the Black Sea to oil refineries deep inside Russia. Both the countries have deployed AI-enabled suicide drones against each other. Drone warfare in Ukraine has undergone a chilling transformation. Modern drones shift the course, the balance and the outcome of wars. The system's artificial intelligence capabilities enable it to operate effectively despite electronic warfare countermeasures and challenging weather conditions. Although the highest number of drones have been reported to be used in Russia-Ukraine war, drones have been deployed in all the recent conflicts around the world, from Armenia-Azerbaijan to Israel-Iran to India-Pakistan.

Since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Ukraine's domestic drone industry has emerged as an increasingly crucial element in the struggle to resist and outmaneuver the Russian military that is considered as a military superpower. Ukraine's innovative use of drones has allowed the country to counter Russia's far greater resources and strike back at

targets everywhere from the Black Sea to oil refineries deep inside Russia. On the other hand, Russia has multiplied the number of drone attacks [1] against Ukraine [2]. The rapid success of loitering munitions has led both Russia [3][4] and Ukraine [5] to establish special teams for drone warfare. Furthermore, both the countries have received foreign support in acquiring and developing drones, such as Ukraine has received German AI-powered drones [6] whereas Russia has received Iranian [7] loitering munitions along with Chinese [8] technical assistance .

2. Methodology

2.1 Research Method

This review approaches a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) to synthesize existing knowledge primarily on the use cases of quantum computing globally across industries. The methodology follows established guidelines for conducting structured reviews ensuring reproducibility and comprehensiveness in the selection of sources.

2.2 Data Sources

In order to include a broad spectrum of research, multiple sources and repositories have been consulted, including:

1. Peer-reviewed journals (IEEE Spectrum)
2. Open-access repositories and encyclopedia (arXiv, Wikipedia)
3. Blog posts, case studies and papers on drone and AI advancements (Helsing, Special Warfare Journal, Army Recognition, Aerotime)
4. Government publications (The Kremlin, The Government of Ukraine)
5. International organizations and media (The UN, The NATO, The Red Cross, The Washington Post)

Search queries combined keywords such as “*ai drone warfare*,” “*ai kamikaze drone*,” “*anti drone technology*,” “*autonomous weapon accountability*” and “*drones in russia-ukraine war*.”

2.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Inclusion: Studies and news published between 2022-2026 focusing on the use of drones in Russia-Ukraine war.

Exclusion: Articles lacking official source, peer review and non-English publications.

3. Technological Features of AI-Powered Loitering Munitions

A widely-deployed, well-known and publicized smart drone used by Ukraine against Russia is HX-2. Produced by German manufacturer Helsing, it consists of state-of-the-art AI features [9][10][11] to anonymously operate, adapt, target and charge. Below are its specialized features illustrated:

3.1 AI and Autonomous capabilities

1. Target Identification: An HX-2 loitering munition uses onboard-AI to classify and identify targets while loitering.
2. Operation in Electronic Warfare (EW) Environment: It is an EW-proof drone that utilizes software-enabled autonomy, thus allowing mission continuation even when connections and links discontinue or degrade.
3. Autonomous Mission: Powered by built-in decision logic for navigation, HX-2 can autonomously or semi-autonomously search and strike up to 100 km.
4. Networked Swarm: Multiple HX-2 loitering munitions in a group (known as swarm) can share information and conduct coordinated attacks using Helsing's Altra command platform.
5. Adaptive Software Update: As tactics change in today's uncertain battlegrounds, the software updates instantly to adapt to the changing dynamics.
6. Human Involvement: A human usually remains in the loop for any lethal and critical decisions. Semi-autonomous operations are conducted by human-AI collaboration.
7. Sensor Fusion: HX-2 loitering munitions are capable of combining data captured through multiple sensors (known as sensor fusion) to generate rich views.

Russia has production-ready loitering munitions since 2020. Powered by AI, Lancet loitering munitions have been produced by ZALA, a subsidiary of Kalashnikov Group, known worldwide for producing the world's most popular rifle AK-47. Salient aspects [12][13][14] of Lancet loitering munitions are illustrated below:

3.2 AI and Autonomous Features

1. Autonomous Engagement: Lancet loitering munitions execute pre-planned loiter and search patterns. Further, these can autonomously home on selected targets during terminal dive. Although an operator supervises each mission, the weapon autonomously conducts the final guidance.
2. Sensor Fusion: It uses data from multiple source sensors, such as high definition electro-optical cameras and thermal imagers. These realtime data are used by the onboard AI models.

3. Computer Vision: AI-enabled computer vision is employed to detect and classify targets.
4. Accurate Striking: It is developed with an emphasis on precise terminal guidance and high dive speeds to ensure accurate strikes.
5. Combo Attack: To conduct inescapable and coordinated attacks, some Lancet variants pair with reconnaissance drones (such as Lancet-E pairing with Z-16-E).

