Preprint / Version 2

Generalized Risk Dominance with Strong Inequality Aversion Solves The Prisoners’ Dilemma

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31224/7233

Keywords:

2×2 bi-matrix games, prisoners’ dilemma, inequality aversion, risk dominance

Abstract

We show that incorporating strong inequality aversion and generalized risk dominance in prisoners’ dilemma leads to a unique outcome which Pareto dominates the equilibrium action profile of the original problem.

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Author Biography

Somdeb Lahiri, (Formerly) PD Energy University (EU-G)

I retired on superannuation as Professor of Economics from PD Energy University (PDEU) on June 5, 2022.

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Posted

2026-06-01 — Updated on 2026-06-02

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Copyright (c) 2026 Somdeb Lahiri

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Version justification

Stronger version of inequality aversion assumption is required. A numerical example has been provided.