3.3 Training the AI Model

A robust AI model requires a concise action plan of steps to train. The following measures are central to train an AI model for smart drone-centric warfare:

1. Setting Objectives: An AI-integrated loitering munition's mission is specified into tasks initially, such as autonomous or semi-autonomous navigation, obstacle avoidance, route planning, object recognition (for instance, tanks, soldiers, vehicles, power grid etc.), tracking, maneuvering, target locking and detonating.
2. Data Collection: Data is collected in assistance with various sensors, such as camera, radar, LiDAR etc. Synthetic data (from simulators, such as virtual grounds and forests) is extensively used to generate labeled datasets instead of initial expensive real flights.
3. Preprocessing: Data is cleaned, labeled, normalized and augmented to bridge the gap between simulation and real world battleground situations.
4. Training Approaches: Using convolutional neural networks (also known as CNNs) as part of supervised learning to train on labeled datasets for object detection, obstacle recognition and visual understanding. As intelligent drones learn optimal actions via trial and error, reward functions are applied to punish or reward for actions. It is fruitful for rapid learning, agile flight and decision-making with the help of reinforcement learning (also called RL). RL contributes to robust training.
5. Testing, Fine-Tuning & Improvement: AI models go through rigorous testing in simulated environments and then in the real world addressing multiple test case scenarios. Real world scenario-based detection, tracking and targeting maneuvering tanks, movement of soldiers, military convoys and installed air defense systems are fed into the model. The feedback is re-applied to improve the models' performance.

4. Comparative Analysis & Evaluated Performance

A comparison of features and performance highlights how competitive two intelligent loitering munitions are against each other as well as how they benchmark in comparison with conventional drones and missiles.

4.1 Comparison of Features and Performance

Table 1

Below is illustrated a comparison of technical and hardware features

[15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22] between HX-2 used by Ukraine and Lancet used by Russia:

Feature	HX-2	Lancet
Manufacturer (Origin)	Helsing (Germany)	ZALA Aero Group (Russia)
Type and Role	Loitering munition & striking	Loitering munition, reconnaissance & striking
Weight (MTOW)	~12 kg	~12 kg
Warhead & Payload	~4 kg (configurable)	~3 kg
Maximum Range	~100 km	~40-70 km
Maximum Speed	~220 km/h	~80-300 km/h
Propulsion / Airframe	Electric motor & X-wing design	Electric motor, pusher prop & X-wing layout
Navigation & Sensors	GNSS & AI-enabled autonomy, GPS-denied navigation via map matching	GNSS/INS & optical-electronic guidance (TV) sensor for terminal guidance
AI & Autonomy	Onboard AI enables autonomous target search, re-identification, navigation in EW environments, human-in-loop engagement	Onboard autonomous flight to target and recognize, autonomous operations with optical input, low anti-EW capability
Software & Systems Integration	Integrated with Altra recce-strike platform supporting swarm control by one operator	Standard mission control with real-time video link & guidance, autonomous engagement & limited swarm control
Electronic Warfare Resilience	Designed for high EW-resistance, jamming & GNSS denial	Dependent on GNSS and radio, limited autonomous targeting & EW-resistance
Operational Use Cases	Precision strikes against	Reconnaissance, direct

	long-range artillery, armor and static targets with swarm missions	strikes on armor, artillery positions and air-mining
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4.2 Capability Comparison Visualization

The following figure illustrates a visual representation of the comparative features between HX-2 and Lancet Loitering Munitions:




Fig. 1. Graph of comparative features of HX-2 and Lancet.

4.3 Feature Comparison of AI-driven Loitering Munition and Conventional Missile

In spite of the fact that conventional missiles have been primarily used in wars by militaries all over the world, smart loitering munitions have recently taken the battlegrounds by storm. Ukraine has reported to approximately hit 80% of its targets [23] in the battleground with the use of drones. The figure below illustrates a comparative insight into modern AI-powered intelligent loitering munition (such as German HX-2 or Russian Lancet) and traditional missiles (such as Russian Iskandar or American Tomahawk):




Fig. 3. Comparison graph of intelligent loitering munition and conventional missile.

4.3 Smart Loitering Munition vs. Conventional Drone

The following figure illustrates how AI-driven loitering munitions differ from conventional human-controlled drones:




Fig. 3. Comparison graph of AI-enabled loitering munition and conventional drone.

5. Discussion

Strategic Advantages & Tactical Impact Analysis

5.1 Advantages

1. **Precise Target Acquisition and Identification:** Specialized computer vision and machine learning algorithms can process multi-sensor data (Fusion) to autonomously detect, classify and quickly prioritize potential targets [24].
2. **Rapid Detonation Timeline:** By automating the search to engagement cycle, AI-powered drones can engage to attack stationary and moving targets faster than traditional manned systems [24].
3. **Reduced Cognitive Load on Operators:** As advanced AI models onboard can handle surveillance and screening, this benefit enables the operators to concentrate on complex and ethical decisions.
4. **Swarm Attack:** Group of interconnected loitering munitions coordinate to strike targets with high efficiency [25].
5. **Operation in GPS-Denied War Environment:** A vastly essential feature of the AI-enabled loitering munitions is to operate in GPS-denied or communications-jammed environments.

5.2 Limitations

1. **Unstructured Environmental Disadvantages:** Performance can deteriorate in complex urban settings, uncertain weather and against camouflaged or mock targets [26].
2. **Adversarial Vulnerability:** AI perception systems are sometimes prone to deception and cyber attacks, including sensor spoofing and data corruption, which could cause misidentification or loss of control in the battleground [26].
3. **Gap of Accountability:** Lethal engagement decision by autonomous algorithms lacks accountability. Unwanted yet AI-decided lethal decisions may prove to be catastrophic on human lives that remain legally and morally unresolved [27].
4. **Instability and Risk Escalation:** Quick attacks deep inside a country or on vital resources may trigger unintended escalation [28].
5. **Ethical and Legal Compliance:** The inability of current AI systems to reliably adhere to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principles is an alarming global concern [26].

5.3 Countermeasures

Both Russia and Ukraine have deployed anti-drone systems to counter smart loitering munitions. The countermeasures include:

1. **EW Tactics:** EW is massively implemented to jam GPS systems and datalinks to ensure signal disruption. It degrades navigation and swarm coordination. [29]

2. Anti-Drone guns and Cannons: Specialized guns such as Sky Sentinel, have been deployed to counter loitering munitions in the Russo-Ukrainian battlefields [30]
3. Air Defense Systems: Classical battle-tested air defense systems are employed to defend against smart loitering munitions [31]
4. Physical Hardening: A layer of physical protection is achieved by adding wire mesh or chain-link cages around artillery and military vehicles to disrupt the detonation mechanisms of loitering munitions or to reduce the damage [32]
5. False Target: Mock military vehicles or camouflage vehicles can deceive and mislead AI models. It results in forcing the loitering munitions to detonate or conduct suicide attempts to destroy themselves on fake and mock targets [32]
6. Interception: Agile interceptor drones have been deployed to counter intelligent loitering munitions [33]

5.4 Ethical & Legal Concerns

The massive deployment of smart loitering munitions in the Russia–Ukraine war has caused civilian deaths as well as destroyed non-military infrastructure such as residential places and power grids [34], raising concerns worldwide such as:

1. International Humanitarian Law Concerns: The Principle of Distinction under the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) requires to differentiate combatants from civilians. It further demands to distinguish between military installations and civilian assets. Autonomous mode attack of a loitering munition has the possibility of harming, killing civilians and damaging their assets. [35]
2. Risks of Civilian Casualties: Demonstrating a lack of human-level situational awareness, AI systems impede their capacity to interpret human behavior or social context. Activities such as running to flee from combat or gathering in groups in a civilian market can be drastically misinterpreted by pattern-matching algorithms as military activity, resulting in unlawful attacks on civilians. [36]
3. Autonomous Lethal Decision and Accountability Gap: International laws struggle to assign responsibility as no clear accusation or responsibility can be imposed on the manufacturers, the military commanders or the governments. [37][38].

5.5 Future Implications

1. The potential for AI-driven swarm warfare where hundreds of drones smartly coordinate attacks [39]
2. The risk of non-state actors acquiring similar technology

3. An essential global call for global treaties on autonomous weapons [40]
4. The Democratization of Precision Strike as AI and commercial tech are flattening military hierarchies [41]
5. Rising vulnerability of tanks and armoured vehicles against intelligent loitering munition strikes on the battlefields signal their uncertain future service [42][43][44]
6. Due to the sheer computational power of Quantum computers [45], these may be employed as the source of power to energize large swarms of networked loitering munitions
7. Quantum computers possess the potential to break the encryption and decrypt the encrypted command and control signals of loitering munitions [45]
8. Development of loitering munitions early detection technology covering wide area
9. Ground-based military installations and vehicles should upgrade anti-loitering munition technology to survive in the battlefields
10. Development and integration of advanced counter-loitering tactics and decentralized C2 [46]

6. Conclusion

This case study has examined intelligent loitering munitions or smart kamikaze drones from both a technical and a societal perspective in the light of Russia–Ukraine war. Driven by AI, these smart unmanned systems have unveiled the dawn of a new drone-centric era in modern warfare that blends AI capability, precision and agility. Despite being constrained by technical and ethical challenges, continuous advancement of AI-enabled loitering munitions poses an existential threat to the conventional military vehicles, air defense systems and supply lines in the battlegrounds while strengthening their position as the leading smart attacking weapon in modern wars. Additionally, employing quantum computing to power swarms of loitering munitions promises an unprecedented boost to their sophisticated capabilities in future.

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